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The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse 
the relationship between money and the macro-economy in Sri 
Lanka between 1977 and 1985, in order to identify the paths 
through which monetary policy impulses are transmitted over 
this period. In doing so, - we also hope to highlight the use 
of macro-simulation as a tool for the analysis of the 
monetary transmission mechanism and to emphasise the impor- 
tance of formulating monetary policy within an explicit 
monetary control framework. This is especially important in 
Sri Lanka since monetary policy has been a key instrument 
of demand management since 1977 and historically there has 
been a noticeable absence of an explicit monetary control 
framework. 
Empirical research on the monetary transmission 
mechanism has been very limited as far as developing coun- 
tries are concerned. An exception here is the SEACEN (1981) 
study which simulates the effects of monetary shocks on a 
number of South East Asian countries, including Sri Lanka, 
using a flexible monetarist approach. Our research is based 
upon a revision of the specification of this model for Sri 
Lanka and a more comprehensive disaggregation of the mone- 
tary transmission channels. 
Our empirical model produces statistical results 
which are generally acceptable and conform to a Priori 
expectations. This model is then simulated dynamically, 
both, to validate the equations in the context of a com- 
plete model and to quantify the impact of alternative 
policy scenarios relating to the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Sri Lanka. 
We believe that our results will help to shed light 
on the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism in 
developing countries as well as provide the basis for an 
on-going analysis of monetary management in Sri Lanka. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis. 
Money's traditional role as the medium of exchange 
and store of value remains important in both developed 
(DCs) and developing countries (LDCs). However, money's 
relationship with the macro economy and its function as a 
channel for transmitting monetary impulses to other sectors 
of the economy is also essential to the analysis of its 
contribution to economic activity. This view of the rela- 
tionship between money, monetary policy and macro economic 
activity has become more central to economic policy formu- 
lation in recent years and the emphasis on this aspect has 
been further strengthened by theoretical and empirical work 
in this area. 
The main objectives of this thesis are three - fold. 
The first-is to provide an understanding-of the underlying 
relationships between money, monetary policy and the rest 
of the economy and to assess the dynamic paths through 
which money feeds into the system (the transmission mecha- 
nism- or the money supply process). In general, interest 
rates, credit availability, wealth, portfolio changes and 
the money supply are considered to be the main channels of 
the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM). Although there 
is ample research in this area in DCs it is limited in 
1 
LDCs. In this regard we consider that explicit modelling of 
money's relationship with other macro economic variables 
is essential and to support our analysis we present a 
simple econometric model of the Sri Lankan economy which 
focuses upon the monetary transmission channels (MTCs). 
A- second objective is to formulate a monetary 
control framework (MCF) which assembles theoretical con- 
cepts, and'institutional factors-relevant to LDCs, such as 
Sri Lanka and the empirical relationships from our macro 
econometric model. So far Sri Lanka does not have any form 
of MCF and we intend to, provide, some guidelines with regard 
to the formulation of a MCF. We highlight necessary condi- 
tions for an MCF within which the consequences of using 
alternative transmission channels can be assessed. The 
criteria for the selection of appropriate channels and the 
relevant policy instruments will be supported by a policy 
evaluation exercise using single and combined policy analy- 
sis. We use this to assess the implications of alternative 
policy combinations within a simulation framework. 
The third, and perhaps the most important objective 
of this thesis is to emphasise the importance for the 
monetary authorities (MAU) of working within an explicit 
analytical framework and to discuss the implications of 
macro simulation models for the construction of a MCF. We 
also wis h to outline ways in which monetary policy can be 
implemented within a more explicit MCF and the extent to 
which our model can contribute towards the formation of the 
2 
MCF. Monetary targeting is the prime focus of atte, n'tion 
here and guidelines will be presented as to how intermedi- 
ate and operating targets (OTs) can be linked As 
MAUs are confronted with the dual objectives of correcting 
major imbalances in macro economic variables and at the 
same time promoting other objectives such as economic 
growth, it is vital that basic links among the variables 
are quantitatively evaluated. This can be systematically 
done within the MCF and it is hoped that the findings of 
this thesis will contribute towards improving the process 
of monetary management in Sri Lanka. 
Having set out the objectives of the thesis we 
shall now proceed with a brief review of the relationships 
between monetary policy and macro economic activity and 
elaborate on the reasons why we believe that further re- 
search is warranted in this area. 
1.2 The Relationship Between Monetary Policy and Macro Economic Activity 
The first task is, to bring into focus money's 
interactions within the macro economy. Although it is 
generally accepted that the money stock (MS) plays an 
important part in an economy in determining such things. ' as 
the price level, output and the balance of payments (BOP), 
the interaction between monetary variables and the rest of 
the economy has not received much attention in an LDC like 
Sri Lanka. The determination of the MS is the result of a 
3 
complex interaction of the behaviour of economic agents 
rather than a process dominated solely by the MAU. These 
agents determine the monetary base that the MAU will 
supply and the commercial banks determine the volume of 
loans and other assets banks wish to acquire and the quan- 
tity of excess reserves they will hold. The public deter- 
mines how to allocate their holdings of monetary wealth 
among currency, bank deposits and other financial assets. 
The MS that emerges therefore, reflects all these decisions 
and it is these decisions which need to be further re- 
searched if the MS is to be used in policy formulation. 
Secondly, there ., are-only a few policy., oriented 
empirical models such as Aghevli., and Rodriguez (1979), 
Reichel (1979) and SEACEN (1981), which combine both, -theo- 
retical concepts and quantitative analysis which-can be 
used for academic research as well as for policy, formu- 
lation in LDCs in general. We shall explain in chapter -3 
how monetary policy formulation in Sri Lanka has been 
dictated' largely by circumstances or ad hoc decisions 
primarily due to the absence of an MCF which sets out ýthe 
interactions more clearly, and empirical research on the 
effectiveness of policy instruments., We hope therefore, 
that--our research will serve a long felt need in the -area 
of' monetary management in Sri Lanka. 
Thirdly, we wish to bring into focus the impact of 
financial innovation (FI) on monetary policy, a subject 
which has been neglected by many researchers, perhaps 
4 
because of an excessive preoccupation with the definitions 
of what the "ideal" money supply should be. FI is measured 
in terms-of new institutions, new instruments and increased 
sophistication of services. These developments appear to be 
important in the MTM in many LDCs due toýtheir fast de- 
veloping financial structures. This is-especially so in Sri 
Lanka as the impact of F1 hasýnot only enhanced the finan- 
cial intermediation in the system but has influenced the 
substitution effect (SE) among financial assets. The text 
book version-of the SE emphasised in, theoretical exposi- 
tions does-, not match Sri Lankan experience for, several 
reasons which we shall-elaborate on-below. The absence-, of a 
market related interest rate policy, the limited number of 
financial institutions and, instruments and the underde- 
veloped nature, of-the capital market appear to be some of 
the major factors. In particular, the type of SE LDCs 
experience has been strengthened to a large extent by the 
FI which in fact, has resultedýin the diversification of the 
financial structure. and financial instruments. More irnpor- 
tantly, the FI has made monetary policy more flexible thus 
accommodating innovations, promoting inventions and facili- 
tating the smooth functioning of the MTM. In this regard, 
perhaps a more important factor would be the ability of the 
MAU to influence behaviour of financial intermediaries in a 
predictable manner via changes in monetary policy. on- the 
other hand, FI also complicates the conduct of monetary 
policyý as a considerable part of the MS has been, outside 
5 
the direct control of the traditionally defined money 
supply. 
We shall now explain why a departure from the long 
held narrow view of monetary policy as influencing only the 
aggregate spending via the regulation of interest rates and 
credit availability is necessary in the analysis of the 
dynamic role of monetary policy. In doing so it is neces- 
sary to address the neglected issue of the impact of FI and 
examine its widespread implications for the MTM and the 
conduct of monetary policy. In particular we wish to empha- 
sise the underlying forces behind FI and discuss the abili- 
ty of the MAU to control a more comprehensively defined MS 
within an MCF. This was eloquently summed up by Shackle 
(1971, p. 33); "If the controlling of money is to provide a 
means of controlling the economy, money has to be something 
which passes two tests; -it must itself have or it' must 
transmit -powerful effects on the economy; and it must 
itself be susceptible to control in appropriate respects". 
We shall begin by outlining below the four main 
approaches to defining'money: the conventional approach 
(CA); 
Ithe 
monetary approach (MA); the Gurleyand Shaw ap- 
proach (GSA) and the Central Bank approach (CBA). 
The CA views money in terms of its characteristics 
as a medium of exchange, and the demand for money is essen- 
tially seen as a theory of the demand for an asset that is 
generally acceptable as a means of exchange. The MA defines 
6 
money, as a "temporary abode, of purchasing power". Tke_c. SA 
extends the definition of money from currency and demand 
deposits to just two of many in , 
the family of claims 
against financial intermediaries. Finally, the CBA views 
money in its widest context and the main focus of this 
approach is not monetary theory per se but rather monetary 
policy and is synonymous with credit availability or total 
liquidity. See, for example, Arestis and Hadjimatheou 
(1982). We regard CBA as a more practical view in the 
conduct of monetary policy in so far as it focuses on some 
of the issues which are necessary when viewing money in its 
broad context. 
It is also our intention in this research to -high- 
light some of the key links that. are vital in the construc- 
tion of monetary transmission models which have not re- 
ceived much attention in previous research. The demand for 
money is a key link in understanding the inter-relationship 
between monetary policy and economic activity. The rela- 
tionship between the nominal stock of money on the one 
hand, and prices, output and the BOP on the other, is 
crucially determined by the public's demand for money. The 
standard demand for money function includes income as the 
scale variable, one or more interest rates or the rate of 
inflation to represent the opportunity cost of holding 
money, and the function is generally expressed in real 
terms. Even if money demand estimates are stable and un- 
biased, it may not be that easy to relate them to the money 
7 
supply function because of the difficulties involved in 
predicting, in most LDCS, the demand for currency and the 
holding of excess reserves by banks. Similarly, the domi- 
nance of government borrowings and fluctuations in the BOP 
can result in erratic movements in the assets side of the 
Central Bank or in the source base (SB). In our study we 
will try to capture some of these inter-relationships in 
the demand for money functions through suitable proxies. 
A second key link is the selection of an appropri- 
ate aggregate price index which relates money to the macro 
economy. Usually, the chosen price index would be the one 
which reflects most closely the goods and services actually 
exchanged for money (all monetised transactions). There- 
fore, the price deflator used for the scale variable in the 
relevant money demand function should be the best proxy 
available for actual transactions and also be the best 
proxy for the theoretically desired price measure in the 
empirical model. This may well be in practice the GDP or 
the domestic absorption deflator. 
A third important link is the establishment of the 
behaviour of the major components of the money stock which 
reflects the behaviour of the public, the financial sector, 
other sectors of the economy and the rest of the world. It 
is at this juncture that the role of MAU in influencing the 
behaviour of key aggregates in the economy becomes impor- 
tant. The construction of, an MCF helps to identify the 
behaviour 'of each of these sectors in the money supply 
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process and their relationship with the other macro varia- 
bles operating in that process. The MS is the product of 
the monetary base (MB) and the money multiplier (mm) and 
the MB is the liability of the Central Bank. The control of 
the MS therefore, requires accurate prediction of the mm 
(through the behaviour of currency, required reserves and 
excess reserves) and also control over the MB. In this 
regard a policy analysis is necessary to understand the 
effectiveness of various policy measures that work via MB 
and mm. 
We intend to establish in our empirical work these 
key links and thus to explain money's relationship with 
the macro economy. However, it is not feasible to specify 
these links fully. In oýher words : "the behaviour of the 
money supply reflects complex interactions of the various 
sectors of the economy which can be fully analysed only as 
an integrated part of the general economic system" [khatk- 
hate et al (1974, p. 748)]. What is clear from the above is 
that the long held view of money's traditional role and its 
relationship with the macro economy have undergone several 
changes which are not easy to capture through one particu- 
lar model based on a priori theoretical assumptions. Mon- 
ey's role therefore, has to be brought into focus through 
empirical research and analysed in a more applied context 
so that institutional and behavioural peculiarities per- 
taining to individual countries can be taken into consid- 
eration, subject to data availability and the inevitable 
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constraints imposed by economic modelling in LDCs. 
Having discussed some of the objectives of our 
research and the need to model monetary policy within the 
context of the macro economy, including allowance for any 
links within the system, we shall now consider some of the 
more important aspects of the MTM directly relevant to the 
topic of this thesis. We highlight these issues because 
they have not received sufficient attention in the previous 
studies. 
ý- To begin with, we shall investigate how monetary 
policy could trigger the SE through which no-netary impulses 
are-, transmitted to -the rest of the economy. In recent 
years, the CBA has renewed interest in, -monetary policy and 
its relationship with economic activity. According to this 
view, monetary policy is seen as the set of policies 
through which savers and investors are put together. To 
accelerate development of an economy it is seen as essen- 
tial that the resources of surplus units be put to more 
productive uses. This requires the provision of more at- 
tractive financial assets for surplus units as a repository 
of transferable savings and monetary policy is expected to 
comply with such demands. Then, we shall discuss whether 
monetary policy in Sri Lanka has been able to create at- 
tractive financial assets and to influence the fund move- 
ments among them. This depends on the ability of the policy 
instruments to trigger the SE envisaged as responding to 
I I" 
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monetary influence. 
, During the early stages of-development when 
finan- 
cial instruments are limited, money is looked upon as the 
major repository of wealth. As money and capital markets 
become more-organised and sophisticated, a, result of the 
FI, the range of assets will be widened. Hence, the monetary 
policy has to take the "initiative" i. e. to create finan- 
cial assets other than money if savings are to be fully 
mobilised in a diversified form. In this context the most 
pertinent question is whether interest rates could be used 
as an effective instrument. The answer depends on the 
degree of SE triggered by interest rate changes. This 
requires that the rate of return on financial assets be 
more competitive compared to the rate of return of less 
productive forms of savings (eg. commodities or gold). 
There has-been no quantitative evaluation of the 
role of interest rates in Sri-Lanka, although a high inter- 
est rate policy was assigned the key role of restoring 
short term monetary and price stability. in this study we 
intend to highlight the role of interest rates and their 
impact on-the MTM of Sri Lanka. According to Chandavaker 
(1971) there are no operationally meaningful a priori 
criteria for what conititutes a realistic and appropriate 
level and structure of interest rates. Therefore, interest 
rates are best regarded as I'multivalued" instruments rather 
than as "targets". Policy in this respect is necessarily 
reduced, to a matter of judicious empiricism, keeping in 
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view- the objectives that, are sought to be incorporated in 
policy. The appropriateness of an interest rate policy 
therefore, has to be judged in relation to policy objec- 
tives. Monetary policy, therefore, has to be based on the 
delicate balancing of the multiple role of interest rates. 
I- in this thesis we also highlight-the- problems of 
policy co-ordination in the transmission process which have 
not -been dealt with adequately in empirical work on mone- 
tary management. --Empirical evidence presented by Khatkhate 
(1988) suggests that in, DCs the -co-ordination- between 
money, monetary policy and the macro economy is ýdifficult 
because of the sophisticated and- more complex nature of 
the financial system. DCs are sensitive to, both internal 
and external disturbances. Thus, when required, monetary 
policy can in principle resort, to fine tuning demand man- 
agement- in these countries. On-the other-hand, the MTM in 
LDCs is less complex, less sophisticated but is more resil- 
ient to disturbances. What is required then-is a thorough 
knowledge of the behaviour of the working of the system and 
the use of policy instruments in such a way as to achieve 
the desired objectives. Once again the role of policy 
instruments in transmitting monetary impulses becomes 
important in order to understand the degree of resilience 
of the system. An MCF would be helpful in this regard 
because it not only outlines the inter-relationships but 
also facilitates the co-ordination between key aggregates. 
Monetary targeting and effective monitoring would become 
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essential in this process. 
Following from the above, we shall also try' to 
establish in our thesis the fact that, except for institu- 
tional differences, there is no fundamental difference in 
the money demand and money supply functions between DCs and 
LDCs. These can be accommodated within the spe'cifications 
of the model. For example, the MB in LDCs is often heavily 
influenced by deficit financing by the government, which is 
often tantamount to the creation of reserve money. -This 
interaction-between monetary and fiscal policies feeds into 
the money price relationship. - Similarly, offsetting -the 
undesirable effects of money creation becomes a monetary 
responsibility and this requires a well coordinated effort 
within a proper framework. The research findings of Aghevli 
et al (1979) and Khan (1980) also support the fact that the 
money demand and the-money supply functions for LDCs are 
not basically different from those of DCs although they are 
influenced by political, institutional and economic factors 
unique to each country. 
We also wish to bring into focus in this thesis the 
changing art of monetary management and hence, the use of 
an array of monetary policy instruments. The appropriate 
way to select these instruments is to give some acceptable 
criteria in the-selection process. These criteria would 
need to be tested and established through empirical re- 
search. Althoughý single or combined instruments could 
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bring in the desired results the selection of a proper mix 
is difficult. in the 1970s interest rates and open market 
operations (OMO) were generally thought to be irrelevant 
instruments of monetary policy in Sri Lanka. - The current 
view, ' based on empirical research suggests that even allow- 
ing for extraneous considerations (capital scarcity, struc- 
tural problems and strange political events) both these can 
be useful instruments of monetary-policy. In addition, the 
choice of, instruments would depend on established operating 
2/ 
targets (OTs) that are closely linked to intermediate 
targets (ITs). -The formation of the `proper" monetary 
policyýý mix is not easy, especially when there is no' clear 
understanding''of the behavioural relationships concerning 
money'and the macro economy. Economists have tried-to! model 
these relationships through highly'aggregated econometric 
models 'which place the financial sector in a broader con- 
text. These models may treat policy variables as exogenous 
thus focusing on the endogenous variables' behavioural 
reactions to various settings of", exogenous policy varia- 
bles. Alternatively, they may include reaction functions in 
the determination of the major aggregates which endogenise 
the behaviour of policy variables. 
It -is also our intention to highlight in this 
thesis'the impact of supply promotional aspects of monetary 
policy-, another area'neglected'by research in, LDCs. This 
deals with, the critical issue'of establishing a balance 
between development finance and'stability-Supply promotion 
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, requires a continuous, 
flow of resources to the key growth 
sectors to maintain current output levels, to encourage 
potential growth sectors and to enhance the productive 
capacity of future output levels. The growth impact of 
given resources will reflect the efficiency with which they 
are utilised. Money and financial assets-in general, and 
monetary policy in particular, stand at the very centre of 
this process. In this connection, it is worthwhile to 
assess the efficacy of selective credit controls (SCCs) in 
promoting the supply side as against the, traditional weap- 
ons of monetary policy. As the motivating force behind the 
profitability of investment, money becomesýa key instrument 
for raising efficiency through competitive adjustment of 
resources in the entire economy. It is from this point of 
view that the understanding of the supply promotion role of 
monetary policy becomes more important. Empirical research 
on money and monetary policy in LDCs has created an aware- 
ness of this relationship but has paid little attention to 
it within the broader context of a MCF. 
Finally, -we shall deal.,. with another empirical 
question raised frequently. in connection with, the, effec- 
tiveness of monetary policy in small countries and,, - 
its 
capabilities,, for maintaining the delicate balance in -han- 
dling conflicting objectives. In Sri Lanka monetary policy 
was assigned the primary role in demand management -after 
1977 and support from fiscal-policy, has been, minimal in the 
stabilisation efforts. During-, this period, monetary policy 
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was assigned to achieve stability'"and growth objectives 
through-traditional as-well as discretionary measures, in 
particular, the SCCs. The effectiveness of SCCs is impor- 
tant in Sri Lanka where supply promotional monetary policy 
is- increasingly seen'to be needed in the present state of 
development. In this sense a proper feedback of the effec- 
tiveness 'of these discretionary measures is essential 
which allows for periodic review of the existing' policy 
mix. - It is in this background we intend to use variables 
which capture "availability effects "in the equations of 
our empirical model and simulate effects I on the macro 
economy. This important task would be made easier' within 
an MCF since-the, key operational parameters would be iden- 
tified'before policy measures are initiated. 
Having 
-explained 
the major objectives of this 
thesis we completethis introduction with a brief descrip- 
tion of the contents of the following chapters. The thesis 
consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the theoret- 
ical framework of the MTM. Theoretical expositions 
-by 
schools of thought such as the "Keynesians", "Monetarists" 
and the "Portfolio Balance Approach" are discussed in 
detail. Chapter 3 presents a historical perspective of 
monetary management in Sri Lanka between 1950 and 1985. 
This chapter contains details of the use of various mone- 
tary Policy instruments and brings into focus the difficul- 
ties of implementing monetary policy in the absence of 
sufficient feedback about the relationship between money 
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and the macro economy. Chapter 4 is divided into two main 
sections. The first reviews the previous literature and 
research on the MTM including that directly relevant to Sri 
Lanka. Of these, the most relevant study, which involves an 
empirical model, is reviewed in detail as we use a similar 
type of a model, in our study. The second section p resents 
the specification and estimation of our model. The valida- 
tion of the model is dealt with in chapter 5 through dynam- 
ic simulation including multiplier and sensitivity analy- 
ses. Having established the dynamic properties of the 
model, in chapter 6, we put together the knowledge gathered 
from previous chapters and attempt to identify the major 
MTCs of monetary policy in Sri Lanka during the period 
under review. The results of this chapter then form part of 
the MCF in chapter 7 where we conduct policy analysis in 
the first part and discuss implication of our model on the 
construction of a MCF in the second part. We assess the 
impact of single policy instruments as well as combined 
policy instruments under three main policy scenarios. In 
the second part of this chapter we also analyse the contri- 
bution of macro simulation models on the formulation of the 
proposed MCF and analyse how a MCF can be used for effec- 
tive monetary policy formulation. Chapter 8 then synthe- 
sises the findings of the previous chapters, discusses the 
limitations of our study, and suggests areas for further 
research. 
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FOOT NOTES 
In the context of macro economic targets, annual growth 
of money and credit aggregates * are 
conceived of as 
"intermediate targets". Authorities require some direct 
instruments which can be effectively used to achieve 
these-targets. 
2.., Operational targets (OTs) are the monetary and credit 
instruments used in the context of week-to-week and 
month-to-month to hit the annual monetary and credit 
targets. These operational targets are usually under 
the direct control of the-monetary authorities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 
The objectives of this chapter are two fold. The 
first is to outline the-theoretical views of"'Keynesians", 
"portfolio balance approaches" andý "rational expectation 
theory" in so far as they represent different views of the 
MTM. The second is to review the working of the MTM in 
LDCs-,. ' in particular', Sri Lanka'and to consider the -extent 
to which the expositions above can be useful in explaining 
MTCs. We do not however, outline the full versions of these 
theoretical models but present only those sections relevant 
to the MTH. Also, we do not wish to emphasise the effects 
of exchange rate movements in transmitting economic dis- 
turbances across countries and their impact on the-MTHs. 
2.1 Keynesian and Post Keynesian Analyses 
The analysis of the role of monetary policy in the 
Keynesian System begins with an evaluation of the quantity 
theory equation itself. According to the classical model 
the monetary sector of the economy revolves around the 
quantity theory equation: 
MV PT 
T 
with M, V -, P, T representing'the money supply, transaction 
T 
velocity of circulation, the price level and the level of 
real transactions respectively. The implication was that if 
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V and T were fixed, a change in the money supply M would 
T 
l/ 
lead to an equiproportional change in P. The Keynesian 
criticism as explained in Keynes (1936) was based on sever- 
al grounds. First, real world experiences, particularly in 
the 1930s showed that the full employment was not the 
natural equilibrium state of an economic system and T was 
not fixed. Prices (P) are not flexible downwards. Any 
monetary impulse from the left hand side of the equation V 
T 
will change T primarily and will only affect P should the 
"special case" of full employment exist. This argument 
rejects the classical proposition of" neutrality" of money 
and the proportionality of changes in money and prices. 
Secondly, Keynes argued that far from being 
constant V is likely to be highly unstable and volatile as 
T 
a result. of precautionary and speculative demand. In 
fact, money balances will be absorbed at first into 
speculative demand so that any increase in M is partly or 
wholly, nullified by a reduction in V. The instability of 
T 
V is heightened by the assumed volatility of the demand 
T 
for idle balances dependent on expectations of the future 
rate of interest. Given these two assumptions, any monetary 
impulse will be weakened by an opposite movement in V, and 
T 
if MV is on balance affectedi the impact will, in normal 
T 
circumstances, be on T and not on P. 
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Thirdly, " Keynesians" argued that the treatment of 
the money supply as exogenous is too simple. The 
unidirectional 'movement from M to PT was disputed. At, the 
other 'extreme, "Keynesians` argued that under certain 
circumstances, the money supply, is completely demand- 
determined. See Radcliffe Report (1959). -Any increase in, PT 
causes an increase in the demand for money which may- be 
automatically matched by a rise in-the money supply. The 
Keynesian position may still be characterised by the- view 
that for all practical purposes, -"money does not matter" as 
far as influencing output and inflation. This is a 
particularly*, valid argument in a fractional reserve system 
where the government is concerned with interest rate 
stability and not monetary control. See Dennis (1981). 
Keynesians reduced'. therefore, the power of monetary policy 
(non-neutral effect on the economy) and cast doubt on the 
independence of monetary control. Accordingly, the role of 
money and the'MTM, was investigatedýin, a new direction., ý 
We shall now deal with the theoretical framework of 
the Keynesians and the post Keynesians. The main theme of 
this analysis is that money influences economic activities 
through three major channels, i. e. the substitution effect 
(SE), the wealth effect (WE) and the credit rationing 
effect (CRE). The theoretical framework used in this analy- 
sis is the Keynesian income/Expenditure model which high- 
lights the fact that monetary policy operates through the 
interest rate channel. The basic assumption of Keynesian 
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analysis is the close substitutability between money and 
other financial assets, in particular, government-bonds. A 
small rise in the rate of interest on such assets, would 
cause investors to move out of money into those assets. The 
interest rate referred to in this exposition is the inter- 
est rate on government bonds or long term government secu- 
rities, and this is the representative rate on all types of 
assets. This simplicity assumes that equities, bonds and 
private debts are all perfect substitutes for one another. 
The change in the rate of interest affects investment and 
possibly consumption and therefore, aggregate demand. This 
in turn has a multiple effect on equilibrium income. 
2.2 The Structure of Keynesian'Models 
In the Keynesian model i. e. Keynes (1936, chapters 11 
and 12), which may be regarded as representative of a 
broader class of "keynesian models" the goods market 
-is 
represented by the following equations: an identity which 
defines planned total demand for domestically produced 
goods (at factor cost): an equation representing the goods 
market equilibrium which assumes that an increase in 
planned demand is met by an increase in the supply of 
domestic output: an equation for real consumer expenditure 
which is determined'by real personal disposable income 
together with an autonomous consumption eg. hire purchase 
credit: an equati-on for private gross investment: an equa- 
tion for exports which depends on the level of world trade 
and the relative price of exports: and an equation for the 
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volume of imports determined by the marginal propensity to 
import and the influence of the relative price of imports. 
2.2.1 The Substitution Effect (Interest Rate Channel) 
According to Keynes (1936) a change in the volume 
of money, (money supply) given a stable interest responsive 
demand for money function, alters the rate of interest so 
asl to equate the demand for money with the.. supply. The 
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to interest 
rates on such liquid assets, is therefore, high. The change 
in the rate of interest then influences investment 
expenditure which in turn affects equilibrium, income 
directly and indirectly through the multiplier. The 
relationship between the interest rate and the demand for 
money and expenditure and the rate of interest are assumed 
to be crucial. Variables included in the demand for money 
function in most empirical studies are: an interest rate 
and an income variable or wealth. For details see Dennis 
(1981). 
In the construction of the demand for money, func- 
tion, the strict Keynesian analysis considers only the 
substitution between money and bonds, but not between money 
and real assets or real expenditure. This is justified on 
three grounds. Firstly, Keynes noted the ambiguity of any 
definition of money supply i. e. the absence of a clear 
dividing line between money and "near money" in an advanced 
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economy and the high degree of substitutability between 
money and the other financial assets. According to Keynes 
(1936, p. 161) "we can draw the line between money and debts 
at whatever point is convenient for handling a particular 
problem". Secondly, it is cheap and convenient to shift 
between money and financial assets and finally, the exist- 
ence of a spectrum of assets ranging from money (earning no 
interest and being perfectly liquid) to long term govern- 
ment debt (earning high interest but relatively illiquid) 
facilitates movement between assets throughout the range. 
These three arguments revolve around the inability to 
distinguish '-'at least'in some of their characteristics - 
between money and a variety of liquid financial debt in- 
struments. For details see Goodhart and Crockett (1970). 
We shall now discuss the role of interest rates in 
Keynesian analysis. The rate of interest is a measure of 
the cost of capital and also an indicator of the stance of 
monetary policy. Therefore, it is the key linkage variable 
between real and financial sectors. According to the simple 
IS/LM model, the interest sensitivity of investment is 
reflected in open market operations which affects the money 
supply and in turn the interest rate on financial-assets. 
This influences investment spending and then the aggregate 
income (GDP). 
According to this, mc'ney is only a substitute for 
financial assets and the efficacy of monetary policy is 
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dependent on two factors: the extent of the change in 
interest rates (on financial assets brought about by the 
change in money) and the effect of interest rate on 
investment spending. Therefore, the relative magnitude of 
the interest elasticity of demand for money has to be 
compared with the demand for goods and services. According 
to Goodhart and Croc+-cetý(1970, p. 161) "the effect of a 
change in the money supply seems to be like a ripple 
passing along the range of financial assets, diminishing in 
amplitude and predictability as it proceeds further away 
from the initial disturbances". 
In the sections below we shall discuss the wider 
impact of the rate of interest. The impact of interest 
rates via changes in the quantity of money affect 
expenditure decisions in the real sector by causing changes 
in relative asset yields (SE) thereby influencing the 
amount of assets people wish to hold. In general, these 
effects can be thought of as the impact of monetary policy 
on investment decisions of the productive sector and 
savings decisions of the personal sector. In the case of 
investors, a. drop in yields on financial assets (including 
money) will widen the gap between yields of real and 
financial' assets. The SE works entirely through the rate 
of interest on long term government bonds. Thus, Keynesian 
theory can be interpreted as a theory of portfolio 
selection between money and bonds. Under the assumption 
that government bonds, equities and private debt are 
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perfect substitutes and that the capital market is 
competitive and well functioning, the equilibrium interest 
rate represents simultaneously the rate of return to 
lenders, the cost of funds to borrowers, the rate of return 
on investment and the opportunity cost of holding money. 
See Tobin (1961). This situation makes it profitable to 
those in the production sector to run down holdings of 
financial assets or issue new financial liabilities on 
themselves in order to obtain funds to purchase additional 
real assets. A drop in the yields on financial assets 
relative to those on real (tangible) assets should 
therefore, raise the demand for real assets. This is 
particularly so, when the range of financial assets is 
limited, ie. given the limited supply of real assets excess 
demand will ceteris paribus raise the price of real assets. 
For details see Park (1971). 
From now onwards we shall look into the SE between 
financial and real assets as envisaged in Keynesian and the 
post Keynesian expositions. If the real assets in question 
are producer goods and consumer durables, a discrepancy 
between their returns and those of financial assets will 
provide an incentive to expand production of those goods. 
On the other hand, if the real assets under consideration 
are gold, ornaments, jewelleyj, land and land improvements 
and stocks of agricultural commodities (whose supply is 
fixed or extremely price inelastic in the short run), an 
increase in the quantity of money will through similar 
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channels lead to. a steep rise in the price of these assets. 
The high prices-of real assets relative to their cost of 
production (if nominal wage rates do not change in the 
initial stages) will induce expansion-in the output of, real 
assets. Consequently, investment will be raised. Someý may 
try to avoid the price hike, of new assets,,. by, hiring exist- 
ing assets; therefore, the rise in prices of new assets 
will be tempered by the availability of the existing 
(underutilized/unutilized) assets. 
At this point it will be helpful to look at the 
direct investment effects experienced by LDCs. Changes in 
the quantity of money would also have more pronounced- and 
quicker effects on private investment expenditure in 
conditions where the, modern industrial sector is relatively 
small. In many LDCs investment opportunities are often 
greater and price inflation is more pronounced. It may 
therefore, be appropriate to conclude that desired 
investment spending would be more sensitive to changes in 
the quantity of money and hence, the role of money in 
influencing economic activity is likely to be more 
important in developing than developed countries. According 
to Keynes and the post Keynesians the impact of an expan- 
sion in the money supply is reflected through the rate of 
interest on bonds,. Extra money balances will be first spent 
on financial assets. Additional demand for bonds drives up 
bond, prices and brings down interest rates. The level of 
additional demand would depend on the size of the drop in 
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interest rates and the sensitivity of spending to a fall in 
interest rates. The MTM could, therefore, be very clear and 
the effect of-an expansion in the money supply will be 
directly felt if, all three channels are in operation. 
However, if there are several unexplainable events happen- 
ing in this process identification will be difficult. ý 
Let us now look at the impact of the SE on savings 
decisions as explained in Keynesian theory. A fall in the 
yield on financial assets will lower the volume of 
consumption goods in future periods and will influence 
savings decisions out of current incomes. Consequently, 
the drop in interest rates would result in a reduction of 
future income from current savings. on the other hand, 
those who intend to run down financial assets, would be 
encouraged to. dissave ýor borrow. Although there is a 
possibility of some saving more when the interest rate 
falls, it is not a very common occurrence. - 
We shall now deal with the three-stage keynesian 
transmission mechanism which is usually termed the "cost of 
capital channel" and examine the main transmission channels 
in the Keynesian framework. For a good review see Dennis 
(1981). 
According to this exposition, the money supply is 
assumed- to increase due to an open market purchase of 
government debt by the authorities. An increase 'in the 
money supply will lead to a reduction in the rate of 
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interest. Due to low interest rates, investment would rise 
leading to increases in income. Keynes (1936, pp. 200-201) 
stated that "monetary 'equilibrium'is" restored by this 
combination of interest rate and income changes with the 
demand forý money rising to equality with the increased 
money supply". The major conclusions that emerge from this 
analysis are -firstly, that the monetary'*expansion only 
affects -the level of income and economic activity 
indirectly. "It is by playing on the speculative motive 
that monetary management is brought to bear on the economic 
system". For details see Keynes (1936, p. 196). Secondly, 
that although feedback effects on money demand due to a 
rise in income are both complex and difficult to represent 
diagrammatically they are essential parts of the MTM. 
In this section we will highlight the transmission 
process explained by Keynesians and post Keynesians and the 
relative importance of money in DCs and LDCs. In 
particular, the SE implies that a given change in the 
quantity of money may have a longer term effect on spending 
a. nd income in LDCs than it would have in DCs with their 
sophisticated financial structures and well developed money 
and capital markets. This follows from the fact that in 
the absence of a variety of financial assets, the only 
alternative to holding money as a form of wealth would be 
real assets, which could be the case in many LDCs. When 
the financial asset structure is simple, the impact of a 
change in the quantity of money will not be diffused among 
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various money substitutes, but will be transmitted directly 
to the 'markets for real assets, and therefore money's 
influence on real expenditure would be greater in LDCs than 
DCs. For similar, reasons, it could be, argued that the time 
lag involved in the, MTM wouldýbe relatively shorter in 
LDCs -because of the limited range of financial assets and 
the shorter time period involved in the transmission of SE 
to ýthe other sectors. The broader the range, the larger 
will be the chain of transactions and-hence, the longer the 
time lag. 
In this connection, Keynesians suggested that 
fiscal policy would have stronger influence on aggregate 
demand. If as a result of a shift in an exogenous factor, 
investment falls and hence aggregate demand, fiscal 
measures would raise aggregate demand. 
-To approximate the situation in a typical LDC it 
would be useful to analyse the effects of monetary policy 
on aggregate demand and the BOP. If the private sector can 
hold financial assets in the form of deposits with the 
commercial banks and loans in the informal credit markets 
(ICMs), they can borrow from either of these two sources. 
Investing in shares issued by the public/private sector 
companies also forms a part of holding financial assets. In 
addition, the private sector holds both reproducible and 
non-reproducible real assets. On the other hand, lending 
and deposit rates of commercial banks are generally fixed 
and very often are below the rates in the ICMs. 
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We shall now examine the situation in many LDCs 
from a, more, pragmatic view, of-the MTM. Keynesian and the 
post Keynesian theories indicate'that monetary policy is 
likely to 'affect' growth mainly through its impact on 
domestic --investment. Empirical studies'done in developing 
countries indicate two of, 4, the- principal constraints on 
investment. For details-see Coats and Khatkhate A1980). 
They 'are the availability of, financial resources and the 
high cost of-capital. Even when adjusted for -risk, the 
rates of'return on'capital-investment in these countries 
are, typically higher than real interest rates on loanable 
funds, the former often kept artificially low by 
governments. In Sri Lanka, this was the case prior to 1977 
during when interest rates were'administratively controlled 
and kept at-a'very low level. 'In fact, low or negative real 
interest'rates resulted in an excess demand for capital. -' 
To summarise, the Keynesian transmission mechanism 
of money is complex and indirect. Its strength is derived 
from the size and stability of a set Gf elasticities. This 
is not, however, the complete analysis of the impact of 
monetary policy on an economy even within a Keynesian 
framework. According to Dennis (1981, p. 87) "debate in 
recent years has centered on the existence of alternative 
channels of the HTM which either augment the power of 
monetary policy if they are accepted as theoretically and 
empirically valid or do not reduce if they are rejected". 
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At the same time, the desired spending may not be responsi- 
ble for decreases in interest rates. As common in many LDCs 
including Sri Lanka (prior to 1977) interest rates are kept 
at artificially low levels and therefore, the SE may not 
have taken place. As suggested by Jorgenson (1963) a more 
systematic approach to the determination of interest rates 
should be used where the rate of interest is but one of a 
number of explanatory variables, i. e. various demand and 
expectation concepts. Therefore, there may not be a direct 
link between money and real spending. Hence, the MTM and 
its relationship with the aggregate demand is less predict- 
able and less powerful. 
2.2.2 Tha Wealth Effect (WE) 
We shall now deal with the WE brought into focus by 
the Post Keynesians and discuss the impact of changes in 
net private wealth as well as income as a factor 
influencing real flows of expenditure and through it, the 
macro economy. According to Laidler (1985) the WE arises 
when changes in the price level shift the' IS curve and 
influence the level of aggregate demand directly, rather 
than by way of their effect on interest rates. The basic 
hypothesis is that consumption depends on the real value of 
the stock of assets held in the economy as well as on 
income. The greater the stock of wealth, -the higher the 
consumption ceteris paribus. An economy's wealth stock 
consists of interest bearing private and public sector debt 
and non-interest bearing private and public sector debt. 
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The relationship between net wealth of the private sector 
and consumption ("Pigou Effect") was later developed by 
Patinkin (1974). 
Keynesians dealt with three types of WEs, i. e-. the 
Pigou Effect, the Real Balance Effect and the Keynes Wind- 
fall Effect. According to the Pigou Effect', if an economy 
were in a Keynesian type unemployment state the price level 
could be forced down due to excess supply of commodities. 
This would raise the real purchasing power of wealth and if 
wealth were an argument in the expenditure function it 
would cause consumption and income to rise. According to 
the real balance effect, a rise in the money supply would 
induce WEs which in turn will influence their spending 
plans and hence real aggregate demand even if there is no 
change in the rate of interest. As the money stock consti- 
tutes a component of the net wealth of the public, an 
increase in money would influence spending. if monetary 
policy is powerless in a liquidity trap situation while 
investment is, interest-elastic, a rise in the money supply 
would be channeled into idle balances. ýI 
A third type of WE is termed as the "Keynes' Wind- 
fall Effect". It operates through a fall in the rate of 
interest following an increase in the money supply which 
will raise the value of financial and real assets. This 
increases the market value of such assets and will cause 
consumption and investment to rise. The main difference 
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between Keynes' windfall effect and the real balance effect 
is that the former will only work when an interest rate 
change occurs and will fail to operate in a liquidity trap 
situation. 
The WE provides an explanation of a substitution 
between money on the one hand and real expenditure on the 
other, which appears to be lacking in the liquidity prefer- 
ence approach of Keynes. 
There has been a great deal of empirical work on 
the real balance effect or more broadly the WE on both 
consumption expenditure and the demand for money. The 
proponents of the real balance effect assumed that the 
2/ 
money stock (monetary base or outside money) is a compo- 
1 3/ 
nent of net wealth of the economy, but "inside money" is 
not. Later developments submitted by Gurleyand Shaw (1960) 
extended the WE beyond money to other forms of wealth such 
4/ 
as equities and interest bearing government debt. 
However, it is argued that the full value of the 
interest bearing government debt is not net wealth, as the 
interest payments on'-such debt which must be financed by 
taxe-s levied-on the private sector, are part of wealth. 
Accordingly, a fall in the price level will invol , ve a- rise 
in the value of government debt, a consequent rise in the 
value of -the'overall wealth in the economy and hence, a 
rise in the level of consumption expenditure. Therefore, if 
the public considers future tax liabilities only as a 
fraction of interest bearing government debt liability, 
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then an open market purchase of government paper would 
change the net wealth of the public and hence, aggregate 
demand. To summarise, apart from the above provision all 
interest bearing government debt should not be included in 
the definitions of net wealth and therefore, the operation 
of the "Pigou Effect" is limited. 
ýAlthough a fall in the rate of interest reduces, the 
cost to the, saver of obtaining a present command over the 
future stream of earnings, it also raises the market. value, 
or in other words, wealth, measured, in terms. of those 
assets. In this sense, the WE may outweigh the income 
effect of the personal sector. Monetary policy, therefore, 
affects expenditure decisions by changing relative yields 
causing variations in wealth variables through changes of 
the market value of outstanding assets. As pointed out by 
Laidler (1985) for the WE to operate it is necessary that 
the stock of real wealth vary with the price level. 
Although the private sector may exchange bonds among 
themselves, this makes no difference to the overall 
position in the economy since the wealth of debtors and 
creditors moves equally and oppositely when the price level 
changes. So long as there are no effects of changes in the 
distribution of wealth, privately issued bonds are 
irrelevant so far as the WE is concerned. 
The amount of assets people hold in their 
portfolios depends -on their total wealth and relative 
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yields. To the extent that'an increase in the stock of 
money balances is regarded as an increase in the wealth 'of 
the public, monetary policy action 'would I influence 
aggregate demand via its WE of consumption and investment. 
Therefore, the'-validity of WE on expenditure is dependent 
on a variety of factors. If there is*no change 'in net 
wealth following a fall in the price level or an increase 
in money supply, any increase in expenditure following 
these changes depends on distribution effects between 
creditors and debtors. Therefore, it is difficult to 
expect substantial impacts on expenditure from such 
effects. 
At 'the theoretical, level, the 'link between net 
wealth 'of, consumers and real consumption has been refined 
in the life cycle hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani (1965). 
They held the view that consumers allocate consumption over 
their life-time, given initial net'worth, a-'rate of time 
preference and expectations regarding labour income., Pesek 
and Saving' (1967), 'argued that an economically 'relevant 
measure' of wealtli'is the capitalized value, of a stream' of 
net income. - Although inside, money (demand-deposits)" and 
outside money -(Monetary base) are'considered to be' very 
different,, ' 'according- to Pesek and'Saving the difference 
between these two is I that fiat moneyýor monetary base is 
produced' by' the government "while demand deposits"' are 
produced by government'agents, '-i. e. 'commercia1 banks. ý For 
inside money, the net income takes the form'of earnings of 
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banks through the process of 
intermediation. The capitalized 
therefore, 'is an increase in net wea 
flow of services-of outside money 
stream of income and therefore, the 
this income is then added to the net 
money creation ' or 
value of earnings 
lth of the economy. The 
generates a positive 
capitalized value of 
wealth of the economy. 
In LDCs, if real income is more supply than demand 
determined due *to the transfer of labour from '-surplus 
agriculture to-, the industrial sector there, can be a change 
in the price of factors of production. 'In these cases 
monetary policy action is likely to change prices of all 
real outputs more than the supplies of these assets at 
least in, the 'short run and hence the difficulty in 
identifying the WE. 
2.2.3 The Credit Rationing Effect (Availability Effect) 
We'shall now discuss the CRE and examine its effec- 
tiveness 'as an *alternative MTC. In 'imperfect capital 
markets several interest rates are charged by different 
financial intermediaries. Therefore, the demand for credit 
is limited not by the borrower's willingness to'borrow" at 
the given rate but by the lender's willingness to lend. In 
these circumstances, what is applicable is a range of rates 
i. e. for lending and borrowing. The "availability doctrine" 
presented in the Radcliffe. Report (1959) attempted to 
expand the traditional view of monetary policy by develop- 
ing a theory of the lehders' reaction to policy changes. 
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The traditional monetary theory focussed upon the interest 
rate as the driving force behind the saving/borrowing 
decision while the availability doctrine viewed the inter- 
est rate as a reflection of underlying changes in credit 
availability. The important point therefore, is' not so 
much the price of credit but the availability of credit in 
the system. 
In the following sections we examine the workings 
of the CR channel. Accordingly, firms have a desired or 
"notional" supply of their products' based on relative 
prices, expectations and 'Several other relevant variables. 
They need credit to produce goods. 'Credit'expansion ease's 
credit constraints', raises supply and fuels aggregate 
demand. The "credit multiplier" leads to more bank deposits 
and in turn more credit and operates along-side the 
standard, Keynesian income multiplier. As 'explained' by 
Blinder (1987, p. 332) "if the requir6d amount of credit is 
not available and firms fail to produce as much as they can 
sell, it may lead to a failure of effective supply. Supply 
failures are crucial because if recessions are initiated by 
declines in supply, rather than by declines in demand then 
prices may rise as economic activity contracts". ,ý 
In the application of this theory to the LDCs it is 
evident that when the amount of credit is limited and the 
price mechanism does not operate smoothly as an allocative 
device, it is generally more realistic to assume that the 
flow of' private investment is constrained mainly by the 
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availability of credit. As the control of bank credit 
generally represents one of the main instruments of 
monetary policy in LDCs, the authorities can influence _the 
rate at which private investors achieve their desired level 
of investment. In the absence of a market clearing price, 
interest rates may be slow to adjust to changing market 
conditions or they may be administered and will reach the 
equilibrium'level only by chance. ' 
CRE will occur irrespective of a change in the 
money supply. However, a money supply change can alter the 
size of the CRE by shifting the credit supply curve. For 
example, an increase in bank reserves leads to increases in 
credit and money supply and will result in an outward shift 
of the supply function causing a reduction of CR. In these 
circumstances, it is assumed to have quick and predictable 
effects on expenditure but the response will be more 
widespread if all financial institutions in the system are 
involved. This may even result in an increase in holdings 
of financial assets in the short run, a feature seen in 
many LDCs including Sri Lanka. 
CRE 'are also likely to arise in relation' to the 
interest rate on government'bonds. If -the authorities 
decide to effect'a once-and-for-all increase in the rate of 
interest on bonds, 'theri banks which hold such, securities 
are "locked'in"I to potential losses on them. They do not 
want'to"sell'and suffer capital losses or wish to wait -and 
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see if prices move up again. This "locking in" effect -is 
postulated to lead to a reduction in the supply of bank 
loans to take, account of the. potential losses, on, highly 
illiquid bonds. For a detailed explanation -see Silber 
(1969).. Bank credit will therefore, be rationed at a given 
loan rate and this will lead to a reduction in -investment 
and other, expenditures financed by such credit.. --- ý- , 
Even if interest rates adjust instantaneously the 
amount of credit made available would still decline. If 
however, the demand for loans was completely inelastic with 
respect to long term bonds and the rate of interest on them 
adjusted immediately, the volume of credit advanced would 
remain fixed. Although this effect is -unrelated-to the 
movement of an exogenous money supply, the influence on-the 
flow of credit is. related to the MTM. However, by 
influencing the, flow of credit such actions are, monetary-in 
nature, and should be considered as an MTC. Moreover, the 
availability. -effects can outweigh the effects of, interest 
rates particularly, in demanding interest bearing financial 
assets. 
In-this section we will examine the relative effec- 
tiveness-of CR. compared to the other MTCs and assess -its 
impact on LDCs. Among the MTCs, CR is the most direct 
channel although it is difficult to measure its Anfluence 
on total credit. This is largely due to the existence of an 
almost insatiable demand, for credit at the prevailing 
interest rate in the formal credit market (FCM). Moreover, 
40 
deposit flows to financial intermediaries may not be' very 
predictable* nor can their asset compositions be changed 
easily in the short run. Under these circumstances, com- 
mercial banks in LDCs will be forced to ration borrowers 
through various non-price means. Alternatively, Central 
Banks, such as Sri Lanka, often introduce SCCs thereby 
forcing the commercial banks to ration credit among borrow- 
ers which may have a direct impact of reducing private 
sector consumption and investment. CRE therefore, not only 
reduces the availability of credit but also raises the cost 
of borrowing if borrowing occurs in the ICMs at high inter- 
est rates. 
In practice, commercial banks often classify their 
customers into a small number of categories. The risk -'free 
customers who are rated as prime customers are little 
affected by-1 CR. In'the other categories, some rationing 
would occur depending primarily on the risk characteristic 
and credit worthiness of the customer. Small firms whose 
bank relationships are not so good would seek access. to 
other sources of finance. They may either rely on credit 
from big firms or ICMs. Eventually, overall credit falls 
and interest rates would go up. If other things remain 
unchanged, the increase in market rates would in turn 
5/ 
reduce investment expenditure If interest rates are 
pegged, and capital or other financial markets are not so 
developed, a limited availability or rationing of loanable 
funds would be directly transmitted to the real sector in 
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the form of 
individuals. 
reduced expenditure by -business firms, and 
Monetary impulses can therefore, be transmitted to 
the real sector L-3, reducing the availability of funds from 
financial intermediaries rather than through a change in 
interest rates. Empirically, measuring and identifying the 
CRE is difficult. In most cases details of non- price 
effects such as changes in downpayments and collateral 
requirements are not recorded. An approximation to CRE is 
to find out the degree of CR by calculating the ratio of 
actual deposit flows of financial intermediaries to the 
expected flow of deposits. If CR is effected through a set 
of SCCs it is possible to estimate the reduction in domes- 
tic credit and assess the impact on the macro economy. 
ý, in summary, the availability doctrine discusses the 
role of the lender as an intermediary between monetary 
policy and spendin7g and also the institutional lending 
structure's importance in analysing monetary policy 
effects. It also focuses upon the importance-of the chan- 
nels through which monetary policy affects the economy and 
often complicates the transmission of monetary impulses 
through the other channels, in particular, the interest 
rates. 
In this section, we explain briefly the direct 
effects of changes in the money supply associated with its 
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impact on expectational variables. Firstly, expectations of 
the future rate of inflation may increase when a money 
supply increase occurs which may lead to two conflicting 
results. A liquidity effect may lead certain individuals-to 
reduce expenditure and hold more money balances to maintain 
living standards when prices increase. Alternatively, - 
others may spend more now to beat the price increases. It 
is difficult to say which of these will dominate. Secondly, 
a money Supply'increase may - encourage investment by generý- 
ating' expectations of Cheaper and more'accessible finance 
and' of-demand increases. On the other hand, *, when money 
supply' targets are set, expectations'of more restrictive 
monetary policies may generate and may lead to more nega- 
tive"'expectations on investments. Any net impact of the 
changes of expectations would therefore, lead to shifts in 
the" IS curve although the direction is ambiguous due to a 
number of conflicting effects. 
2.3 Appraisal and Recent Developments in Keynesian and 
Post Keynesian Theory. 
In the following sections we shall consider the 
main criticisms of the Keynesian and the post Keynesian 
theories in the MTM. 
In the Keynesian income/expenditure model, real 
capital -goods do not appear'as an''asset in financial 
portfolios because they 'are assumed to be- perfect 
substitutes for long term bonds. In practice'money is a 
substitute not only, for bonds, but also for real assets and 
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therefore, monetary policy operates "directly" in a 
framework in which real assets are explicitly introduced 
along with other assets. This argument is more in line with 
monetarists and is associated largely with Fisher and the 
other classical economists. According to them an increase 
in money would lead to a purchase of real commodities. For 
more details see Silber, et al (1971). 
A second drawback of the Keynesian transmission 
channel is that it takes place through one single route 
from money to bonds and from bonds to real assets. 
Therefore, in the absence of any direct effects of money on 
income, the Keynesian monetary policy link and the 
transmission mechanism is very weak. Keynesian models tend 
to assume two major sectors, i. e. the public sector and the 
private sector, and two forms of assets: i. e. public sector 
bonds and money. The SE is expected to work entirely via 
the interest rate on government bonds. If the WE on the 
demand for real assets and on the propensity to save is 
relatively small, the effect of monetary policy changes 
would depend only on-the relative size of the demand for 
money in response to changes in bond rates. One of the 
major issues in this regard is to-explain how the SE take 
place in situations where there is no substitution between 
money and government bonds, a feature observed in many 
LDCs, including Sri Lanka. Moreover, the highly aggregated 
Keynesian model ignores sectoral responses which are impor- 
tant in LDCs i. e. structural bottlenecks. - 
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Thirdly, 
-the 
Keynesian speculative. motive 
" 
for 
holding money does not provide a satisfactory explanation 
for the non-zero interest elasticity of the demand for 
money in an economy where short term securities exist. in 
such economies changes in the current rate of interest and 
expectations about capital gains or losses are not suffi- 
cient to explain the substitution between long, term secu- 
rities and money. 
Finally, the assumption of perfect market 
conditions in the Keynesian Income/Expenditure model, is 
not a reality in many LDCs. Wealth and relative price 
effects occur only if these conditions are satisfied. There 
is no analysis as to how the situation can differ if 
markets are not perfect, a feature especially relevant to 
LDCs. It is also assumed that the interest rate is exoge- 
nously determined. However, in the long run when personal 
sector savers and the business sector play a more dynamic 
role in the determination of interest rates it may not be 
valia'to assume this'. There is no explanation in the Keyne- 
sian model as to how the SE and WE work if interest rates 
are not entirely exogenously determined. Changes in wealth 
itself lead to changes in consumption and desired holdings 
of assets. However, this aspect has not received due 
attention in Keynesian analysis. 
The restriction of Keyn-esian theory to money and a 
representative long term bond alone has attracted consider- 
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able criticism. Leijohnufvud (1968) categorised long term 
bonds with real assets and all short term financial assets 
with money. Tobin's analysis of the relationship between 
the expected rate of return and- risk can be modified to 
include various real and financial assets with differing 
maturities between which the individual establishes his 
optimum portfolio subject to an'interest return. Leijohnuf- 
vud's (1968) reinterpretation of Keynes' liquidity prefer- 
ence theory suggested that liquidity can be held not only 
in money form but also in a variety of short term assets 
such as building society deposits and treasury bills. 
In sum, the Keynesian MTM is complex and indirect. 
Its strength is derived from the size of a set of 
elasticities and a series of behavioural relations. In the 
IS/LM framework, the impact of monetary policy in terms of 
a Keynesian approach depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the interest elasticity of the demand for money as compared 
to that of goods. 
2.4 Portfolio Balance Atmroaches 
We shall now analyse the portfolio balance approach 
as an alternative explanation of the MTM. This approach 
emphasises the portfolio management of various assets and 
has been used by both non-quantity and quantity theory 
monetarists. Ideas of neo-Keynesians are represented by non 
quantity theory monetarists (NQTMs) while those of quanti- 
ty- theory monetarists (QTMS) are represented'by the mone- 
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tarists 
Meltzer 
appears 
ness of 
research. 
in particular, Friedman (1970 a), Brunner and 
(1971). The difference between these two groups 
to relate to their differing views on the unique- 
money and their priorities in terms of 
2.4.1 The Non-Ouantity Theory Monetarists (NOTMs)- 
First, we deal briefly with the basic ideas of this 
approach and outline the analyses of the two groups within 
this framework. 
6/ 
According to the NQTMs money supply is not 
entirely exogenous and is influenced by the monetary au- 
thorities i. e. but is partly endogenous and reflects the 
economic behaviour of financial intermediaries and economic 
units. The major thrust of the NQTMs' analysis is based on 
the difference between real and financial sectors. The 
financial sector deals with the stock of assets and debts 
and its framework is the balance sheet. The decision varia- 
bles are stocks. The real sector deals with income flows, 
expenditure and the production of goods and services. Its 
accounting framework is the income statement and the deci- 
sion variables are flows. According to Tobin (1961) the two 
sectors are linked by "accounting identities" and techno- 
logical and financial stock-flow relations. 
According to this approach there is no unique role 
played by- money among all financial assets. The only 
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difference between money and securities is that the 
interest rate on the former is exogenously fixed by law or 
convention while the rate of return on the latter is 
endogenous and market determined. According to the 
portfolio approach when the supply of any asset is 
increased, the structure of the rate of return on this and 
other assets must change in a way that induces the public 
to hold the new supply. If interest rates on assets rise, a 
large part of the necessary adjustments in the money market 
will take place. If however, rates are fixed, adjustments 
must take place through reductions in other rates of return 
or increases in the prices of other assets. 
Secondly, monetary policy operates through changes 
in the market prices of equities which represent claims on 
existing real assets such as plant and equipment. If mone- 
tary policy is expansionary it will raise prices and reduce 
the yield of equities and will create a discrepancy between 
the market valuation of real assets and their cost of 
production. This discrepancy provides an incentive to 
expand production of those real assets. Thus, the equity 
rate serves as the major link between money and the level 
of economic activity. In a more applied sense, if the 
Central Bank reduces the reserve requirements of commercial 
banks the latter will demand more government loans, bonds 
and securities and low risk obligations in their asset. 
holdings while creating more demand deposits. As their 
demand rises, prices of financial assets will go up and 
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interest rates'on those securities, will fall. Therefore, 
financial assets will be-more expensive in relation to 
non-financial assets such,, as real property and consumer 
durables. The effect of-this will be felt through increased 
prices for non-financial assets which will stimulate an 
increase in the demand for current productive services both 
for producing new capital goods and for purchasing them. 
Thirdly, the portfolio approach advocates that 
changes in the real sector can also take place independent 
of any changes in monetary policy. There can be changes in 
portfolio preferences or asset demand functions by banks. 
Therefore, it implies that the impact of monetary policy 
cannot be captured by any single exogenous or intermediate 
variable such as the money supply or some market interest 
rate. According to Tobin (1972), they are at best "imper- 
fect and derivative" indicators of monetary policy- 
Fourthly; the portfolio'balance approach implies a 
variety of assets and a range of interest rates rather than 
a single rate of return. Therefore, the main target of 
monetary policy should be to maintain the required rate of 
return on capital or equity yields. According to Tobin and 
Brainard (1963) equity rate therefore, is assumed to be the 
major link between money and the level of economic activi- 
ty. 
However, despite the complicated theoretical 
explanation of real and financial sectors adopted by this 
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school the MTM remains naive and simple. If one draws a 
parallel to keynesian analysis the essential link is 
nothing other than the emphasis on the rate of interest on 
financial assets. Secondly, the NQTMs have not been 
supported by empirical evidence in LDCs as equity rates 
cannot be regarded as the link between money and the level 
of economic activity. For details see Khatkhate (1988). For 
example, in Sri Lanka there is no representative equity 
rate in view of the absence of a well developed capital 
market. 
2.4.2 The Quantity Theory Monetarists (OTMs) 
QTMs tend to assume that a change in the money 
stock is the primary determinant of changes in total 
spending and should be given major emphasis in economic 
stabilisation- programmes. Movements in the quantity of 
money are the most, reliable measure of the thrust of mone- 
tary impulses and are transmitted to the real economy 
through a relative price process (portfolio adjustment) 
which operates through a wide array of financial and real 
assets. 
According to Friedman (1970,1971) an economy can be 
characterised in terms of the following six equations. 
Real Sector 
(1, r) 
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i= 
p 
Y C+I 
P PP 
Monetary Sector 
d 
M= P. 1 (X, r) 
P 
s 
H h (r) 
d s 
M M 
where, 
Y money income 
C consumption 
I investment 
r the rate of interest 
P the price level 
s 
M money supply 
d 
M demand for money 
... (2) 
... (3) 
... (4) 
eoo, 
... (6) 
In this model, equations (l)-(3)-describe the real 
sector while equations (4)-(6) refer to the monetary 
sector. Equation (1) defines real consumption expenditure. 
Equation (2) explains real investment and equation (3) is 
the equilibrium condition in the commodity market. Real 
money balances in (4) are a function of real income and the 
real rate of interest (equation 4) while the nominal money 
supply is assumed to be an increasing function of the r- in 
(5). The equilibrium condition in the money market is by 
(6). 
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The model has 6 independent equations and 7 
ds 
endogenous variables (C, I, P, Y, M M r). Since there are 
three unknown; Y, P and r one of the variables must be 
determined exogenously. Friedman, in Gordon (1974, p. 35) 
discussed different ways of solving the system using three 
different macro economic theories i. e. the income/expendi- 
ture theory; the quantity theoryl and the monetarist theory 
of nominal income. The difference between the first two is 
the condition that is added to make the model determinate. 
The Keynesian income/expenditure theory assumes 
that the general price level is determined outside the 
system and-that there exists price or wage rigidity (P=P 
0 
The system can now be solved for equilibrium Y/P and r. 
We shall refer to the other two solutions below but 
can now highlight the major differences between the 
classical Keynesian and monetarists analysis. The classical 
quantity theory assumed that real income is determined 
outside the system and this allows a dichotomy between the 
real and the monetary sectors. Therefore, the demand for 
and the supply of money functions determine the price 
level. The velocity function in the modern monetarist 
analysis -is more complex, based on certain behavioural 
variables "and is assumed to be more stable. Unlike in the 
old quantity theory'approach monetarists do not assume that 
either the level of transactions (T) or the price level (P) 
is fixed, so that any, impulse from the left hand side (MV) 
would change nominal income (PT). According to this 
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explanation money is non-neutral. However, the money supply 
is essentially exogenous and dominates any other influence 
on nominal income. These assumptions combine to yield the 
monetary theory of nominal income. It does not preclude the 
influence of non-monetary factors on income but merely 
highlights the importance of monetary variables. According 
to Friedman, the quantity theory model is valid for long 
term equilibrium so that the long term variation in the 
rate of change of the quantity of money will change only 
the rate of inflation and not growth in the real sector. 
Friedman (1968) argued that in the long run monetary 
- i. e. the price policy can control only nominal quantitiest 
level, the money-rate of interest and nominal income, but 
not real variables. 
According to monetarists, both NQTMs and QTMs, the 
income/expenditure model is not satisfactory for short term 
analysis because neither explain short term deviations in 
nominal income between prices and output; short term 
adjustment of nominal income due to a change in autonomous 
variables, and the transition between short and long term 
equilibrium. For details see Friedman (1970 a). 
Friedman's approach differs in three major ways 
from the Keynesian IS/LM framework. Firstly, the LM curve 
is much, steeper in the monetarists' version and this 
reflects the low substitutability between money and bonds 
and therefore, the low interest elasticity of the. - demand 
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for money. Second, there is no liquidiiy trap. An increase 
in the money supply will always alter the rate of interest'. 
Third, the IS curve is less steep and reflects the size' of 
the interest elasticity of investment. As a result, the 
monetary model of nominal income, assuming that the IS 
curve shifts far enough to the right as a result of an in- 
crease in the money supply, there would be an increase in 
income and a lower rate of'interest. A significant feature 
of this model is thata change in the rate of growth of the 
money. supply, affects the rate of growth of nominal income 
without any immediate effect on interest rates. 
Friedman's demand for money model (1972) sets out 
the channels by which a change in the money supply 'affects 
economic variables on the assumption that money is an 
unique asset: According to Nobay and Johnson (1977, p. '478) 
"money is to be regarded as an asset in the generalised 
portfolio, in sharp contrast to the Keynesian tradition of 
considering money to be a substitute for financial assets". 
This replaces the Keynesian money/bonds Choice by one where 
portfolio adjustments involve an array of assets, both 
financial and real. According to Friedman and' Meiselman 
(1963) the crucial issue is not whether changes in the 
stock of money operates through int'erest'rates, but rather 
the range of interest rates concerned. This model provides 
an empirical approach to the estimation of the effects of 
monetary policy. Friedman indicates that an exogenous 
change in money stock begins with changes in prices and 
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yields of financial assets. These changes in the price of 
financial and non-financial assets influence spending on 
new assets and- current services. They also -alter real 
wealth of the public relative to income and thereby affect 
consumptioni This in a simple fashion is the way in which 
the initial impulse is diffused from financial markets to 
the markets for goods and services thus, affecting portfolio 
adjustments. . _', ýIý 
As in the income/expenditure theory the rate of 
interest plays a key role, but Friedman in Gordon (1974, 
p. 35) argues that the impact of monetary policy is 
understated in Keynesian analysis. This is because monetary 
policy impinges on a range of capital assets and 
correspondingly a broader range of associated expenditures. 
The Keynesian practice of looking only at recorded market 
rates of interest which are only a part of a much broader 
spectrum of rates makes one underestimate the actual impact 
of monetary policy. The rates of interest that influence 
investment decisions are for the most part implicit yields 
and hence, not observable, so that one cannot hope to 
obtain useful results by looking at relations between 
market interest rates and categories of spending associated 
with these rates. Also, recorded market rates may not be the 
appropriate measure of the cost of' capital since these 
rates are not real rates of interest that reflect the basic 
forces of productivity but nominal rates that are influ- 
enced by the expected rate of inflation. Monetary influ- 
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ences may work through any particular channel as monetary 
policy operates through an extremely complicated process of 
portfolio*adjustments. Even the most complex structure of a 
general equilibrium model cannot be expected to capture 
actual monetary influences adequately. One such relation- 
ship is the velocity function relating. income to money (the 
essence of the quantity theory). Another is'the multiplier 
relationship between income and autonomous expenditure 
(essence of income/expenditure theory). In fact Friedman 
argues, that the velocity function has been shown on aver- 
age, to be more stable and less affected by institutional 
and historical changes than the, multiplier relationship and 
consequently, the velocity may be the key relationship in 
understanding macro economic developments. It then follows 
that a much more promising approach to the question of 
evaluating monetary policy effects on the economy is to try 
to relate changes in the quantity of money. Friedman's 
monetary model of nominal income seems to reflect this 
point of view. 
In spite of 
Friedman to monetary 
that changes in the 
changes in interest 
Later monetarists 
monetarist framework 
the theoretical contribution made by 
theory, empirical evidence does suggest 
quantity of money, are associated with 
rates. For details see Galbis (1981). 
have accepted this and extended the 
accordingly. 
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2.5 Later Developments and Rational Exr)ectations Theory 
An ýimportant contribution made to the monetarist 
approach, especially in connection with LDCs, was the 
presentation by Polak (1957). He developed a structure that 
made imports a function of nominal income and then added a 
quantity theory of money equation to explain nominal in- 
come. In this model, an increase in the rate of credit 
expansion would increase money supply and nominal income. 
This in turn would raise imports and cause an outflow of 
international reserves. This process would continue until 
the initial increase in domestic credit was exactly matched 
by the loss of international reserves. This phenomena is 
particularly important for LDCs like Sri Lanka as the 
openness of the economy and leakages through imports appear 
to have aggravated the BOP problems in the period under our 
study. 
According to the Polak model (1957)ýthe effects of 
monetary policy, CRE in particular, depend on a number of 
factors, such as the'speed with which the limited effects 
of credit restrictions-'are offset by international reserve 
movements (the responsiveness of the current account and 
the degree of capitalýmobility), the response of domestic 
inflation to the excess demand for real money- balances 
created by credit restrictions, the extent to which the 
excess money demand reduces aggregate demand (the degree 
of excess demand for output in the economy)-*and the effect 
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on private investment of a reduction in the availability of 
credit. As these factors influence in a complex way the net 
outcome clearly becomes an empirical question. 
In the Polak model, expenditure can be affected 
directly -by changes in real money balances and interest 
rates or via capital mobility, allowing purchases or sales 
of assets in response to changes in relative interest 
rates. The monetary approach to the balance of payments 
(MABP) developed by Mundell (1968) and Johnson (1972 ) and 
Frankel and Johnson (1976) build upon this idea. The es- 
sence of the MABP is that BOP will depend- on the price 
level -of a country relative to-those of its trading part- 
ners, which in turn is influenced by the degree of money 
growth. at home, and abroad. Therefore, a money supply 
growth rate that, exceeds the world,, average rate of monetary 
expansion would lead to a higher price level in the home 
country relative to that abroad thus generating a deficit 
in the BOP. The excess demand for money balances plays a 
direct role in the short run behaviour of prices. Sri Lanka 
is no exception to this situation and the adverse conse- 
quences of excess money balances and their impact on the 
macro economyls illustrated in chapter 3. As reviewed by 
Khan (1980) domestic credit will in the short run increase 
domestic inflation and worsen the BOP. Eventually, the 
decline in the money supply due to outflow of international 
reserves will cause a reversal of the process so that once 
again in the long run the monetary relationship will con- 
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tinue to hold. 
-A further development of monetarist -thinking 
relates to the Rational Expectations Hypothesis-(REH) which 
assumes that individual economic agents act as utility 
maximising individuals. When forming expectations about the 
future they take into account all available information 
including the" level of GNP, level of their -disposable 
income, monetary and fiscal policies in the current 
period, In this sense economic agents will form subjective 
expectations concerning future economic variables which are 
equal to the true mathematical conditional expectations to 
be taken by those variables. For details see Muth (1961). 
In other words, the "objective" probability distribution of 
outcome associated with a particular policy action will be 
used to generate expectations concerning the variable of 
relevance to the economic agent. Assuming this information 
is used efficiently, the agent's predictions or expecta- 
tiong will be identical to the mean value of the distribu- 
tion of possible outcomes generated by the relevant theory. 
In the case of an agent concerned with the future price 
level this implies that the expected price is in fact an 
indicator of the actual price. 
Lucas (1981) suggested that the adoption of the REH 
would further improve Friedman's contribution specially 
when there is no s ystematic relationship between expecta- 
tion errors and information available to agents at the time 
of formation of expectations. The hypothesis could be used 
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to avoid the implication of sub-optional behaviour by 
individuals. Lucas's new theory of price stickiness was 
used to explain incomplete price responses in terms of 
choices made by optimizing agents in the light of their own 
objectives and constraints. However, it is necessary ac- 
cording to this view to understand the nature of price 
sluggishness to know if its quantitative manifestation will 
remain intact in the face of altered conditions. 
According, to_Lucas, individuals not only-. have a 
coincidence of expected mean and actual-mean values but it 
is also possible for a coincidence, between, the agent's 
subjective probability distributions over--all possible 
outcomes,, and the actual objective distribution- controlling 
the -economic, system. In such a situation the RMwould, be 
tantamount-to perfect foresight. Clearly the usefulness-of 
the REH depends on the extent to which, individuals'forma- 
tion of "rational'I. expectations, and, its application is 
greater the-simpler the underlying process to be understood 
and the less demanding is the information set involved in 
any given-situation.. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has. beenýto outline the 
main -theoretical expositions of the Keynesians and Post 
keynesian, ý analyses, non-quantity- theory monetarists, 
quantity theory monetarists including the, REH. We have 
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attempted to expose divergent views about the MTM and' to 
examine the relevance-of these ideas to developing coun- 
tries in general, and Sri Lanka in particular. Despite 
differing views-about the MTM, at present there are proba- 
bly ýfew-major disagreements between economists about it. ' 
Both NQTMs and QTMs support some version of portfolio 
adjustment as the basic framework describing the MTM. The 
disagreements however, remain in terms of the range of 
assets, the range of interest rates and the technical 
relationships involved in the stocks of, real assets and 
flows of real expenditure corresponding to these assets. 
For non monetarists, the range of assets is limited while 
for monetarists it is a broad spectrum. ' According to the 
Keynesians andithe post Keynesians there, is only one inter- 
est rate (long term bond rate) and this is the representa- 
tive rate for all types of earning assets. -This implicitly 
assumes that equities, government bonds, and private debt 
all are substitutes for one another. In the Keynesian 
analysis the SE is only between money and bonds and it 
ignores entirely the substitutability between money and 
real assets or real expenditures (the real cash balance 
effect). All groups in general agree that WE and CRE are 
important. 
Secondly, although the emphasis on-money is different 
in Keynesian and Monetarist analysis it is probably more 
of an empirical question than a theoretical one. Keynesian 
theory sees changes in-the money supply-working their way 
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through the system in a way that does not result in a close 
and stable linkage between changes in the money'supply and 
national income. The monetarists-on-ýthe other, hand, per- 
ceive such a close and stable linkage. For monetarists, 
money is extremely important in influencing the level of 
money income while according to k"eynesian view, money is 
less important in this respect. Again this is essentially 
an empirical question. 
Thirdly, we noted diverse views on the role of 
interest rates. Some monetarists believe that the demand 
for money is crucial in understanding macro economic 
relationships but place less emphasis on the sensitivity of 
the demand for money function to interest rates. If howev- 
er, interest rates are relevant at all to the demand for 
money, then there has to be a theory of the determination 
of interest rates. The traditional quantity theory is 
irrelevant in this sense to the MTM. 
Fourthly, views on how to model the MTM differ among 
the major theoretical groups; -Monetarists argue that the 
MTCs are, diverse and, complicated and therefore difficult 
to identify- and measure using large scale structural 
models. Therefore, they-advocate the-use of reduced form 
equation models or direct estimationzethods using final 
demand variables such as money GNP which are7, regressed upon 
monetary and fiscal variables. However, the-use, of reduced 
form equations raises-problems as they -ignore prior 
restrictions on the coefficients of independent variables. 
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i. e. restrictions built into general equilibrium -models 
through identities, lags etc. They become therefore no more 
than linear equations relating endogenous variables such as 
money GNP to a set of exogenous variables with no 
meaningfulýeconomic analysis between those variables. 
To monetarists, the major factor determining 
aggregate demand is money. If monetary policy is 
expansionary the aggregate demand curve shifts to the right 
reflecting the increasing demand for goods and services. 
The MTM therefore, is direct and certain. Extra money 
leads to direct SE between money and real goods and serv- 
ices but does not spill over into the bond market and raise 
prices and drive down interest rates. Those who have money 
would spend it and its impact on GNP would be direct. The 
main objective of the monetary authorities is to keep money 
supply at a desirable level. When aggregate demand starts 
to respond to the increased money supply the transaction 
demand for money would rise and therefore, the rate of 
interest would go up. The income effect of the increased 
money supply will therefore, overwhelm the liquidity effect 
and as a result, the rate of interest would fall back to 
its original level. A problem common to both monetarists 
and non-monetarists is the selection of exogenous monetary 
and fiscal variables. Depending on the variables that are 
assumed to be exogenous i. e. the monetary base, reserves, 
narrow money, broad money (monetary sector) and autonomous 
expenditure on the fiscal side, one can take either a money 
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"mostly matters" or fiscal policy "mostly matters" or "both 
matter" stance. 
Our next task is to examine the historical role of 
monetary management in Sri Lanka before we combine it with 
the theoretical literature reviewed here in order to 
construct an empirical model of the MTM for that country. 
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FOOT NOTES 
The term 'Keynesian' 
lates to the interp 
Employment, Interest 
others who might be 
the IS/LM framework, 
of The General Theory 
Clower (1969). 
referred to in this chapter re 
retation of the General Theory of 
and Money given by Hicks and 
described as 'Keynesians, ' within 
rather than the reinterpretation 
given by Leijonhufvud (1968) and 
2. 'Outside money' is defined as the money that is backed 
by foreign or government securities or gold or fiat 
money issued by the government. 
3. 'Inside money' takes the form of various types of depos- 
its which are claims of the public on the banking 
system. Therefore, when the balance sheets of all 
economic events are consolidated, 'Inside money' disap- 
pears and therefore, should not be considered as a part 
of wealth. 
4. The government ignores the real value of its debt be- 
cause it can pay back by issuing new debts as it con- 
trols the money supply and possesses taxing power. 
5. Both the simple quantity theory and Income/Expenditure 
approach assume that price units are stable. Hence, 
real and nominal rates of interest are the same. 
6. Tobin (1965) and Tobin and Buiter (1976) represented 
NQTM views. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MONETARY MANAGEMENT IN SRI LANKA 1950-1985 
The main objectives of this chapter are three fold. 
The first is to summarize the instruments that can be used 
by the authorities to influence the monetary transmission 
process. The second is to provide a description of the 
monetary policy stance pursued in Sri Lanka between 1950- 
1/ 
1985 and to critically evaluate the implementation of 
monetary policy in terms of achieving its objectives. In 
doing so, we also establish the international and domestic 
economic environment within which monetary policy in Sri 
Lanka was pursued, policy thinking with regard to the MTM, 
and the actual use of policy instruments by the monetary 
authorities. Thirdly, we wish to analyse the implications 
of uncoordinated policy and highlight the importance of 
working within an explicit MCF for effective monetary 
management. A chronological account of monetary policy 
measures between 1977 and 1985 is presented in appendix 
3.2. 
Since independence in 1948 Sri Lanka's economy has 
undergone significant changes. Being largely an export- 
import economy, external shocks and volatile commodity 
prices have been important factors in monetary and fiscal 
policy formulation. Moreover, novel ideas introduced into 
monetary management and consequently, the changing art of 
central banking have also influenced the choice of monetary 
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policy instruments during this period. To analyse the 
changes which have occurred over the period 1950-1985 more 
meaningfully, section 3.2 is divided into three periods. 
The first relates to the decade 1950-1959 which has been 
characterized as the pioneering years of monetary manage- 
ment during which monetary policy was "accommodative" and 
"liberal". The-events between 1960 and 1976 are described 
as the years of control-and adaptation. During this period 
monetary policy was more "rigid" but adjusted itself to 
suit the economic environment. The third period has been 
one of moving towards mature monetary management, commenc- 
ing in 1977 and continuing to the present. Monetary policy 
was $'aggressive" during this period. 
3.1 Available Instruments I 
2/ 
The Central Bank of Ceylon was established in 
1950 as the authority responsible for the administration 
and regulation of the monetary and banking system of Sri 
Lanka. According to The Monetary Law Act (1949) the Bank is 
entrusted with the duty, inter alia of regulating the 
supply, availability, cost and international exchange of 
money so as to secure the following objectives: the stabi- 
lization of domestic monetary values; the preservation of 
the par value of the Sri Lanka rupee and the free use of 
the rupee for current international transactions; the 
promotion and maintenance of a high level of production. 
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When the Central Bank commenced operations, it 
inherited a monetary and a banking structure which was 
oriented primarily to serve international trade and pay- 
ments. Under the Currency Board System the Rupee standard 
relieved the country of the burden of managing the exchange 
value of her currency unit. See Gunasekera (1962). Branches 
of foreign banks dominated the banking scene and money and 
capital markets were at rudimentary stages. The primary 
objective of the post- independence monetary policy was the 
setting up of an independent monetary system with the 
required degree of financial autonomy to cope with the 
problems of monetary management in an emerging nation. 
Accordingly, the Monetary Law Act (MLA) of 1949 which 
outlined the law relating to the establishment of the 
Central Bank of Ceylon gave it a wide array of powers to 
conduct monetary -policy. The Monetary Board which was 
constituted in July 1950 was directly empowered with re- 
sponsibility ýfor. monetary policy. -As, regards the issue of 
currency, the Central Bank differed fundamentally from the 
Currency Board-in that it was empowered to hold domestic 
securities as, part of the assets "backing" the note issue. 
In the sphere of credit control, the Bank was equipped with 
all the weapons of modern central banking and instruments 
of-monetary control. The Bank was empowered to deal in gold 
and foreign exchange operations and grant loans to foreign 
institutions and was authorized to regulate rates applica- 
ble to the purchase and sale of foreign exchange by commer- 
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cial banks. 
Instruments such as discounting and rediscounting 
of commercial and productive paper used in domestic trans- 
actions outlined-in sections 83 (a),, (b),, and (c) in the 
MLA-suggest thatýinterest rates and discountýrates were to 
form, the main instruments available for credit operations. 
Section 89 of, the MLA authorizes-the Bank to provide provi- 
sional advances to the government to' finance ýexpenditure 
while-sections 90,,, 91'and 92 specified the use-of, OMO. 
Sections 92-98 dealt with the instrumentsýof Central Bank 
securities (CBS) and statutory reserve requirements (SRR) 
in regulating reserves of commercial'banks. 
Monetary policy instruments are directed at con- 
trolling both the volume and the direction of credit. 
Control over the volume is known as quantitative control 
of credit and is achieved largely through instruments such 
as OMO, SRR and the Bank rate (BR). Among the "Additional 
regulation of credit operations" of banking institutions, 
the main instruments'are the fixing'ofTmaximum permissible 
maturities ofýloans and investments or classes of loans and 
investments of commercial banks, the ceilings on commercial 
bank credit, the fixing of minimum ratios for'the stipula- 
tion of -cash margins against-letters of credit'-and the 
control over bank interest rates. 
69 
3.2 Historical Perspectives 
3.2.1 The Pioneering Years: (1950-1ý59). 
During the 1950s, monetary policy in general, was 
liberal -and complementary to the macro economic policy 
environment in which reasonable growth rates, with a fair 
degree of price stability, were displayed. Except in boom 
years, - monetary expansion, measured 
in terms,, of currency 
and demand deposits (Ml) had been comparatively modest. In 
the. first few years, after 1950, the economy was highly 
liquid due to the commodity boom during the Korean War. The 
increased external assets and. monetization of export pro- 
ceeds enhanced liquidity in the system thereby exerting 
inflationary, pressures. Notwithstanding this enhanced 
liquidity, prices, measured in terms of the Colombo Consum- 
er Price Index (CCPI) dropped from 5.4 per cent in 1950 to 
3/ 
4.0 per cent at the end of 1953, probably due to heavy 
imports. 
The Central Bank. was mindful of these developments 
but the need to, ensure sufficient availability of liquidity 
constrained its ability to tighten monetary policy. Howev- 
er, the Bank. saw the need for initiating action to reduce 
imports and to provide BOP support. Hence, the SRRs were 
used to raise the cost of funds to banks and in turn to 
discourage credit. creation. Accordingly, a SRR, of 10 per 
cent and 5 per cent respectively were fixed on, demand and 
time and savings deposits of commercial banks. The reserve 
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ratio on demand deposits was raised from 10 to 14 per cent 
in 1951- to further strengthen the effectiveness of-- this 
instrument. To absorb excess liquidity, the Bank engaged-in 
OMO and the BR was increased from 2.5 to 3.0 per cent per 
annum. This helped to reduce the dependence of commercial 
banks on Central Bank funds. To release part of the re- 
serves absorbed through high SRRs and to counteract the 
fall in liquidity caused by the decline in foreign assets, 
the SRR on demand deposits was reduced from 14 to, 10 per 
cent. This relieved the tight liquidity position of banks 
and enhanced the flow of bank credit to the private sector. 
As an indicator of the essentially subservient and accommo- 
dative role of monetary policy as compared to fiscal, the 
interest rate of government securities were lowered to 
reduce the cost of borrowing for the government. The mone- 
tary authorities responded by bringing down the BR from 3 
to 2.5 per cent in 1954. 
1 As far as the -.. Fj-YsL . 
half of the 1950-1959 period 
is concerned, the., 5- years ending in 1951+, immediately 
preceding the Korean war boom period, illustrated numerous 
problems typically encountered by an export economy and 
policies pursued by theýmonetary authorities to contain 
inflation and stabilize the economy. - During 1950-1951, 
although commodity export prices rose to very high levels, 
no attempt was made to achieve a viable and sustainable BOP 
position. The economy was relatively free of controls. The 
ad hoc monetary policy measures-introduced in 1950 and 1951 
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provided only a weak support to the BOP. In the two years 
ended 1953, both the current account and the basic balance 
recorded deficits with a sharp depletion of reserves. The 
gross external-assets which were sufficient to support 
about 13 months of imports in 1949 were adequate to support 
only 5 months of imports in 1952 and 1953. (Annual Report 
1954, Central-Bank of Sri Lanka). This situation implies 
that monetary policy measures adopted during the two years 
ended 1951 were not-forceful enough to nullify the basic 
disequilibrium experienced by'the economy, the'key factors 
being declining export incomes following the collapse of 
the boom, the rising volume of imports and a credit expan- 
sion. 
Several factors hindered the achievement of policy 
objectives during this period. First, the experience of the 
early 1950s showed that the progress towards achieving a 
favourable BOP, price stability and desirable money growth 
required a coordinated effort in fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Moreover, the non-effectiveness of 
interest rates as policy instruments was clearly reflected 
during the three'years ended 1953 in the inadequacy of 
domestic ýsavings and investment. Despite the favourable 
terms of trade and rising exports, the government was 
unable to generate any savings. While excessive consump- 
tion by the government and the private sector resulted in 
increases in imports, no attempts were made through inter- 
est rate policy to offer positive rates on financial depos- 
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its and to channel funds to investment. -Instead, a low 
interest rate policy was maintained to accommodate govern- 
ment financial requirements at low cost. On- the other 
hand, sufficient action was not initiated to absorb the 
enhanced liquidity through taxation and reduce the depend- 
ence on bank borrowings. Moreover, government expenses were 
directed towards current expenditure, in particular, wel- 
fare and subsidy programmes but not for 'investment pur- 
poses. In sum, the absence of a coordinated macro economic 
policy package was clearly felt during the period 1950- 
1953. The adjustment programmes should have aimed at lead- 
ing the economy into a more stable and sustainable growth 
path' from an unsustainable path that accompanied supply 
demand imbalances. It is also noteworthy that the Central 
Bank gave little or no consideration to the promotion and 
development of the financial structure during'this -period. 
This may, have been due to an emerging nation's inexperi- 
enced central banking. 
Secondly, it is evident that in the first few years 
after the establishment of the Central Bank, monetary 
policy was not called upon to play a dynamic role within 
the context of overall economic objectives. The behaviour 
of macro economic indicators during 1950-1959 are shown in 
Table 3.1. 
lAlthough 
monetary expansion was moderate this 
was largely due to a draw down in external assets from 8., 5 
per cent during 1950/1951 to 2.3 per cent in 1955/1956. 
This situation further weakened the BOP position and there- 
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fore, did not help to retain favourable benefits 
Table 3.1 
I Major Macro-Economic Indicators 1950-1960 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1950/1951 1955/1956,1959/1960 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Rate of Growth of GDP 1/ NA* NA 4.9 
Rate of'Growth of GNP 1/ , NA -, NA 4.8 
Rate of Growth of per capita 
GNP l/ NAý 
Colombo Consumers' Price Index 
(% change Dec - Dec) 4.0 
% change in Ml 10.5 
% change in M2,12.1 
% change in External Banking 
Assets (Net) -8.5 
Government Expenditure 2/ NA 
Government Revenue 2/ ' 'NA 
Balance of Payments 3/- --, 1950 
NA 2.0 
0.1 -1.6 
5.0 2.7 
7.3 6.4 
, 2.3 -, - -42.3 
NA 24.5 
NA 22.8 
-1955 i , 1960 
TradeýBalance ýý +328 +516 +332 
Current Account Balance +146 +323 +75 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
refers to data not available 
1/ = current factor prices 
2/ = as a per cent of GDP 
3/ =-, figures for the year are expressed in Rs. Million- 
Source: Annual'Reports, Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
associated with the commodity booms. By the end of 1960sthe 
surpluses in both the trade and the current account bal- 
ances were more moderate. Inflation slowed down largely due 
to the reduced money growth and the drop in commodity 
prices, particularly those of tea and rubber by the end of 
1953. As seen in table 3.1, the CCPI which stood at 4 per 
cent during 1950/1951 gradually dropped to less than I per 
cent and to negative levels towards the end of this period. 
The expansionary fiscal policy was largely reflected in 
money growth and did not contribute to increased investment 
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and-production. 
Thirdly, the continued dependence of the government 
on the banking system to-finance budget deficits raised the 
money in the-system and also undermined-the effectiveness 
cf monetary policy, measures in force. This, coupled with 
the low interest rate'policy prevented the Central Bank 
from 'launching an aggressive monetary 7 policy which would 
have prevented the'authorities from'resorting to adminis- 
trative and rigid controls after 1960. Due to inadequate 
attempts made to reap benefits from the enhanced external 
assets, the second half of the 1950s featured a depletion 
of reserves. Although the need for sustained price and 
monetary stability was recognized from time to time, this 
did not. 
1persuade 
authorities to follow restrictive monetary 
policy measures. Also, the inability of the under-de- 
veloped money market to adjust quickly and to mobilize 
resources resulted in an inefficient allocation of invest- 
nent. 
Fourthly, 'traditional central 'banking did not 
involve the 'promotion and development of the financial 
structure. ' Aside from the establishment of the Development 
Finance' Corporation of Ceylon (DFCC)'in 1956'in which the 
Central Bankýt6ok initiatives, "no other non-banking insti- 
tutions were set'up during this period. In' the latter half 
of the -'1950s'monetary management was uneventful but the 
basic'ý' problems "remained unresolved though' at moderate 
levels. In February 1956 for the first time the Central 
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Bank issued its own securities worth Rs. 10 million which 
absorbed part of the excess liquidity generated by the 
government. There was, no other occasion for active central 
bank intervention through OMO. In the wake of declining 
international reserves, the major source of reserve money 
was the heavy borrowings of the government from the Central 
Bank, during 1956-1959. On the other hand, the money multi- 
plier varied between 1.61 and 1.93 and appeared to be more 
influential than the credit multiplier, which fluctuated 
between 0.82-1.43 during the same period. 
Overall, therefore, monetary policy during this 
period was essentially conservative and 'traditional'. It 
was considered that short term fluctuations were better 
controlled through automatic adjustments or by fiscal 
p. olicy instruments such as export taxes. Changes in exter- 
nal assets continued to be the most important determinant 
of the money supply. Bank lending within the country was 
geared to foreign trade and the volume of bank credit to 
the private sector, was largely demand determined. The 
modern weapons of central banking played hardly any signif- 
icant role. in-the events of this. period. On the other hand, 
the Central Bank's conventional powers for influencing 
monetary developments were not, used at all according to 
Gunasekera (1962). To a large, extent therefore, fiscal- 
policy, was responsible for economic stabilization during 
this period and was complemented by monetary, policy. 
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3.2.2 The Years of Control and Adaptation: 1960-1976. 
The period after 1960 was characterized by intensi- 
fied control over the major macro economic variables. 
Monetary policy was adjusted in line with the administra- 
tively controlled economy. Changing economic events in the 
1960s were more complex than in the 1950s and the major 
policy considerations that guided general economic thinking 
during this period were three-fold. First, foreign exchange 
reserves were no longer adequate to sustain a sizable flow 
of imports and corrective action was needed to reduce the 
level of imports and provide BOP support. Second, the 
rising debt service pro blem had to be arrested through a 
reduction in foreign borrowing on the one hand, and a rise 
in exports on the other. Third, inflationary pressures 
caused by enhanced monetary expansion in the previous 
decade had to be contained to restore price stability. 
Confronted with these three upper most policy considera- 
tions, the authorities saw an administratively controlled 
policy framework as a desirable course of action. 
During the late 50s domestic demand, and in part- 
icular, the spending of the government and the private 
sector, continued to expand beyond the country's long term 
growth potential and the economy lived beyond its means at 
the expense of a, widening trade deficit. These economic 
events during the early 1960s caused monetary management to 
deviate from the more general controls to the use of admin- 
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istrative and selective credit'controls'(SCCs). The chang- 
ing art of centr'al banking during the 1960s followed by 
many Asian countries' considered SCCs as one of the effec- 
tive methods of handling situations'in which market mecha- 
nisms fail to work. 'For a detailed review see Bank Negara 
Malaysia (1984). As'the 1960s progressed the Central Bank 
began to shift its focus to the performance of aggregates 
such 'as the volume of bank-credit. Direct controls, in 
particular, credit rationing (CRY was considered an inpor- 
tant transmission channel'. 
In the first half of the 1960s several monetary 
policy measures were introduced to provide BOP support. 
These included upward I revisions in the BR, SRRs and the 
introduction of special reserves on incremental deposits. 
Other measures introduced included margins of letters of 
credit, rationing of import I credit, control over credit 
operations finance'and'hire purchase companies, restric- 
tions on credit to resident and non-resident companies 
registered in Sri Lanka. In broader terms, these measures 
were intended to help contain aggregate demand and dampen 
the flow of imports. In terms of action the first priority 
was to provide BOP support. In view of the steady deterio- 
ration of the country's terms of trade, by mid 1960, the 
import programme was brought within an Annual Foreign 
Exchange Budget. (Annual Report 1965, Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka). In addition, exchange controls were introduced on 
foreign travel and capital transfers. Restrictions were 
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also placed on the purchase of estates by both local and 
foreign companies. To complement these foreign exchange 
controls, on the fiscal front, import duties*were raised on 
a number of occasions during the second half of 1960. While 
tying up fiscal and exchange control measures with more 
general type monetary policy measures, SCCs were seen as 
useful to support domestic production and exports. Maximum 
interest rates and interest chargeable by banks on advances 
in respect of production and exports were fixed at, rates 
which prevailed in August 1960 subject to the condition 
that these rates should in no circumstances exceed 6 per 
cent per annum. 
The second concern was the absorption of excess 
liquidity. SRRs were raised to-tackle the liquidity problem 
and were further supported by the introduction of- marginal 
reserve requirements QIRRs) in the form of special reserves 
equal to 38 per cent-on any-increase in demand deposits 
over the level of such liabilities as at February, 1961. 
The impact of MRRs was, however, cushioned by the till-cash 
concession allowed to commercial banks, in that'50 per. cent 
of the required "reserves could be'held in the form of 
currency'-notes and coins. The till cash concession was 
further raised to 75 per cent during the same year. ' To 
discourage commercial banks from resorting to Central Bank 
funds, the BR was raised from 2.5 to 4 per cent per annum. 
Thirdly; monetary policy was also- designedý to' 
strengthen and further devel I op existing'financial''institu- 
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tions and establish new credit facilities. To provide 
further support to priority areas, the Central Bank estab- 
lished-the- Medium and Long Term Credit Fund (MLCF) in May, 
1964. With effect from August 1964 advances granted under 
the MLCF by commercial banks and credit institutions for 
the promotion and development of industries or agriculture 
was fixed at 3 per cent per annum. The-refinance rate for 
the purchase of machinery and new tea factories was fixed 
at 5 per cent with a similar margin to credit institutions. 
The intensification of import control measures along with 
tight monetary and credit policy resulted in an enhanced 
demand. for funds primarily for speculative purposes. 
Against this background, in May 1965, -the BR was increased 
from 4 to 5 per cent per annum thus limiting the general 
accommodation to commercial banks. The CR was further 
strengthened thereby minimizing the availability of credit 
to non-essential purposes. On the other hand, to provide 
concessions to production and priority areas the Bank 
refinanced the commercial banks at 3 per cent per annum on 
credit to co-operatives for purposes of purchasing and 
storing agricultural products. The Peoples Bank, one of the 
state banks, which was exempted from MRRs, was required to 
maintain a special reserve of 28 per cent on incremental 
deposits. 
There are a number of reasons for the change in 
attitude- of the authorities in terms of monetary policy 
stance., Firstly, by mid 1965, the authorities felt that a 
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greater co-ordination and structural adjustment support 
from an outside agency was necessary to cope with emerging 
problems in the economy. Hence, the SCCs were withdrawn and 
lending restrictions on overdraft facilities to foreign 
firms other than those in export trade were reduced. Sec- 
ondly, the relaxation of these policy measures had been a 
part of an overall stabilization programme in support of 
which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided facil- 
ities under the Stand by Agreement. Moreover, price in- 
creases during the first half of 1960s were less than 1 per 
cent and this did not require restrictive monetary policy 
measures. Third, to cope with these developments and the 
excess liquidity situation more general type monetary 
policy measures were resorted to thereby avoiding the use 
of SCCs and CR. 
Table 3.2 shows the performance of. the major macro 
economic indicators over the period 1965 to 1976. During 
the latter half of the 1960s price increases measured in 
terms of the CCPI rose to a peak of 5.9 per cent. The 
unprecedented, increase, in pri ces after 1970 reflected the 
impact of the first oil shock in 1973. Towards the end of 
this period monetary expansion stood above 30 per cent 
although the CCPI dropped to 1.2 per cent during 1975/1976 
period. The heavy reliance of the budget on the banking 
system and the unabated liquidity expansion therefore cast 
doubts on the efficacy of some of the monetary policy 
measures during this period. The current account balance 
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reduced from its negative level (Rs. 393 million ) to Rs. 50 
million during 1975/1976, indicating an improvement in the 
BOP. During the latter part of this period both investment 
and domestic savings (as a ratio of GDP) dropped. 
As far 'as the effectiveness of monetary policy 
followed during this period is concerned, we observe sever- 
al major features. First, the type of monetary policy 
measures used during this period suggests that the CR was 
considered the main channel of the transmission process. 
Second, no consideration was given to control the reserve 
money or money/credit multipliers through direct monetary 
policy instruments such as OMO. The SRRs were used as a 
means of raising the cost of funds to commercial banks. 
However, this measure was ineffective in affecting the 
money/credit multipliers mainly due to the till cash con- 
cession granted to banks. The credit multiplier (cm)' fluc- 
tuated in a range'of 1.11 to 1.94 while the money multipli- 
er (mm) ranged between 1.29 and 1.54. During this period 
the money /credit multipliers appear to have been-more 
influential than the reserve money. Third, apart from the 
establishment of the Peoples' Bank and the nationalization 
of the 'Bank-of Ceylon, financial innovation in terms of 
institutional developments, new instruments and banking 
facilities showed no progress. 
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Table 3.2 
Major Macro-Economic Indicators 1965-1976 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1965/1966 1969/1970 1975/1976 
Rate of Growth of GDP l/ 3.2 8.3 9.1 
Rate of Growth of GNP l/ 2.6 8.1 8.9 
Rate of Growth of per capita 
GNP 2/ 5.8 7.2, 
Colombo Consumers' Price Index 
(% change December -December 2.2 1.2 
% change in Ml -3.3 4.5 34.9 
% change in M2 -1- 7 9.2 32.9 
% change in Domest ic Credit 0: 4 9.8 23.2 
change in External Banking 
Assets (Net) 0.8 0.3 130.0 
11 1965 -1970 
Investment 3/ 18.9 
Domestic Savings 3/ - 15.8 
Government Revenue 3/, 23.3 28.0 
RsIU. S. $ 4.76 5.95 
Rs/SDR 4.76 5.95 
Trade Balance (Rs. Mn. ) -5 -316 
-Current Account Balance (Rs. Mn. ) -47- -393 
1976 
16.2 
13.9 
20.4 
8.46 
9.76 
-710 
- 50 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1/ =% current factor cost prices 
2/ = current prices 
3/ = as a per cent of GDP 
Source: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanký. 
On the whole, between 1960 and 1977 the administra- 
tively controlled monetary and credit policy package was 
implemented as a remedy for BOP problems and domestic price 
instability. Most policy instruments were geared to provide 
BOP support. Policy thinking was guided by the fact that 
imports should be restricted and domestic supply be promot- 
ed through SCCs. In this regard, broader policy ýinstruments 
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such as exchange rates and interest rate policies were not 
considered important. Import controls were chosen to reduce 
the huge outlay on imports while the SCCs were used to 
promote exports and implicitly, import substitution; 'The 
changes in the-economic environment, policy-thinking'in an 
administrative framework and ideas on the working of the 
MTM were largely responsible for monetary--and price insta- 
bility observed by the end of 1976. It -may however, - be 
added that when compared to the 1950-1959 period there had 
been a better co-ordination among the policy making author- 
ities, although the support from the fiscal front was 
minimal. CR and SCCs also had their adverse effects due to 
inefficient allocation of resources and the circumvention 
of ceilings by the private sector with respect to bank 
borrowings. It is also important to note that over-reliance 
on SCCs and the CR channel inhibited the growth of a dynam- 
ic and an outward looking financial structure. The banking 
sector was allowed to play a limited role in providing 
banking services and they were not aggressive in mobilizing 
resources; which was reflected in the shortfall of loanable 
funds. On the other hand, the intensification of the SCCs 
enhanced the demand for funds primarily for speculative 
purposes and the building up of stocks. This was further 
aggravated by the short supply of goods and services and 
restrictions on imports. 
Over this period, the interest rate was used only 
as the price of capital, but not as an instrument to re- 
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store stability. Despite the low interest rate policy 
designed to provide cheap credit investments remained at 
relatively low levels due to several other adverse factors, 
such as, administrative controls, fear of nationalization 
and rigid controls on imports. Therefore, the low interest 
rate policy not only failed to promote investment but also 
adversely affected the activities of the private sector due 
to the preemption of credit by the government at cheap 
rates through the rupee securities and Treasury bills. 
SRRs were used tolimit the credit creating capaci- 
ty-of commercialýbanks but the till cash concession moder- 
ated the effectiveness of this instrument. OMO was not 
considered as an effective instrument to absorb 'excess 
liquidity. instead, SCCs and the CR were used as major 
instruments to contain credit to the private sector while 
the government continued to preempt credit from the banking 
system. Despite determined efforts, the absorption of 
excess liquidity was not very successful due to the rela- 
tive ineffectiveness of policy instruments. Moreover, SCCs 
and the CR were ineffective in arresting demand pressures 
which emanated from the supply constrained economy. By 
1976, monetary and price developments indicated considera- 
ble instability which in fact, called for concerted and 
effective action in which monetary policy was expected to 
play a more aggressive role. 
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3.2.3 Towards Mature Monetary Manaciement: 1977-1985 
There, was a--fundamental'shift in Sri Lanka's- over- 
all development 'strategies -in November 1977' when it 
launched a new policy-package based on liberalized economic 
policies. ý The basic objective of the'policy stance was to 
lay the foundation-for rapid and balanced economic growth. 
The initial adjustment package included-the dismantling 'of 
direct, controls-on prices,, imports and-external payments, 
retrenchment of government operations in processing and 
distributing basic commodities, provision of adequate 
incentives to producers, and the adoption of a flexible 
exchange rate policy. This policy package was supported by 
two stand-by arrangements with the IMF (4th quarter of 
1977-1978 and during 1983) and the Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) covering the period 1979-1981. 
The ambitious fiscal policy accompanied-by a- heavy 
investment-programme required a large sum of funds, from the 
domestic economy. In this context, there was a greater need 
to --provide BOP support through-monetary policy measures. 
Moreover, the-monetary and price -, instability experienced 
during the previous year called upon monetary policy to 
play an aggressive role to restore stability. In 1976, Ml 
rose by 35 per cent, while broad money M2 grew by 32 per 
cent. The -substantial growth in external' banking assets 
(net) and a sharp increaselin-domestic credit, were the 
principal-factors underlying the monetary expansion' during 
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1976. - Confronted, with these problems, monetary policy had 
to- be, designed to achieve the objectives of the post-1977 
economic -reforms. -This-required several policy measures. 
One of, the-salient features in-the formulation of monetary 
policy was to influence the MTM through the interest rate 
channel and to deviate from the CR and administrative 
controls that existed prior to 1977. This reflected a major 
shift in thinking with respect to the working of the MTM 
and the choice of techniques in monetary management. 
For , convenience, the post-1977 period is catego- 
rized into two sub-periods: ý1977-1981, and, 1982-1985. The 
restoration of money -and price stability was theý- main 
objective during the first period, while establishing a base 
for longer term economic, growth, was the prime concern 
during ýIthe latter period. A common objective during both 
periods was toýdevelop the money market and promote the 
financial structure, which forms-an important part of the 
broader objectives of national economic policy, namely, to 
bring about a sustained-growth in output, employment and 
investment. As explained in Jayamaha (1986 a), the key role 
of the, Central Bank was to provide a monetary environment 
conducive to the attainment of these objectives. 
a. Restoration of Stability: 1977-1981 
Between 1977 and 1978, the external environment was 
subject to-pressure arising from high inflation and growing 
imbalances in-external payments among the major industrial 
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countries. This led, to*turmoil, in international currency 
markets centering on the marked weakening of the U. S. 
dollar. ýProtectionist. sentiments in industrialý countries 
also threatened to increase according to Bank Negara Malay- 
sia (1984). 
On the domestic front, rapid monetary expansion 
presented formidable problems of demand management. Since 
excess growth in the money supply was not counteracted by-a 
parallel growth in domestic production, this exerted upward 
pressure on prices. The liberalized trade policy introduced 
after several years of restrictions triggered an increase 
in the demand for imports leading to BOP problems. In 
response to these developments, monetary policy measures 
initiated in 1977 continued to be in force during 1977- 
1981. Policy thinking at this stage centered around the 
view that stability is a precondition for economic growth. 
The policy instruments therefore, included inter-alia, 
increases in interest rates (the raising of the BR and the 
introduction of a penal rate), quantitative restrictions on 
accommodation to commercial banks, raising of SRRs, OMO, 
the introduction of SCCs, credit planning and moral sua- 
sion. 
As far as interest rate policy was concerned, the 
interest rate was considered as an effective channel for 
the monetary transmission process. The objectives of the 
high interest- rate reform were several fold., First, - it 
aimed at ensuring positive rates of return on deposits, 
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thus promoting financial savings. Second, the interest 
rate was used to reflect the true cost of funds, thereby 
arresting the growing demand pressure and discouraging the 
demand for non-essential credit. Third, high interest rates 
were expected to determine the price of capital through 
market forces. The administratively fixed interest rates 
prior to 1977 were seen as a deterrent to the growth of 
sub-markets and therefore, the development of a market- 
oriented interest rate system was designed to respond more 
promptly and efficiently to changing market conditions. In 
August 1977, by raising the interest rates of the National 
Savings Bank (NSB), the money market was guided to increase 
deposit rates. The commercial banks and finance companies 
followed suit. The increase of the BR and the introduction 
of the penal rates (PRs) were used to set the pace with 
respect to lending rates. By end 1977, therefore, the 
entire interest rate structure was raised to a higher 
4/ 
plateau The effectiveness of this policy on monetary and 
price developments was illustrated by the annual increases 
in the narrow money supply dropping below 30 per cent by 
end 1977, to 11 per cent in 1978, and 6 per cent in 1981. 
In terms of the major macro economic aggregates the Sri 
Lankan economy recovered sharply in 1978 from the depressed 
conditions of the previous years and was poised for further 
expansion in 1979 and 1980 (see Appendix Table 3.1). 
We turn now to the effectiveness *of the monetary 
policy package introduced'in the-post 1977-period. 
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Despite the enforcement of the restrictive monetary 
measures, money and price developments were not consistent 
with the'performances of the realsector during the latter 
half, of 1979 and throughout 1980. , The, policy stance, 
therefore, was directed at rationalizing the, existing 
package and improving its- effectiveness. " Central Bank 
accommodati'on, to commercial -banksýwas reduced and, the 
graduated scale of penal rates, was raised to a higher range 
of 15-25 per, cent per annum in 1979., To take an overall 
stock, of liquidity and to safeguard the interests, of depos- 
itors, the activities of finance companies -were brought 
under control by the Finance. Company Act of 1979. Moreover, 
the international economic and financial-environment in. -the 
early 1980's posed new challenges-to the-conduct of mone- 
tary policy. The world economy in-this period was charac- 
terized by a-severe and prolonged global recession accompa- 
nied- by high energy prices. in'the wake of the "second oil 
shock" of 1979-80, -and severe global inflation stemming 
from price pressures'-and persistently high interest rates. 
See the IMF Survey (1982). In these circumstances, monetary 
management had not only to counter the dampening effects of 
world recession, especially the potential contractionary 
impact on domestic liquidity emanating from a weakening 
external sector, but a lso to maintain monetary stability in 
order not to fuel further inflation or to worsen the BOP. 
These considerations and large budget deficits required 
monetary policy to be selectively accommodative in its 
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overall stance and to encourage the growth of private 
sector investment. 
- Problems on the domestic front were also important. 
To begin with, deficit financing by the government through 
borrowings from the banking system increased liquidity in 
the system -in the two years ended 19M There was -also 
heavy pressure from the private sector for-bank funds''as 
vehicle importers were given-fiscal incentives to import 
used vehicles under the Lump Sum Depreciation (LSD) Facili- 
ty. Despite the reduction in accommodation under the BR and 
the increase of penalty rates, commercial banks' continued 
5/ 
to depend on Central Bank funds at high PRs. During the 
latter half of 1980, while external assets exerted moderate 
pressure, domestic assets rose to unprecedentedly high 
levels, largely due to the lack of fiscal support to con- 
tinue with the monetary policy package launched in 1977. 
Activities of both government and the private sector, 
resulted in a growth of domestic credit by 72 per cent in 
1980 ( see Appendix Table, 3.1). 
Secondly, in 1980 the economy clearly displayed 
problems associated with the liberalized economic policies 
introduced earlier. Financial support given by the IMF 
through an EFF came to a halt since performance under the 
programme did not comply with the initial objectives. This 
situation not only questioned the efficacy of monetary 
policy instruments but also emphasized the need for a 
coordinated macro-economic policy framework if the country 
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was to achieve its stability and development objectives. 
Further tightening of monetary policy measures without 
adequate fiscal discipline proved to be counter-productive. 
As the "crowding out" effect already preempted funds by the 
government from the banking system, heavy demand for credit 
by the private sector exerted liquidity constraints on 
banks. Despite the build-up of deposits through high inter- 
est rates, banks were unable to cater to the rising demand 
and hence,, ' resorted to borrowings from the Central Bank at 
high PRs thus raising reserve money (RM). The M2 multiplier 
rose rapidly from 2.8 to 3.2 and consequently, 142 rose by 
32 per cent in 1980. Reflecting these developments, the 
CCPI rose by 25 per cent indicating the continuation of 
double digit inflation, while the returns on financial 
deposits remained at negative levels throughout 1980. This 
situation casts doubts on the efficacy of the interest rate 
instrument as it was unable to restore price stability on 
the one hand, and mobilize domestic savings at desirable 
levels on the other. While monetary policy was confronted 
with domestic financial instability, the real effective 
exchange rate appreciated in the two years ended 1981. The 
need to absorb excess liquidity through effective OMO was 
greater. This called upon the government to make concerted 
efforts to reduce budget deficits, reschedule the massive 
investment plan on a priority basis and to reduce depend- 
ence on Bank funds. 
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Since 1981 there has been a more coordinated policy 
package and a more restrictive approach beginning in the 
first half of 1981. Since late 1980 both Ml and M2 (Ml + 
time and savings deposits of the public held with commer- 
cial banks) were considered as monetary targets. The high 
interest rate policy and the public's resort to interest- 
bearing financial assets and the quickened pace of FI 
fundamentally altered the character of the public's mone- 
tary assets and, therefore, strengthened the case for using 
M2 as an intermediate target. 
Second, in view of the enhanced liquidity, setting 
out money and credit targets was seen as necessary. For the 
first time, the Central Bank prepared a National Credit 
Plan (NCP) in 1981. Based on the available resources in the 
system (Monetary Survey) and planned credit disbursements 
of commercial banks, the NCP set out money and credit 
targets. This enabled the Bank to initiate prompt action 
where the growth paths of these aggregates deviated from 
targets. The NCP also helped to channel bank credit to 
predetermined priority sectors and was supplementary to the 
existing demand management policy measures. The announce- 
ment of the withdrawal of the LSD facility for vehicle 
importers at end March 1981 resulted in an unprecedented 
demand for credit by the private sector during the first 
quarter of 1981. Therefore, as a third policy measure within 
the coordinated policy framework, the Central Bank intro- 
duced a short term credit ceiling effective 11th May, 1981 
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on the private sector to bring down domestic credit. The BR 
was raised from 12 to 14 per cent per annum in the 2nd half 
of 1981 and accommodation under the BR was reduced to 
Rs. 108 million. The penal rate structure was raised from a 
range of 20-30 per cent per annum to a range of 21-30 per 
cent per annum. The SRR on demand deposits was raised from 
12 to 14 per cent while the ratio on time and savings 
deposits was raised to 6 per cent per annum. This was 
further augmented by the introduction of the Secondary 
Treasury bill (STB) market through which the Central Bank 
conducted limited OMOs. These measures together helped to 
absorb excess liquidity and reduce the credit creating 
capacity of commercial banks. 
By 1981 these reforms had achieved --a reasonable 
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degree of' price and monetary stability largely 'due to 
concerted efforts in'all policy-areas and greater fiscal 
discipline. Towards the end of 1981, although inflationary 
tendencies were visible, monetary expansion had stabilized 
and was no longer a significant source of inflationary 
pressures. 
Although-'the major"thrust-of, monetary policy intro- 
duced during 1977-1981, as, outlined'above, was-the, control 
of the aggregate demand and excess liquidity in order,, to 
restore stability and create'an': atmosphere conducive -to 
investment and economic growth,,,, the'-desirability of supply 
management Policy was not altogether ignored during this 
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period. To support1priority sectors-,. -the Central Bank took 
several initiatives after 1977. Among these, the introduc- 
tion of a Pre-shipment-Export, Credit Refinance Facility and 
the enhancement of-funds available under this facility from 
Rs. 100 million in, 1977 to Rs. 590 million by end 1981 were 
significant. The interest rate-, instrument was also used 
selectively to provide concessionary finance to priority 
sectors under several-refinance schemes. The provision of 
long term capital, through the establishment of development 
banks also received-priority during this period, including 
the establishment of the National Development Bank (NDB) to 
finance project loans and other, medium and, long term indus- 
tries- and the amalgamation ofýthe-Agriculture and , Invest- 
ment Credit Corporation (AICC) and the State Mortgage Bank 
(SMIB) in 1979. These supply promotional initiatives taken 
by the Central Bank were supported by the availability of 
funds under the IMF stand-by programme. 
It is-important to emphasize the significant fea- 
tures -of the monetary-policy stance during 1977-1981. 
First, there, was a., clear departure from the administrative 
controls and in particular, the CR and, the SCCs that were 
frequently used prior, to 1977. Instead, the cost of credit 
was raised to discourage non-essential ýborrowings whilst 
channeling credit to needy sectors. The second was that 
only after 1981 was there-a concerted-coordination between 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies-- 
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b. Development Efforts and Surveillance on Stability: 
1982-1985 
Having achieved a reasonable degree of monetary and 
price stability by end 1981, the promotion of the supply 
side, while keeping stability under close surveillance, was 
the prime concern during this period. A second objective 
was the development of the money market and the financial 
structure. Adverse effects of high interest rates, in 
particular, the high cost of credit were reflected in the 
low level of activities of the private sector. 1982 being 
an election year, recorded only a few changes in monetary 
policy. -However, it was considered desirable to revise 
downwards the interest rate structure with a, view to intro- 
ducing -greater flexibility and establishing more- market 
oriented rates. 
The immediate objective of the monetary authorities 
was to restore stability prior to growth. 1983 posed sever- 
al problems for monetary management. In the first half, 
government borrowings from the banking system were at 
moderate level. However, the pent up demand for credit from 
the private sector following political stability after the 
election, and the enhanced demand for working capital in 
the tea sector in late 1983 raised private sector credit to 
very high levels. Confronted with an unexpected overshoot 
of its money growth targets, the Central Bank wished to 
restore stability before addressing development issues and 
therefore, in late 1983 a short term credit ceiling was 
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introduced. Simultaneously, the availability of funds to 
commercial banks under the PRs was withdrawn. 
Secondly, during the first half of 1983 demand for 
M1 balances and bank reserves was high. Credit demand was 
also strong following the reduction in interest rates. As'a 
result, a supplementary refinance facility was introduced 
to provide relief to non-traditional exports. -The immediate 
objective of this move was to increase the competitiveness 
of non-traditional exporters as the exchange rate was not 
adequately remunerative. 
.,, In generalý monetary policy during the two' years 
ended 1985 was aimed at supporting economic growth . The 
basic, stance of, monetary policy was to emphasize the promo- 
tion of domestic savings, a better balance between national 
savings and investment as well as a viable BOP situation. 
Consolidation--of the government's financial position and 
maintaining an `even keel" in monetary conditions, I -were 
considered , as important, aspects in effecting, structural 
adjustments but, did not receive'adequate support at the 
implementation,. - stage. In addition, a gradual reduction in 
interest rates remained a desired objective. Both compo- 
nents of the money supply i. e. the RM and mm were consid- 
ered as ITs with equal importance. To make monetary policy 
7/ 
more effective, a combination of general and SCCs were 
used in more complex situations. SCCs were used to contain 
the non-essential demand for funds on the one hand, and 
ensure adequate credit for priority sectors on the other. 
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These measures helped to reduce private sector credit from 
20 per cent in the first quarter of 1984 to 17 per cent by 
the end of the year (see Appendix Table 3.1). However, 
credit expansion in 1985 was rapid and much stronger in 
relation to GDP growth. Both money and credit multipliers 
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dropped due to the sharp deceleration in external assets 
and absorption of excess liquidity through OMO. 
Appendix Table 3.1 shows the behaviour of the major 
macro economic-aggregates during the 1977-1985 period. As 
seen from the table, the two years ended 1985 were charac- 
terized- by a deceleration of prices. The prospects for 
further oil price -declines -helped dampen inflationary 
expectations and the market responded positively to in- 
creases in food supplies. The drop in inflation (9.5 per 
cent in 1984 and further to 1.5 pet cent in 1985) was 
further illustrated by the drop in income velocities of 
both narrow and broad money from 9.3 and 3.5 in 1984 to 8.6 
and 3.2 respectively, in 1985 suggesting that the high 
growth in Ml in 1985 did not imply the same inflationary 
potential as in-the past. 
Towards the end of this period several monetary 
policy measures were taken to promote growth objectives. To 
lower the interest rate structure the Central Bank set the 
pace with a reduction in refinance rates in early 1985 and 
the BR later in the year. Money market conditions were 
easier -, so that'interest rates continued to move downwards 
98 
9/ 
during 1985. -The gradual decline in'interest rates ap- 
peared to have stimulated (with the usual lag of some 
months) a sizable increase in the demand for M1 and gradual 
shifts of quasi-money and liquid funds Out of money' market 
instruments. 'The' two years-ended'1985 experienced mixed 
results in monetary management. Despite forceful monetary 
policy measures, liquidity and money incomes remained at 
undesirable levels'and government fiscal operations placed 
heavy reliance' on the banking system largely due to the 
drop' in export- revenue and heavy defense expenditure. 
Although economic conditions began to deteriorate, 
emerging'-civil unrest prevented 'appropriate and- timely 
policy -responses. 'Therefore, ' efforts to reduce the fiscal 
deficit, to provide more resources for investment and to 
reduce pressure on monetary policy did not become a reali- 
ty. 
3.3 DeveloDnent Of The-Financial Structure 
It is important to highlight the steps taken to 
promote the financial structure within the monetary policy 
package due to its'importance in the process of transmit- 
ting 'monetary'policy to'the rest of the economy. Although 
adverse international and domestic'economi6 and 'fiýancial 
conditions preoccupied monetary management in the post 1977 
period the Central'Bank, was'mindful'of'the''need to develop 
and strengthen the-financial structure to - cope with new 
challenges faced by the economy. Development of the' finan- 
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cial structure-was also*expected to'facilitate the working 
of the MTM and the Bank played a prominent role in this 
regard after 1977. The fastest development in the banking 
sector took place during 1977-1985 following the introduc- 
tion of ne w economic policies including greater competition 
in the banking industry. To encourage foreign investment 
and trade, branches of internationally reputed foreign 
commercial banks were allowed to commence operations in Sri 
Lanka. Secondly, existing banks were encouraged to expand 
their branch network and further banking services. In 
addition, the-Central Bank opened three regional offices to 
promote regional banking and a, network of unit banking was 
introduced through- Regional Rural Development Banks 
(RRDBs). The branch expansion had considerable feedback on 
monetary policy in-that, the mobilization of resources into 
the institutional network was important. Accrual of re- 
sources to-the-NSB considerably reduced the pressure on the 
banking sector! s funds for government operations and the 
expanded branch network also helped-to-reduce transactions 
of ICMs and further the banking services-in outstations. 
Monetary policy also supported dynamism in the 
b anking industry. The liberalized economic policies and the 
associated trading activities necessitated sophisticated 
banking in Sri Lanka. For details see Jayamaha (1985). The 
rapidly growing export/import. trade demanded specialized 
banking services while the, growing, economy needed flexible 
attitudes towards risky lending., For example, limited off- 
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shore'banking was introduced in-1979-ý 
Attractive concessions were also made available 
under the "Non-Resident Foreign Currency Accounts" (NRFC) 
scheme and the "Special Accounts". Finally, the Central 
Bank encouraged the establishment of "Merchant Banks" in 
the early 1980s as a new dimension primarily, aimed at 
providing financial consultancy and facilitating ancillary 
services in-the banking sector-. (Jayamaha -andý Jayatissa, 
1984). 
It seems, therefore, that the open economic policy 
adopted after 1977 and the support given through monetary 
policy la rgely contributed to innovations in the banking 
industry. - These developments no doubt challenged monetary 
policy in dealing with the emerging problems. In addition 
to the easing of the transmission process, F1 also helped 
to contain RM at desired levels as emerging short term 
outlets provided funds for those who needed them. By end 
1985, the monetary and banking environment in Sri Lanka had 
been transformed radically under the auspices of aggressive 
monetary policy resulting in a greater degree of financial 
intermediation. 
3.4 Summarv and Concludina Observations 
- In adopting strategies for monetary policy over the 
past three and'a half decades, we observed that the authori- 
ties -. were confronted by a number of basic issues. These 
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included - the lack of fiscal discipline, the slow adjust- 
ment of the exchange rate in pursuit of monetary policy 
objectives, the establishment of stability prior to growth 
and the choice of policy instruments in affecting the 
transmission process. In addition, there were problems 
arising from adjustments needed to cope with FI and from 
the essentially ad hoc nature of monetary policy. 
Secondly, although confronted with the above prob- 
lems, monetary, management in Sri Lanka over the, last 35 
years gathered considerable experience and-progressed 
towards maturity. A relatively easy"monetary policy-- stance 
was adopted throughout the 1950's and' monetary measures 
were' basically accommodative. The role, ofýmonetary -policy 
was -confined mainly to promote-stable monetary conditions 
consistent with, the growing needs of an ýexpanded economy 
and maintaining, the purchasingýpower, of the national cur- 
rency. In the pioneering years, monetary policy was comple- 
mentary to fiscal'policy which held-the main responsibility 
for implementing the stabilization programme of an emerging 
nation. Traditional central banking advocated "stability" 
as the-prime concern and therefore, the'use of general, and 
quantitative-type-monetary, policy measures-were, considered 
adequate. On the other hand, -monetary and credit expansion 
remained moderate and-price-developments were at reasonable 
levels. Monetary policy wasýnot concerned about the devel- 
opment of the financial structure as an objective of mone- 
tary'policy'and hence, problems associated with the FI did 
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not arise. 
We noted that the period 1960 to 1976 was charac- 
terized by administrative controls, restrictions on exter- 
nal payments and the accommodation of the growing financial 
needs of the government under the controlled -regime. 
Monetary policy was called upon to fall in line with these 
policy prescriptions thus establishing-a reasonable degree 
of co-ordination among, the major macro economic variables. 
As the 1960's progressed, the country was, faced with eco- 
nomic problems including slow economic growthand external 
financing constraints. Often, fiscal-deficits were high and 
the exchange rate was out of, line. Although fiscal policy 
maintained the key role in economic development, monetary 
policy was accorded more responsibility to deal with relat- 
ed problems. The market mechanism was suppressed- by con- 
trols and there was no FI. CR was considered as the major 
vehicle for the MTM. The outcome of the policies pursued 
during the 1960's was illustrated by the high rate of 
expansion of money and credit displaying greater financial 
instability. The extensive use of CR and SCCs not only 
resulted in counter-productive results as the economy 
experienced severe imbalances in demand and supply but also 
did not allow the establishment of systematic effects in 
the short run. The disruption of the working of the market 
mechanism resulted in an irrational allocation of funds as 
these sectors have not contributed to significant changes 
in the economic structure. 
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We observed a clear departure from this policy 
stance to a more aggressive and an open policy package in 
1977. This was a landmark in the history of monetary policy 
in Sri Lanka. Liberalized economic policies and ambitious 
investment plans by the government posed numerous problems 
for monetary policy. Some of these were contained effec- 
tively through monetary policy which thus displayed a 
greater degree of maturity. Experience drawn from the past 
helped the monetary authorities to act more cautiously and 
to formulate policies in keeping with national priorities. 
Monetary targets were set within this framework and in many 
instances appropriate measures were used to achieve the 
objectives. The over-ambitious investment programme of the 
government however, reduced the efficacy of monetary policy 
instruments that were in force during the first few years 
after 1977. 
Monetary policy underwent several radical changes 
during the period 1977-1985. Having gone through the 
accommodative 1950's and rigid controls in the 1960's a 
wide array of monetary policy measures were used to come to 
grips with emerging problems. While this chapter reviewed 
the specific issues that monetary policy was confronted 
with, it has also attempted to highlight the lessons to 
draw from the past. 
The first lesson to note is that the fiscal re- 
straint is a necessary component of, economic adjustment 
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strategy and effective monetary management. Throughout the 
35 years ended 1985, monetary policy has been very effec- 
tive in those years in which fiscal policy displayed a 
greater discipline. It is also important to note that 
undue restraints introduced through monetary policy meas- 
ures due to lack of fiscal discipline has led to under- 
performance of the economy, particularly during the 1960S 
and in 1980 and 1985. Moreover, there has been no proper 
timing with respect to borrowings from the banking system. 
A second lesson refers to the fact that the enhancement of 
refinance facilities to the private sector, although in- 
creasing the RM, had to be continued in order to make 
exporters more competitive. A reasonable intermediate 
objective of any changes to the present exchange rate 
system* would be to maintain enough flexibility in real 
exchange rates to aid external adjustment. 
A third lesson'to draw from past experience is to 
treat''the development of the financial structure - as an 
important objective which would mobilize greater savings in 
the economy if sustained production-is to be financed. In' 
the process, maintenance of public confidence in the finan- 
cial structure is crucial. During the 1950's no-attention 
was paid to this aspect of monetary policy and the' con-' 
trolled system in the 1960's was also not conducive to- the 
development--, of-the financial structure. The period 1977- 
1985 was characterized by considerable FI, and todayý-there 
is not only a diversified and 'Competitive financial struc- 
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ture, but a system that is capable of transmitting monetary 
policy action to the other sectors in the economy. 
Finally, and perhaps most important of all are the 
difficulties experienced in monetary policy formulation as 
a result of working without a coordinated framework. Prob- 
lems confronted by monetary management in the 1950's were 
simpler than those of the 1960's, and thereafter. Being a 
newly established Central Bank, monetary policy could not 
have foreseen complex situations and worked within a coor- 
dinated framework. The 1960s and the early 1970s saw a 
concentration on ad hoc measures within the framework of 
controls. Despite recognition of the fact that monetary 
policy could be made an effective tool of demand manage- 
ment, complemented by fiscal discipline, money's role in 
economic activities was not properly established, even 
during the 1977-1985 period. To gather prior information as 
to how related variables react to policy measures it is 
important to set intermediate and operational targets which 
are linked to ultimate targets. Had this aspect received 
adequate attention, an MCF for the conduct of monetary 
management might have been developed. Although monetary 
targets were set from 1981 onwards through the NCP and 
interest rates were consistently used as a vehicle of the 
MTM, progress was not reviewed at regular intervals in 
order to monitor the smooth working of this channel. Tar- 
gets have not been set on RM and therefore, there was no 
OTs which reflected the behaviour of the ITs. 
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The MCF that will be-developed in later chapters 
will focus onhow monetary policy, instruments might affect 
real variab les in the economy. This will help us to show 
how 
-monetary,, 
policy measures might be initiated in the 
context of. an established framework which would provide 
guidance to monetary management. 
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Foot Notes 
1. The main data source for this historical review are the 
Annual Reports of The Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
2. In August 1985 the name of the Central Bank of Ceylon 
was changed to The Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
3. The growth of prices'for 1950 and 1951 is calculated 
using 1939 as the base year (1939=100). 
4. The weighted average of commercial banks'lending rates 
rose from 9 per cent in 1976 to 12.8 per cent by the 
end of 1978. 
5. In 1980, the penal rate structure was further raised to 
a range of 20-30 per cent per annum. 
6. Ml and M2 rose by 6 per cent and 23 per cent, while the 
CCPI rose by 18 per cent in 1981. 
7. Banks were allowed to expand credit by not more than 5 
per cent of such advances granted and outstanding as on 
11th May, 1984 until further notice. 
8. Money multiplier dr*opped from 1.23 to 1.15 and, credit 
multiplier from 2.96 to 2.65 during 1985. 
9. The twelve month fixed deposit rate (at maturity was 
reduced from 20 to 18 per cent per annum. 
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APPENDIX-3.2 
Monetary Policy Measures, 1977-85 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Date Instrument/Measure Taken 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
January 1977: Interest rates; Bank rate was increased 
from 6.5 per cent to 8.5 per centyear. 
July 1977: Rediscount facility; for commercial 
bank was restricted to 7 per cent of 
selected assets outstanding on 
6/30/77, and excess became subject to 
penalty rate of 15 per cent per annum 
for first 30 days and an additional 
percentage point per annum for each 
additional 30-day period. 
August 1977: Interest rates; Bank rate was increased 
from 8.5 per cent to 10 per cent per 
year. 
September 1977: Interest rates; NSB deposit rates raised 
sharply and, as a result, commercial 
bank deposit and lending rates were 
revised upward correspondingly. 
November 107: Rediscount facility; limits were reduced 
from 7 per cent to 4 per cent of select- 
ed assets outstanding on 7/30/77. 
December 1977: Refinance credit; limit for export fi 
nancing was raised by SL Rs 100 million. 
December 1977: Reserve reguirement; till cash phased 
out as approved reserve account. 
March 1978: Selective credit ceilings; on commercial 
bank credit to non-bank companies en- 
gaged in lending and hire purchase were 
relaxed to exclude financing of capital 
equipment and commercial vehicles. 
June 1978: Selective credit ceilinas; on commercial 
bank credit to government corporations 
and statutory boards at 6/2/78 levels. 
July/August 1978 Selective credit ceilings; introduced on 
government corporations and statutory 
boards in June 1978, were adjusted 
upward 5 per cent and 12 per cent. 
ill 
September 1979: Rediscount facility; central bank credit 
in excess of quotas became subject, ýto 
gradual penalty rate scale from 15 per 
cent to 25 per cent per annum, depending 
on amount of excess. Total quotas were 
increased by SL Rs 210 million for 
export credit refinancing; individual 
banks' quotas were based on outstanding 
assets on 12/31/78 and 6/30/79. 
September 1979: Selective credit ceilings; on commercial 
bank credit to government corporations 
and statutory boards were withdrawn. 
April 1980: Interest rates; were increased: Bank 
rate from 10 per cent to 12 per cent per 
annum; Treasury bill rate from 9 per 
cent to 13 per, cent per annum; Govern- 
ment securities rate from 10 per cent-, to 
16 per cent per annum; and deposit 
rates of the NSB and commercial banks 
were revised upward. 
April 1980: Refinance facilities; - export credit 
refinance facilities were increased by 
15 per cent (to SL-Rs, 230 million). 
January 1981: Refinance 
refinanci 
from SL 
million, 
based on 
6/30/80. 
facilities; export ý credit 
ng facilities were increased 
Rs 230 million to SL Rs 530 
and allocated- among banks 
such credit on 3/31/80 and 
January 1981: Rediscount facility; quotas for general 
accommodation of banks were reduced-from 
4 cent to 3 per cent of selected assets 
on 8/31/80, or from SL Rs 473 million 
to SL Rs 462 million. 
April 1981: ODen Market Operations; Central Bank 
began resale of Treasury bills from its 
portfolio at rates above call market 
rates (net resale of Treasury bills was 
at Rs 684 million in 1981). 
May 1981: ' overall credit ceilings, were imposed on 
commercial banks at 5/11/81 levels until 
5/25/81, and at 3/31/81 levels thereaf- 
ter. 
June 1981: Overall credit ceilings; were removed on 
6/l/81. 
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June, 1981: Rediscount facility; total quotas for 
general accommodation were reduced from 
SL Rs 462 million to SL Rs 108 million 
with a minimum of SL Rs 1 million per 
bank. 
June 1981: Reserve recruirements; were raised from 
12 per cent to 14 per cent of demand 
deposits, and from 5 per cent to 6 per 
cent on time and savings deposits. 
August 1981: Interest rates; were increased: Bank rate 
from per cent to 14 per cent per 
annum; and Bank penalty rates_from 20-30 
per cent per annum to 21-30 per cent per 
annum. 
December 1981: National Credit Plan; was introduced to 
cover commercial bank credit to private 
sector and serve as a tool in'formulat- 
ing monetary policy, monitoring credit 
growth and ensuring adequate credit to 
priority sectors (exports, industry, 
agriculture and touriim). 
January 1982: Refinance facilities; rates and margins 
of such facilities were revised 
upward; refinance under medium- ' and 
long-term credi. t facility was increased 
from 80 per cent to 100 per cent of 
project cost; and export 
-pre-shipment credit facility increased from SL Rs 575 
million to SL Rs 590 million. 
February 1982: Selective credit ceilings;, banks. were 
allowed to lend to non-bank companies in 
excess of the 6/30/76 limit if loan was 
to be used for capital equipment and 
commercial vehicles. 
June 1982: Selective, credit ceilings; introduced in 
1962 on bank credit to residents or 
companies registered in Sri Lanka for 
the purchase of estates or immovables 
were withdrawn. , 
December 1982: Interest rates; the Treasury bill rate 
in the primary market was allowed to 
fluctuate within a small ma-r, g, 3,. n. 
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March 1983: Interest rates; were reduced: Bank rate 
reducea-fý-o-m14 per cent to 13 perý cent 
per annum; Most central bank refinance 
rates by one percentage point per annum; 
and Penalty rate range of 21-30 per 
cent per annum was replaced by a flat 
penalty rate of 20 per cent per annum. 
April 1983: Refinance facilities; access and bank 
margins for some medium- and long-term 
facilities were reduced. 
May 1983: Interest rates; yields on government 
securities were reduced from 16 per cent 
to 14 per cent per annum, together with 
an extension of maturities from three 
years to five years. 
June 1983: Refinance facilities; limit for export 
refinance was increased from SL Rs 590 
million to-SL Rs 1,200 million while 
the rates and margins on bank refinanc- 
ing were reduced by one percentage point 
(to 10 per cent and 3 per cent per 
annum, respectively). 
September-1983: Refinance facilities; limit for export 
refinance was increased by 10 per cent, 
to SL Rs 1,320 million. 
November 1983: Overall credit ceilings.; were imposed on 
commercial banks (on November 1) at 
levels outstanding on 10/31/83. 
November 1983: Overall credit ceilings; were removed on 
11/30/83. 
November 1983: Reserve recruirements; were increased 
from 14 per cent to 16 per cent of 
demand deposits, and from 6 per cent to 
8 per cent for time and savings depos- 
its. 
November 1983: Rediscount facility; accommodation at 
penalty rate was reduced as percentage 
of collateral and subsequently all 
accommodation at penalty rates was 
discontinued; rediscount quotas for banks 
were to be used only on a temporary 
basis. 
December 1983: Reserve reguirenents; of 16 per cent 
were introduced on unutilized over- 
drafts. 
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March 1984: Refinance facilities; the facility for- 
the Paddy, Marketing Board was limited to 
SL Rs 400 million, and its refinance 
rate was raised by two percentage points 
per annum. 
March 1984: Rediscount facility; was withdrawn 
altogether. 
March 1984: Refinance facilities;. the export pre- 
shipment facility was increased by the 
amount withdrawn for general accommoda- 
tion, or SL Rs 108 million, and was 
further increased by SL Rs 350 million 
to finance higher tea exports; -the new 
limit for the facility was SL Rs 1,778 
million. 
March 1984: Forward sales of export receipts; all 
exporters were obliged to sell forward 
90-day exports over SL Rs 0.5 million. 
Where pre- shipment refinance was used, 
the forward sales requirement was re- 
duced to 60 days. 
March 1984: Refinance facilities; an Interest Rebate 
Scheme was introduced as an incentive 
for exporters to repatriate their 
proceeds; refinance rates for tradition- 
al and non-traditional exports were 
raised from 10 per cent to 13 per cent 
per annum, and from 7 per cent to 10 per 
cent per annum, respectively, - and on- 
lending rates from 13 per cent to 16 per 
cent and from 9.75 per cent to 12.75 per 
cent per annum with an, interest rebate 
of four percentage points per annum. 
April 1984: Open Market Operations; the Central Bank. 
began io-issue its own', securities in an 
effort to "mop up" liquidity; in 1984, 
SL Rs 557 million-of such securities 
were sold. 
May 1984: Selective credit ceilings; were intro- 
duced on loans and advances to the 
private sector, excluding exports., and 
agriculture; the ceilings were set at 5 
per cent above such credit outstanding 
on 5/4/84. 
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June 1984: Selective credit ceilings; were intro- 
duced on credit for nonessential 
imports (all imports except food and 
foodstuff, raw materials, components and 
intermediate goods, drugs and pharmaceu- 
ticals, books and pamphlets, capital goods 
and parts thereof) of individual import- 
ers at 3/28/84 levels. 
September 1984: Minimum liquidity ratio; for finance 
companies was increased from 5 per cent 
to 10 per cent of deposits, and they 
were required to maintain reserves 
equivalent to 3 per cent of deposits in 
the form of government or central bank 
securities. . 
November 1984: Reserve reguirements; special reserves in 
respect of incremental deposits were 
introduced according to a reserve 
tranche system as follows (in per cent): 
Increase in deposits Special reserve 
over 11/1T/85 level requirement on 
increase in 
Deposits 
up to 3 
over 3 to 65 
over 6 to 10 10 
over 10 15 
January 1985: Selective credit ceilings; on credit for 
non-essential imports extended to 
finance companies at 1/1/85 levels. 
February 1985: Refinance facilities; rates for 
pre-export credit reduced from 8.75 per 
cent to 7.8 per cent and from 12.75 per 
cent to 11.8 per cent for nontraditional 
and traditional exports, respectively. 
June 1985: Minimum liquidity requirement; for fi 
nance companies was raised from 10 per 
cent to 15 per cent of deposits applica- 
ble on any one day. 
June 1985: Reserve reguirenents; for time deposits 
could be met, up to 12.5 per cent of such 
reserves required, by holdings of special 
bonds issued by the DFCC (yielding 7 per 
cent per annum); at end-1985 banks held 
SL Rs 333 million of such bonds. 
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August 1985: Interest rates; yields on government 
securiiýTes -were reduced from 16 per cent 
to 14 per cent per annum for maturities 
of six years. 
September 1985: Reserve reguirenents; were raised from 
16 per cent to 18 per cent for demand 
deposits, and from 8 per cent to 10 per 
cent for time and savings deposits 
except time deposits of less than 96 
days, for which the requirement was 
raised from 8 per cent to 14 per cent. 
September/ Interest rates; yields on Treasury 
December 1985: bills were reduced from 14 per cent 
to 11.5 per cent for primary issues, 
and from 14-14.2 per cent to 11.3-11.5 
per cent per annum in the Central 
Banks'secondary window. 
December 1985: Interest rates; Bank rate (not opera- 
tionalT and all refinance rates were 
reduced by 2 per cent per annum. 
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CHAPTER 
THE ESTIMATING MODEL 
4.1 Previous Research 
There has been relatively little research on the 
Transmission Mechanism of monetary policy in developing 
countries (LDCs) as compared with the voluminous litera- 
l/ 
ture available for developed countries (DCs) In particu- 
lar, Aghevli and Rodriguez (1979), Reichel (1979), Aghevli, 
et al; (1979), Wijesinghe (1986) and SEACEN (1981) are 
considered to be relevant for the purpose of this thesis. 
In this section we present a brief summary of the first 
three studies and a detailed review of the SEACEN study. 
Aghevli and Rodriguez (1979) use a modified 
monetarist model to analyse the role of monetary factors in 
the process of short run determination of output, growth, 
inflation and the trade balance for Japan during the period 
1965 to 1976. The theoretical framework is highly aggrega- 
tive and focuses on the explanation of the behaviour of key 
economic variables. -A dynamic model was estimated for 
Japan using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
The theoretical framework for this study is an 
extension of Friedman's (1970 a) closed analysis to an open 
economy and is essentially monetarist. It assumes that the 
excess supply of real cash balances plays the leading part 
in the short run adjustment of the economy, but extends the 
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analysis to an open economy. 
-Following 
the "monetary 
approach to the balance of payments", Aghevli and Rodriguez 
(1979) deal with an open economy by taking into account the 
trade balance as one of the main endogenous channels 
through which the public adjusts its actual cash 
2/ 
balan'ces "By implication, therefore, the effects of 
excess money supply are reflected in the deterioration of 
the trade balance. The concept is crucial for' many LDCs 
including Sri Lanka, which is a relatively open economy. 
Most empirical work on the monetarist approach is 
also based on a small country with full employment and 
recognizes that at least some prices in the economy may not 
be immediately responsive to world prices. The Aghevli and 
Rodriguez (1979) model also deals with the concept of 
potential output which acts as an important self- 
equilibrating variable. A larger level of excess capacity 
is assumed to reduce inflation and stimulate output and 
growth in the long-run. 
The Aghevli and Rodriguez model for Japan utilized 
this basic monetarist structure for empirical research on 
money's influence on the real economy in South East Asian 
Countries. The most important contribution of this model 
is to provide an empirical framework for capturing the 
institutional peculiarities of many developing countries 
within the basic monetarist approach. In other words, the 
excess money supply would lead 
, 
to increases in domestic 
prices, output and a deterioration of the trade balance. 
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The SEACEN (1981) study, Wijesinghe (1986) and the model 
used in our thesis are adapted versions of this model. 
--Reichel (1979) attempts-to analyse the implications 
of the,, specific features of financial markets and their 
behaviour in developing countries (including Sri Lanka), 
for the money supply process. He suggests that the fragmen- 
tation, ill-developed or non-existence of financial mar- 
kets, and the practice of fixing principal interest rates 
in developing countries tend to result in a pattern of 
financial behaviour which is difficult to capture by con- 
ventional approaches to money supply modelling over the 
short period. In particular, the virtual absence in de- 
veloping countries of instantaneous adjustment in prices, 
obscures portfolio behaviour and produces a slower speed of 
adjustment and a larger than normal deviation from portfo- 
lio equilibrium in the longer term. 
Reichel (1979) thus attempts to embody the special 
features of financial markets in a quarterly model for the 
money. supply process in developing countries. A novel 
feature of the investigation into the forces which deter- 
mine observed behaviour of variables influencing the money 
supply is the deviation of Shock Variables for both the 
non-bank and the banking sector. Shock Variables are 
introduced to capture the effects of unexpected changes in 
key variables associated with certain financial instru- 
ments. With the help of this model, the effects of changes 
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in government borrowing from the Central Bank; changes in 
the rediscount rate and the treasury bill rate; and changes 
in required reserve ratios and in exogenous components of 
the monetary base (MB) are analyzed. Simulation is used to 
highlight the impact of certain monetary policy instruments 
on the MB and the money multiplier (mm). 
Aghevli, et al; (1979) provides an overview of the 
role 
_of, 
money and monetary policy in South East Asian 
countries including Sri Lanka. It assesses the constraints 
imposed by under developed financial markets in conducting 
monetary policy and the possible adverse effects of certain 
policy instruments on long-term financial development. It 
also. stresses the structural aspects and the high degree of 
openness of Asian countries with respect to movements of 
goods and services and capital. In particular, it stresses 
the importance of these movements in relation to the size 
of the economies concerned. 
WiJesinghe (1986) models the basic links between 
major' macro economic variables for Sri Lanka over the 
period 1979-1982 and evaluates the effect of exchange rate 
and 
'monetary policy changes on output, 
prices and the 
balance of payments (BOP). The results show that 
contractionary monetary policy is effective in improving 
both the BOP and real income in the long run. According to 
this study, although the exchange rate was effective in 
improving the BOP situation over this period, it did not 
reduce the volume of imports nor improve real income in the 
121 
long run. The results, however, are not strictly comparable 
with our own since Wijesinghe modeled only the real sector 
of the Sri Lankan economy and used a different time period. 
of -particular importance to our thesis is the 
SEACEN (1981) : study which -is -designed 
to empirically 
examine the effects of monetary- impulses on growth, 
inflation-and, the, BOP in individual South, East Asian 
countries. These include Indonesia, ' Malaysia,, Nepal, 
Philippines, - Singapore, Sri -Lanka and, Thailand. it 
analyses the effects of monetary policy instruments such as 
interest rates, exchange-rates and open market operations. 
A simple aggregative econometric model (based broadly on 
the Aghevli and Rodriguez model for Japan) was developed in 
order to analyse money's relationship with economic activi- 
ty. The prime focus is on developments in the economy over 
the short run when markets are in disequilibrium. Hence, a 
quarterly model is used. Within this model there are two 
self-contained and mutually exclusive models: the financial 
sector model and the real sector model. 
The theoretical framework which lies behind the 
model is based upon a money-goods economy where an excess 
I-I 
supply of money as opposed to an excess demand for goods 
results in higher output, higher prices or a deterioration 
of the trade balance. The adjustment of output, prices and 
the trade balance is assumed to depend on the excess money, 
the degree of openness of the economy and the existing 
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level of excess capacity. In the real sector model, the 
money supply is taken to be exogenous. Accordingly, it is 
d 
assumed that the excess money (MO) over demand (MO) spills 
over into the goods market. This will be reflected in an 
increase in expenditure on domestic and imported goods by 
d 
the private sector (MO-MO) The model also implies that 
the, effects of money on output are transmitted via total 
domestic spending (absorption). Therefore, for any given 
supply of money the rate of adjustment of actual output 
towards its potential, level is assumed to depend on the 
excess capacity of the economy. 
Imports are determined by the difference between 
domestic absorption and spending on hone goods, the latter 
in turn is influenced by the prices of hone goods, import 
prices in foreign currency, the rate of exchange, its 
previous period value, and seasonal dummies. In addition, 
the change in, current spending, when combined with the 
potential change, in current output, provides a measure of 
demand pressure on the prices of home goods. 
A further implication of the model is that given 
the expansion of output, the larger the change in spending, 
the greater should be the spill over into higher prices. 
Given the rate of spending, a larger expansion of output 
should -be associated with less spill over 
into higher 
prices. Moreover, because the responses of individuals and 
firms to changing demand and supply conditions are 
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typically lagged, current'changes in the rate of inflation 
reflect past growth rates of spending and output. 
The main objective of the SEACEN study is to 
analyse the -'effects 'of monetary impulses- on , growth, 
inflation and the BOP. Secondly, it explores the money 
supply process and the impact-of monetary impulses and 
establishes relationships within the context of individual 
SEACEN countries. In order to provide a basic framework 
for assessing the, consequences of- alternative policy 
decisions, - the, study'is designed in such a way that it 
could be modified to incorporate individual SEACEN country 
differences. This study allows the researcher to vary the 
exact components of the model based upon data availability, 
empirical evidence-and institutional features pertaining to 
the particular country concerned. 
'Having considered the basic ideas behind the SEACEN 
model, the next step is to examine its structure in more 
detail. This is important because it represents the 
immediate empirical work from which our own model was 
derived. 
The monetary side of the model highlights some of 
the major monetary transactions. The money supply in this 
model is determined by the stock of reserve money (monetary 
base or high powered money) and the components of the money 
multiplier (Mm). Accordingly, narrow money (NMO) is the 
sum of currency circulating outside banks (C) and bank 
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deposits held by-the public (D) so that; 
NMO =C+D 
The broadly defined money (BMO) includes currency, 
demand deposits and time and savings deposits of the 
private-sector held with the commercial banks (T). 
BMO C+D+T... (2) 
The"monetary base''(MB) consIsts of all sight 
liabilities-of the Central Bank. 
MB C+R 
Where R statutory reserves or excess reserves of 
commercial banks and C= currency held by the public., 
Multiplying the right hand side of the equatl'ons (I) '-and 
(2) -by MB / (C, +- R) 
NMO ý-- C + D MB (4) 
C + R 
BMO =-C + DT MB (5) 
c + R 
nm C + D ... (6) c + R 
bm C ,+ D+ 'T (7)- 
c + R 
where nm and bm are narrow and broad money multipliers, 
respectively. 
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- The demand for money is estimated by three beha- 
vioural equations: demand for currency, demand for demand 
deposits and demand for time and savings deposits. The 
total reserves equation may be considered either as the 
3/ 
demand for statutory reserves or for excess reserves 
The monetary sector contains several key monetary 
policy instruments. Among the direct variables, interest 
rates and required reserves play a significant role while 
components of the monetary base form the other variables 
which can be used as monetary policy instruments. Among 
them, net credit to government and gross credit to commer- 
cial banks and other institutions are important. 
In the real sector, domestic expenditure (total 
absorption) consists of 'both home and imported goods. ý 
Imports are estimated as a behavioural equation where real 
income 'and the'real price'of imports are important varia- 
bles. 
Changes in the gross domestic product deflator 
reflect past growth rates of. prices of exports and domestic 
goods. Inflationary or deflationary gaps in the traded 
goods market resolve themselves. through net imports as long 
as foreign borrowing and lending are allowed for the 
private sector and the. government, can control the rate of 
exchange. In the market for non- traded goods, excess 
demand pressure spills over into higher prices as 
relatively large quantity adjustments cannot take place in 
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the short run. over the long run, however, changes in the 
level and composition of demand affect the growth of 
output. The combined effeýt of these changes provides a 
measure of demand pressure on the GDP deflator in the 
model. 
A demand. determined export function is used to 
close the model. However, unexpected changes in supply 
conditions are taken into consideration through the 
introduction of exogenous variables. The major determi- 
nants of. the export equation are foreign demand and the 
relative price of, exports. 
The money supply process is linked to the real 
sector via the BOP and MB identities: 
t, 
B=X IM + CAP = NFA - NFA 
t t-1 
MB NFA + NDA + OIN 
where: 
B Balance of Payme , nts 
X Exports of Goods and Services 
IM Imports of Goods and Services 
CAP Capital flows, both short term and long term 
MB Monetary Base (Reserve money) 
NFA Net Foreign Assets 
NDA Net Domestic Assets 
OIN Other Items (net) 
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The implication is that both imports and exports 
are determined. in the real sector. The BOP outcome which 
is equal to NFA - NFA feeds into the monetary sector 
t t-1 
through MB. In explaining the money supply process the 
model assumes that the excess of money over the demand for 
money spills into the goods market. Therefore, the excess 
money supply affects both prices and private sector 
expenditure in real terms. Thus, the private sector 
expenditure function takes the form; 
d 
PA/P =f [YQ(-J), IM - 11 ) (-1)1 
PP 
where YQ refers to real income and the demand. for money 
function takes the form. 
(YQ, Tr 
Where If is the expected rate of inflation. By considering 
these two equations, reduced form equations are obtained 
for private sector expenditure and the price level 
PA/P =f [U (-1) , YQ (-l) 
P 
f Cg (-l) I YQ (-I) (-l) p 
The full model is listed. below. Ln refers to natural logs. 
128 
Monetary Sector 
Behavioural Eciuations 
1. Ln C/cp a+a LnYQ +a rl +ar+a LnNBO 
0123 st 4 
+a Ln (C/cp) (-l) +aD+aD+aD 
5628371 
2. LnD/cp b+b LnYQ +b If +br+b LnNBO 
0123 st 4 
+b Ln (D/cp)(-l) +aD+aD+aD 
5617283 
LnT/cp c+c LnYQ +c ff +cr+c LnNBO 
0123 st 4 
+c Ln (T/cp)(-l) +cD+cD+cD 
5617283 
4. Rd+d NBO +dr+d (T + D) +dZ 
012c34 
+dD+dD+dD 
516273 
Identities 
5. NMO C/CT3 + D/cp MB 
C/cp + R/cp 
6. BMO C+D+T,. MB 
c+R 
7. MB NFA + NDA + OA 
Real Sector 
Behavioural Equations 
8. Ln(PA/p) =e+e LnYQ(-l) +e Ln (ITMO/cp)(-l) 
012 
+e3 fjý(-J) +e4D1+e5D2+e6D3 
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9.6 LnP f+f LnYQ(-l) +f Ln(NMO/cp)(-l) 
012 
+f If (-l) +f LnMP +fD+fD 
345162 
fD 
73 
10. LnMQ =g+g LnYQ +g LnMP/p +g LnMQ (-1) 
0- 1 
9D+9D+gD 
415263 
ll. LnXQ =h+h LnXP/XPC +h LnXQ(-l) +h X* 
32 
Identities 
12. Y= PA +- G+ XQ . XP MQ. MP 
13. YQ = Y/P. 
14. B= XQ. XP - MQ. MP + CAP NFA - NFA (-l) 
EndocTenous Variables 
C/cp = Real currency in circulation 
D/cp = Real Demand Deposits, 
T/cp =--Real-time and, savings deposits 
R. = Total reserves of-the commercial banks 
MB = Monetary Baseý(Reserve money) 
NMO = Narrow money 
BMO = Broad money 
PA/p = Private sector expenditure in real terms 
P = Price level (GDP deflator) 
MQ = Volume of imports 
X0 = Volume of exports 
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Y= GDP at current prices 
YQ = Real GDP 
B= Balance of payments surplus 
z= Vector of cost push factors 
Exoaenous Variables 
Tr = Expected rate of inflation 
Ir = TP + (i -r) -rr with -jr = 0.1 
t-1 t-1 
NBO = Number of bank offices 
r= Weighted average of interest rates on time and 
st 
savings deposits 
r Interest rate which banks must pay to borrow 
c 
from the Central Bank 
cp Colombo Consumers' Price Index 
MP Price of imports 
XPC Price of competing exports 
XP Price of exports 
X* Export capacity generated using a trend line 
on XQ 
Dl, D2 D3 Seasonal dummies 
NDA Net domestic assets 
NFA Net foreign assets 
OA Other assets 
CAP Capital flows 
Within the framework of this model a quarterly 
model is estimated for Sri Lanka for the period 1974 
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quarter 1 to 1979 quarter 4. Ordinary least squares was 
used to estimate the equations. The results of the 
SEACEN/Sri Lanka model are reported in Appendix 4.1. 
Having explained in some detail the SEACEN 
framework, which -is used flexibly by the countries 
concerned, our next task is to present our- estimating 
model and to explain its relationship to the SEACEN 
formulation. 
4.2 Choice of Model 
The specific concern of our study is to provide a 
framework for understanding the underlying relationships 
among monetary and real sector variables for Sri Lanka over 
the period 1977 to 1985 and to assess the effective 
monetary transmission channels dur ing this period. 
Accordingly, we utilize a standard monetarist model similar 
to that used in the SEACEN (1981) study discussed above. 
There are a number of reasons why we considered a 
monetarist framework to be'an appropriate basis for our. 
analysis of the MTM in Sri Lanka. To begin with, this 
perspective -is especially relevant since we are concerned 
with the MTM in Sri Lanka over the period-1977-1985 during 
which monetary policy was assigned a prime position with an 
explicit monetarist bias. The introduction of monetary 
shocks has been fairly regular-and was followed by strict 
implementation procedures. The changes that were introduced 
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through monetary policy no doubt had significant influences 
on the performance of both financial and real sector aggre- 
gates. Such effects would be seen in the behaviour of 
monetary and financial variables and therefore, a monetar- 
ist type empirical model was considered more appropriate 
for our purpose. Although it is possible that our model 
misses out important mechanisms which have been excluded, 
either because of insufficient data, or because they con- 
tradict the principles already assumed within the broad 
monetarist framework, this can probably be judged in the 
light of the model's performance later in this thesis. 
Secondly, the reliance on a predominantly monetar- 
ist perspective is also less of a handicap insofar as there 
is little significant disagreement between monetarists and 
Keynesians in respect of the, basic theory of the trans. -. Iis- 
sion 'mechanism. Both groups support some version of the 
portfolio adjustment process as the appropriate framework 
to- describe, the effects of monetary policy on the real 
sector. The SEACEN approach is also flexible enough to 
accommodate differences of opinion about the MTH within the 
general portfolio adjustment approach. Many of the differ- 
ences revolve around the range of assets to be included, 
the role of interest rates and the technical relationships 
between stocks of real assets and the flow of real expendi- 
ture corresponding to those assets. 
Thirdly, using a similar model to the SEACEN study 
allows us to compare and contrast the validity of a 
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monetarist model for the two periods, i. e. 1974 to 1979 and 
1977 to 1985, although a direct comparison is ruled out due 
to the modifications introduced in our study. 
Fourthly, since this thesis is aimed at providing 
an insight into the effects of monetary impulses on other 
variables in the economy and providing an analytical 
framework within which monetary management could be 
improved, the use of a monetarist type model would be 
helpful to highlight the importance of monetary instruments 
in influencing real sector variables. 
Fifthly, and perhaps the crucial reason in 
practice, is the availability of data which imposed a 
severe constraint on the type of the model which we were 
able to build. In particular, the absence of quarterly data 
for real sector aggregates such as the capital stock, 
capacity utilization, labour supply and employment, 
prevented us from testing a structuralist type model in 
which more attention is paid to real sector variables. We 
elaborate on this in the next paragraph. Also there wasl no 
consistent data series for sectoral expenditure. For 
example, we tried to separately estimate government and 
private sector expenditure but we were not successful as 
the sectoral totals did not add up to the total aggregates. 
Finally, it is pertinent at this juncture to 
examine the relevance of a model based on structuralist 
theory for Sri Lanka. The key theme of the structuralist 
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approach is that development is a discontinuous process ýof 
structural change. This line of thought was influential in 
the 1960s in suggesting that development policy requires a 
big pushin investment to escape from "vicious circles of 
poverty" and attain self sustaining growth with greater 
emphasis on industrialization. Linked to this, was- the 
adoption of an inward lookinginternational trade policy 
including import substitution and protectionist policies. 
These ideas were influenced by Chenery and Eckstein (1970) 
and represented a critique of application of the theory of 
comparative advantage to the developing countries and 
reflected -a growing pessimism about the prospects for 
primary product exports in developing countries. 
A second important component of the structuralist 
school was that price stability', could only be attained 
through selective and managed policies for economic growth. 
It was suggested that the basic forces of inflation, were 
structural in nature and that inflation was essentially a 
supply phenomenon which could only be remedied by monetary 
and fiscal means at the expense of an intolerable 
underutilization of resources. Structuralists did not deny 
that inflation cannot persist for long without, monetary 
expansion but they regard this as irrelevant because price 
stability can only be achieved, by monetary means at the 
cost of stagnation and underemployment of resources. Thus 
the role of financial factors in propagating inflation was 
not denied, but what was disputed Is the idea that 
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inflation has its origins in monetary factors. In the 
structuralist view monetary policy would only attack the 
symptoms of inflation but not the root causes. Owing to 
the instability of export proceeds and the slower growth of 
exports relative to the demand for imports, the control of 
imports in the short run for BOP reasons will result in 
adverse consequences for growth. For a review of 
structuralist theory, see Thirwall (1983). 
Structuralists also tend to suggest that the BOP is 
a binding constraint on growth via the supply of foreign 
exchange needed to finance "essential" imports for domestic 
industrial expansion. The rationale behind this was 
derived from "two gap" analysis which has its origin in the 
standard Keynesian position that export-inport gaps are 
identical ex post and that there is no reason for them to 
be equal ex ante (in a planned sense). The basic 
assumption of this analysis is a lack of substitutability 
between foreign and domestic resources. if foreign 
exchange savings are scarce it is not easy in the short run 
to use domestic resources to earn more foreign exchange or 
to save foreign exchange by improving the productivity of 
imports. If domestic savings is scarce, it is probably 
easier to find ways of using foreign exchange to 
substitute, raising the domestic savings ratio and the 
productivity of capital. See Thirwall (1983). When the 
shortage of domestic savings is the more important problem, 
the savings/investment gap will ex ante be the larger; when 
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foreign exchange is the constraint the ex ante 
export/inport gap will be greater. 
Two gap analysis is more persuasive to the 
extent that price adjustment, for example via the exchange 
rate is limited, and rigidities of the sort assumed in 
their models apply in reality to LDCs specially where there 
are limitations to the expansion of exports. In these 
countries investment depends in a relatively fixed way on 
imported inputs and the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported inputs may be close to zero. if 
these assumptions are valid then the authorities which are 
committed to a particular growth target may adopt an 
"inward looking" trade policy, an approach which was 
adopted in Sri Lanka prior to 1977. 
The structuralist approach to the finance of 
development is to encourage investment prior to saving. 
Investment is expected to generate savings, either through 
increases in output if resources are employed, or through 
income redistribution from groups with a low propensity to 
save to those with a high propensity. Structuralists also 
dispute that saving is necessary for investment and that 
investment is constrained by saving. The implication of 
this approach is that growth may be continued either by 
savings or foreign exchange and that foreign resources will 
usually be needed to supplement domestic savings if target 
growth rates are to be achieved. If a structuralist model 
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is to be successful in capturing the impact of monetary 
influences on the MTM, that model would need to have a 
whole spectrum of real and financial assets and the 
explicit relations between the production of new real 
capital goods and existing ones. See Brunner and Meltzer 
(1971). 
The assumptions of the structuralist approach 
appear to us to be a little demanding in the context of Sri 
Lankan development after 1977. As explained earlier in this 
thesis, the government that came into power in 1977 
followed more outward- looking open economic policies and 
therefore, the relevance of a structuralist model for the 
period of our research appears to be somewhat limited. 
Moreover, as we explained above, the objectives of this 
thesis sug gest that a more monetarist-oriented approach 
would be appropriate. 
4.3 Modifications for Sri Lanka 1977-1985 
We introduced certain modifications into the SEACEN 
model for a number of reasons. First, it was necessary to 
examine whether the standard monetarist model used to 
analyse money's relationship with economic activity in 
SEACEN countries could be used to identify the important 
MTCS in Sri Lanka during the period 1977-1985. Secondly, 
it was intended to analyse whether the model is capable-of 
explaining changes in the behaviour of major macro economic 
variables during this-later period. Thirdly, we intend to 
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examine whether the results obtained from this type of a 
model can form the base for future monetary policy 
formulation. 
As well as re-estimating the_model completely with 
data for the later period, we made some important changes 
in the specification of particular equations, notably to 
disaggregate the identities for reserve money and total 
credit to establish the importance in the MTM of credit 
operations by both the government and the private sector. 
Secondly, we employ ý-Two Stage Least Squares Principal 
Components (2SLSPC) as an additional estimation method to 
the OLS parameter, estimates used in the SEACEN study, and 
subject the model to a fuller range of validation 
techniques, both on an individual-equation basis, and 
within the context of dynamic simulation. 
In what follows we take each equation of the SEACEN 
model for Sri Lanka and discuss the results whilst 
highlighting the modifications introduced into, our 
equations. Whenever there are important variables included 
in several equations, for example, the expected rate of 
inflation (<) we proceed with a general discussion which 
can then be assumed to apply to all other relevant 
equations which follow. 
There are three demand for money equations in the 
monetary sector. The demand for currency equation has 
eight explanatory variables and all the key variables are 
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statistically significant. A key variable in the demand 
for money functions in the SEACEN study was the expected 
rate of inflation This is the proxy for the 
substitution effect (SE) of the rate of return of real 
assets. Since . 
71ý is highly significant in the SEACEN Sri 
Lanka money demand. equations,, private expenditure ýequation 
(despite 
-a, 
low t-ratio. ) and the aggregate- price level, 
some justification for its-exclusion in our model- isý re- 
quired. Tr. is calculated in the SEACEN study, asýfollows: - 
-r (P Jr 0<3->l 
t t-1 
where p is the actual rate of-inflation- and-the-adjustment 
coelfficient,, r is, determined outside the behavioural equa- 
tion concerned. This. is rather than specifying the expecta- 
tions variable within the, equation and eliminating it by 
substitution and transformation,,, with-its place taken by a 
distributed lag on the actual variable. One presumes thi s 
would have raised problems of parameter identification 
where a partial adjustment process was also being assumed. 
In this specification price expectations are assumed to be 
adaptive i. e. the public are presumed to revise their 
expectations about inflation in proportion to the error 
they made in their expectations of price movements in the 
previous period. This hypothesis has been quite popular 
in applied econometrics. 
We were unable to find a, satisfactory statistical' 
fit for this variable using both this process and other 
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methods of defining expectations. It is possible that this 
arises from the choice of a later time period, but we 
suspect that the original SEACEN formulation could be 
somewhat spurious given the complex nature of price expec- 
tations. 
There-are also a number of competing ways to model 
inflationary--expectations and it is very difficult a priori 
to choose, between them without specifying the-relationships 
involved -in detail. ýFor example, an alternative to 
adaptive expectations is'rational expectations theory in 
which inflationary expectations are, based onýan information 
set''containing all relevant variables at a point in time. 
This, allows for the identification from a reduced form 
relationship between inflation and the data that is 
available at the time abput_the formation of expected 
inflation. See for example Challen and Hagger (1983). 
We began by testing the simple SEACEN formulation 
but did not find 1r to have the correct sign or to be 
significant during our time-period. We then tested out the 
simplest form of the adaptive, expectations hypothesis where 
f( is set equal to the actual inflation rate lagged one 
year or separately 1,2 and 3 quarters. We used both the 
previous period's inflation rate and the rate of change of 
the previous period's inflation in our equations. These 
were not satisfactory. We also calculated *rr as the sum of 
a three Period moving average of past inflation rates. It 
did not prove to be significant. 
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In view of the ambiguity surrounding the definition 
and interpretation of this variable, we decided to proceed 
without it. We also felt that this variable would need to 
be defined more carefully and tested thoroughly within the 
broader framework of expectations theory before including 
it in the model, since it is likely to have an effect on 
the system as a whole and, if misspecified, could distort 
the other parameters. Clearly, more detailed research 
specific to this problem is required where a full 
specification of the model of inflation is being made. This 
is beyond the scope of our thesis. 
Alth ough in general the SEACEN study included 
interest rates in the demand for money functions, it 
omitted them in the demand for currency and demand deposit 
equations, perhaps due to the problem of multi-collinearity 
among key explanatory variables. The number of bank 
branches (NBO) is an important variable in the demand for 
currency equation in the SEACEN model but it was not 
significant,., in our equations, I possibly as a result of the 
closure of most of the bank branches during the 1977-1985 
period. 
The equation for demand deposits in the SEACEN 
model and our model differ in the following respects. The 
SEACEN model used Tr and NBO as key variables. We 
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dropped both of them for reasons explained above and also 
because they were not significant in our model. Instead, 
we used the nominal interest rate (RST) which was 
significant. This variable is relevant to the post 1977 
period as it captures the SE between interest bearing and 
non-interest bearing monetary assets triggered by the 
government's high interest rate policy. 
Both real income and RST were significant in our 
equation for the demand for time and savings deposits 
unlike in the SEACEN model. We also introduced domestic 
credit (DC) as an explanatory variable for two reasons. 
First, there appears to be a close correlation between DC 
and the accrual of time and savings deposits in the post 
1977 period as part of the increased money income was held 
in the form of time and savings deposits. Secondly, DC 
acts as a proxy for the " availability effects" associated 
with the credit rationing channel of the transmission 
process and, therefore, we wanted to compare the relative 
significance of this variable and-the interest rate. 
There are seven explanatory variables in the total 
reserves equation of the SEACEN model. A variable (Z) was 
introduced to represent a vector of cost push factors. The 
study did not clearly define what this variable is and the 
purpose of using it. If Z is used to reflect the opportu- 
nity cost of holding reserves, it may be the interest rate 
on competing reserve assets. The coefficient of this 
variable exceeds unity and is highly significant. In our 
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model we used the inter-bank call money market rate (ZXY) 
to represent the yield on competing reserve assets and the 
opportunity-cost of holding reserves. ZXY also indicates 
the direction of short term lending rates in 'the money 
market. 
This is particularly so as the Bank rate (the rate 
at which commercial banks borrow from the Central Bank) 
failed to-perform the role of the Apex rate in the short 
term interest rate structure-during this period. This is 
due to the introduction of quota restrictions on bank rate 
accommodation to commercial banks, the imposition of a 
graduated scale of penal rates during the first part of the 
period 1977-1985 and the excess liquidity of banks that 
prevailed during the second half of this period. 
We next dealt with the issue as to whether the 
statutory reserves variable should be in ratio or level 
form. Since 1977, Sri Lanka used statutory reserve ratios 
as an effective instrument of monetary policy and revisions 
were introduced on several occasions. As shown below 
different reserve ratios were made applicable on various 
4/ 
classes of deposits 
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--- 17 ----------- 
Effective Date 
----------------------------- 
Type of Liability 
-------------- 
Revised 
Rate 
(in per 
---- --------- 
cent) 
-------------- ----------- 
1., 1960.08.26, - 
-------------------- 
, -Demand 
deposits, 12% 
Time and Savings Deposits 5% 
2.1981.06.19 -Demand deposits, 
Time and savings deposits 6% 
3.1983.12.02 Demand deposits 16%'' 
Time and savings deposits 8% 
4. -1983.12.16 Total unused-bala nces of 16% 
overdrafts 
5.1985.08.09 Demand deposits 18% 
Time and--savings deposits 12% 
(not exceeding 90 days) 
Time deposits(exc luding 90 days)10% 
Savings deposits 10% 
deposits' 
6.1985.09.13 Time deposits 14% 
---- 
(not exceeding 90 
--- 
days) 
--------- -------------- ----------- 
Source: -Central 
----------------- 
Bank of Sri Lanka, Bulletin, December 1985. 
In addition to these revisions, effective 14 Novem- 
ber 1984, commercial banks were required to maintain spe- 
cial reserves under a reserve tranche system against in- 
creases in deposits over the level as of 14th November, 
1984. Reserves in respect of each tranche were specified 
as follows: 
Up to 3% nil 
ii. 7' Over 3% and up to 6% 5% of increase 
iii. 6% and up to 10% 10% of increase 
iv. ýOver 10% 15% of increase 
Since it was difficult to calculate a meaningful 
average of these ratios, we used required reserves in 
levels. 
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There are three identities used in the monetary 
sector of the SEACEN model. The two money supply identi- 
ties (NMO and BMO) are clearly defined and specified. In 
terms of total liquidity NMO is not comprehensive as a 
considerable portion of the increased money income or 
wealth of the public is held in the form of time and sav- 
ings deposits with the banking sector. Moreover, it does 
not help to analyse the SE between money and financial 
assets and between financial and real assets. 
The reserve money identity (RM) is not clearly 
defined in the SEACEN model. RM is specified in terms of 
broader aggregates, i. e. RM = NFA + NDA + OA. (NDA 
includes claims on both private and government sectors) and 
it is not clear in the SEACEN study whether. RM represents 
assets of the Central Bank or the entire banking system. 
Moreover, these broader aggregates do not reflect the 
differences in the behaviour of the private and government 
sectors. As a result, the impact of credit to government 
and the private sector cannot be fully assessed in a policy 
context. 
Due to the ambiguous nature of the RM identity it 
is difficult to see how well the real and monetary sectors 
are linked through'this identity. Strictly speaking RM 
only includes balance sheet items of the Central Bank. The 
overall balance of the BOP is equal to the change in net 
foreign assets of the banking system (including commercial 
banks). In the SEACEN model the BOP outcome is equal to 
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NFA -NFA. Even if we assume that the SEACEN model 
t t-1 
refers to net foreign assets of the banking system there 
still remains a definitional problem about the link between 
RM and the BOP identity. 
I 
We disaggregated RM and assume that ITFACB is a 
proxy for the change in net foreign assets of the banking 
sector. This. is justified to the extent that more than 90 
per', cent of the NFA of the banking system is held by the 
Central Bank as commercial banks in Sri Lanka are not 
allowed to invest foreign exchange holdings at will. 
1 
We 
also used the components of RM as policy variables in the 
simulation experiments. 
In our model we use the BMO identity to link 
the monetary and - real sectors'which includes all components 
of RM. We also'introduced two new identities: total 
deposits (TD) and domestic credit (DC) into our monetary 
sector model. TD enables us to examine the impact of 
exogenous changes in long term deposits (T1) via the 
reserves equýtion. The DC identity is specified as a 
component of the monetary survey. This allows us to 
examine the relevance of domestic credit in the MTM and 
reflects the lenders' reaction to policy changes. 
According to the availability effects, the driving force 
behind saving'and borrowing decisions is not the interest 
rate but the availability of credit. As credit rationing 
(CR) has been an important monetary policy instrument the 
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use of this variable would help"to capture the effects of 
selective credit policy. 
The -real sector of the SEACEN model contains four 
behavioural equations: the real expenditure of the' private 
sector, 'the rate of inflation, the volume of imports and 
the volume of exports., The first two are specified so as 
to reflect the main assumptions of the model, that excess 
money spills over into the goods market and exerts pressure 
on both real expenditure and prices. Wedepart from the 
SEACEN version which splits the real expenditure into 
private and government sectors. Accordingly, government 
sector real expenditure is exogenous. We did not find this 
division useful because the structure of the SEACEN model 
is such that it does not show any response to changes in 
government expenditure in our case. Neither the components 
of government expenditure nor the financing part of it is 
represented through any of the variables in the system. 
This was also a consequence of data availability. We 
therefore, estimated total real expenditure including both 
private and government sectors together. As stated earli- 
er, 'the private sector real expenditure function in the 
SEACEN model is explained by lagged real income, the dif- 
ference between the real money supply (lagged) and' money 
demand and lagged fr. The underlying money demand func- 
tion in this case is explained by real income and the 
expected rate of inflation. 
The specification of the real expenditure function 
148 
in our model is different to that of the SEACEN model. 
'rr and interest rates (both real and nominal) were tested 
for in our study but were not significant. We also decided 
to use broad money as a more comprehensive proxy for total 
liquidity in the system rather than narrow money used in 
the SEACEN model. Both lagged real income and broad money 
variables are however, relevant in so far as they influence 
real expenditure and the aggregate price level. 
I- *The SEACEN model estimated both the rate of 
inflation and the price level (GDP deflator) and retained 
the_ latter for simulation. purposes. Both equations 
however, displayed very poor statistical fit. Eight 
variables are used in the rate of inflation equation and 
none achieved at greater than or equal to 2. Similarly, 
nine variables were used in the price level equation and 
except for the price level lagged one period P(-1), all the 
other variables are insignificant. 
In our price level equation, both demand and supply 
factors are taken into consideration along with lagged 
import prices to capture the impact of imported inflation. 
The latter variable is especially 'important as it 
represents -the impact of trade liberalization and the 
depreciation of the Sri Lankan Rupee after 1977. It could 
be argued, on theoretical grounds, that the price equations 
should include a separate term to capture the effects of 
expected inflation on actual price changes both directly 
through price mark-ups and indirectly through its effects 
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on money demand. Experiments including the expected rate 
of inflation variable however, did not prove satisfactory. 
There are six explanatory variables in the volume 
of imports equation of the SEACEIT model. Except for the 
lagged import variable all the others are insignificant. 
We modified this equation by including real income, lagged 
import prices (in real terms) and a lagged import credit 
variable. The latter is used to assess the impact of SCCs 
on imports.. I '' -- 
There are seven explanatory variables in the SEACEN- 
model designed to capture both supply and demand factors on 
real exports. Although it is designed to include a demand 
variables, no variable representing world demand was 
included. We modified the export equation by introducing an 
explicit demand variable: real income of OECD co untries 
(GOECD), and the relative price of exports (XPFXPC) and 
obtained significant results. The latter reflects the 
competitiveness of Sri Lanka's exports in relation to 
exports of competing countries. We also included a lagged 
dependent variable to allow for a partial adjustment of 
actual to desired exports. The SEACEN export capacity 
variable was insignificant in our case. 
The three identities in the real sector of the 
SEACEN model are for nominal income, real income and the 
BOP respectively. Our model specifies income in real terms 
and therefore drops the nominal income identity. Although 
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the SEACEH model treats government expenditure as an 
exogenous variable in the income identity it is not linked 
to the monetary survey through variables which account for 
financing of government expenditure. Both private and 
government credit are included in net domestic assets (NDA) 
and therefore, the model does not indicate the effects of 
changes in net credit to government (NCG) or to the private 
sector. 
Most variables that account for financing 
government expenditure are outside the scope of the 
Monetary Survey. Contributions of the non-bank financial 
institutions can be obtained only from a full financial 
survey which is not available in Sri Lanka for the time 
period. Credit to government by the banking system 
represents only one part of the financing of government 
expenditure and, therefore, the impact on the monetary 
sector cannot be assessed without introducing an identity 
for financing of the government expenditure. In our model 
we used government expenditure as a part of total real 
expenditure which is endogenously determined. 
Unfortunately, as with the SEACEN model, it is not feasible 
to analyse the effects of government financing without the 
help of a financial survey. 
The BOP identity used in the SEACEH study does not 
specify whether it refers to the current account balance, 
basic balance or the overall balance. We specified the BOP 
to reflect the overall balance and therefore linked it 
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explicitly to the net foreign assets of the banking sector 
via the net foreign assets of the Central Bank (11FACB). In 
Sri Lanka, the net external assets of the-commercial- banks 
consist only, of foreign exchange working balances as ýthey 
are not allowed to invest foreign exchange reserves. As a 
result, 
- 
more than 90 per cent of net foreign assets are 
held by the Central. Bank. 
In the original Aghevli and Rodriguez model (1979) 
GAP 'is defined as the difference between actual and 
potential output. GAP is assumed to respond positively to 
the level of excess demand in the goods market which is 
generated by the excess supply of money. In addition, for 
any given excess supply of money, the rate of adjustment of 
actual output' towards its potential level is assumed to 
depend on the excess capacity present in the economy. This 
assumption is in line with the monetarist formulation. 
In the SEACEN model, the output GAP is defined as 
the log of the ratio of potential over actual output. They 
assumed over the long run that changes in the level and the 
composition of demand affect-the growth of output. GAP is 
the self correcting mechanism that adjusts the actual 
growth rate of output towards the potential (trend) rate. 
The SEACEN study however, did not use GAP as an explanatory 
variable in any of the equations or as an identity. We 
found it to be insignificant in the imports and price level 
equations. 
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ý As a third identity, therefore, we used GAP 
measured as the ratio of actual'income to potential income 
as a proxy for capacity. Potential income is calculated by 
fitting a trend-line to the actual income series. Any 
changes. -in real income would therefore, be ýreflected in 
changes in the GAP, and may, -capture some of the supply side 
effects -on. the-MTM. This definition of, GAP is- however, 
still too,, simple and, a more, detailed treatment of this 
supply variable would be needed in a future study. 
4.4 Mod2l Specification 
Following Aghevli and Rodriguez (1979) and SEACEN 
(1981) we are dealing with a goods-money economy in which 
excess demand for goods results in higher output, higher 
prices, or a deterioration in the trade balance. We are 
concerned essentially with developments in the short run 
when markets are in disequilibrium and adjustments depend 
on the excess of money, the openness of the economy, and 
the existing level of-excess capacity, although ýwe -shall 
also refer to some longer term implications. - 
The model can be viewed initially as comparing two 
self-contained and mutually exclusive sectors which are 
subsequently combined in a simulation framework. A 
financial sector deals with the money supply process and 
the real sector assumes the money supply to be pre- 
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determined and relatýs it to output, the price level and 
the BOP. The model is summarized in 4.5 and the variables 
are defined. 
4.4.1. The Monetary Sector 
The monetary sector contains 4 behavioural equa- 
tions and 4 identities. The money supply in this model (6) 
is derived in a familiar fashion from the stock of RM and 
the components of the mm. Wehave chosen to use BMO rather 
than narrow money and to convert it into real terms via the 
Colombo Consumers' Price Index (CP). We also disaggregated 
RM into its constituent parts in (7) to facilitate exposi- 
tiOn at this stage. It is not necessary for model simulaý- 
tion. 
More specifically, BMO is defined as the sum of 
currency circulating outside the banks, demand deposits and 
time and savings deposits held by'the private'sector with 
the commercial banks. 
BHO CU +D+T 
The MB consists of all sight liabilities of the 
Central Bank (total currency issue plus reserves of the 
commercial, banks plus deposits of other institutions held 
with the Central Bank). 
RM CI +R+ RS 
Hence, the broad money multiplier in (6) is 
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CU +D+T 
CI +R+ RS 
and BMO can be re-written as 
BMO CU +D+T. RM 
ci +R+ RS ,7 
With RM viewed as the assets of the Central Bank 
CB) disaggregated in (7) into its various components, 
including net foreign assets of the CB, net credit to 
government by the CB and gross credit to the commercial 
banks by the CB. 
The demand for money by the private sector is 
estimated by 3 behavioural equations (1), (2), (3) 
referring respectively to currency, demand deposits and 
time and savings deposits. Equation (4) specifies the 
demand for reserves by the commercial banks. 
(5) and (8) are the other identities of the 
monetary sector which are included primarily for purposes 
of simulation. - The identity for-total-deposits TD, which 
is 
. -an explanatory variable 
in the reserve equation (4) 
allows us to manipulate the long, term deposits of the 
government and other-institutions. T1 and the direct-credit 
identity (8) enables us to- analyse the "availability 
effects" of monetary policy through the demand for time and 
savings deposits equation (3). In,, particular, DC is 
directly related to BMO and the net domestic assets of the 
banking system. I- 
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4.4.2. The Real Sector- 
The real sector contains 4 behavioural equations 
and 3 identities. The behavioural equations determine 
total real domestic spending or absorption, the aggregate 
price level, and the real volume of imports and exports. 
The identities define real gross domestic product (income), 
the BOP and an index of excess demand/capacity. We shall 
examine each in turn. 
Total real expenditure (absorption) consists -of 
bothý private -and government, spending on domestic and 
imported goods and is related to'both the, level of real 
income and the excess of money'over demand: -, 
PAG/P =f CYQ, (M/P Md/P)l 
, This- specification reflects the view that in the 
real sector the money supply is exogenous and the excess of 
actual money over desired M/P Md/P spills over into the 
goods market and will manifes ,t itself in increasing 
expenditure on domestic and imported goods by both the 
private and government sectors. Md/P in turn consists of 
the sum of currency CU/CP, demand deposits D/CP, and time 
and savings deposits T/CP, corresponding to our definition 
of real broad money BMO/CP. These components have already 
been explained in the monetary sector in-equations U), 
(2), and (3) by real income YQ and other variables. BMO/CP 
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plays an important role here because it acts as the 
mechanism by-which monetary impulses are transmitted to the 
real sector. 
Equation (10) is derived from an analysis of the 
5/ 
inflationary process in an open goods-money economy. 
Inflationary and deflationary gaps are seen to resolve 
themselves in the traded goods sector through an increase 
in net imports, and in the non-traded goods sector' by an 
excess of actual over desired money spilling over into 
higher prices. This spill over effect arises in the short 
run because sufficient quantity adjustments are not 
possible in such a short period. In the longer run, 
however, changes in the level and composition of demand 
affect the growth of output. The combined result of these 
changes provides a measure of demand pressure on the GDP 
deflator P, which is supplemented by cost push factors 
including changes in import prices. 
Again, (5) is transformed into an estimating 
equation by taking logs, adding lags to the explanatory 
variables for non-instantaneous adjustment, and testing for 
Partial adjustment via the lagged dependent variable. H/P 
was replaced by BMO/CP and we chose to estimate the 
equation in level rather than in change form to facilitate 
simulation. 
Since it is not possible for Sri Lanka to separate 
out domestic spending on home goods from spending on 
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imports, real imports (11) are estimated as a behavioural 
6/ 
equation. *- As Sri Lanka is small country in international 
trade, imports are demand determined and import prices are 
taken as exogenous, in line with standard practice. 
, Our final behavioural equation in the real sector 
is -aný, aggregate export function. It is often very 
difficult in developing countries such as Sri Lanka to 
distinguish between demand and supply factors affecting 
exports, since the data is consistent with both the volume 
7/ 
demanded and the volume supplied. Henc e an aggregate 
function is specified containing both supply and demand 
factors. 
To complete the specification of the real sector we 
postulated 3 identities. (13) defines GDP in real terms as 
the sum of- total real expenditure and the difference 
between the volume of real exports and imports. Lack of 
suitable data precluded us from distinguishing between 
government and private spending and simulating exogenous 
changes in the former. 
(14) deliberately defines the BOP as the overall 
balance rather than as the basic balance or current 
account. This is so that we can discuss the links between 
the BOP and the RM identity (7) in the monetary sector 
8/ 
through 'changes- in net foreign assets (NFA). - In other 
words, we can simplify (7) into NFA, NDA and other 
influenc es of the banking system (OAB). 
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Finally, 'the GAP identity (15) is'expressed as the 
ratio of actual to potential income (calculated by fitting 
a linear trend line to actual income). This represents a 
simple measure of excess demand or low capacity to capture 
9/ 
supply effects in the model 
In 4.5 we present the model in its full form. The 
prefix Ln indicates that the variable concerned is 
expressed_as a natural logarithm, while the suffix (-l), (-2) 
etc. signifies the length of the lag attached to the 
variable, measured in quarters. 
4.5 The Estimatina Model 
Monetarv Sector 
(a) Behavioural equations 
[11 Ln (CU/CP) = aO + al Ln YQ + a2 Ln (CU/CP)(-l) 
+ a3 Ln RST + a4 D2 
[21 Ln (D/CP) = bO + bl Ln YQ(-4) + b2 Ln (D/CP)(-4) 
+ b3 Ln RST 
[31 Ln (T/CP) cO + cl Ln YQ(-l) + c2 Ln RST 
+ c3 Ln DC + c4 Dl 
[41 Ln R dO + dl Ln ZXY + d2 Ln TD + d3 Ln RR 
(b) Identities 
[ 51 TD =D+T+ Tl 
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[61 BMO/CP = CU/CP + D/CP + T/CP RM 
CI/CP + R/CP + RS/CP 
[71 RM = NFACB/CP + NCG/CP + GCB/CP + DOI/CP 
+ OINCB/CP 
[81 DC = BMO/CP x CP - NFA - OAB 
Real Sector- -, 
(a) Behavioural eguations 
[91 Ln (PAG/P) = eO + 
+ e3 
[101 Ln P= fo + 
+ f3 
[111 Ln MQ = go + 
+ g3 
[121 Ln XQ = hO + 
+ h3 
el 
D4 
fl 
Dl 
gl 
Ln 
hl 
Ln 
Ln YQ(-3) + e2 Ln (BMO/CP)(-l) 
Ln MP(-2) + f2 Ln (BMO/CP)(-2) 
+ f4 D4 
Ln YQ(-2) + g2 Ln MP(-4) 
Ln GOECD(-4) + h2 Ln XPFXPC(-4) 
XQ(-l) 
(b) Identities 
[131 YO = PAG/P + XQ - MO 
[143 BOP = XQ. XP -, MQ. MP + CAP. 
[151 GAP = YQ/YQT 
Endocrenous variables 
CU Demand for currency 
D Demand for demand deposits 
T Demand for time and savings deposits 
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CU/CP Real demand for currency in circulation 
D/CP Real demand for demand deposits 
T/CP Real demand for time and savings deposits 
R Total reserves of the commercial banks 
TD Total deposits 
BMO Broad money 
RM Reserve money (monetary base) 
DC Domestic credit 
PAG Total expenditure (private and government) 
P Aggregate price level (GDP deflator) 
PAP/P Total real expenditure 
MQ Real volume of imports of goods and services 
. 
(1980=100) 
XQ Real volume of exports of goods and services 
(1980=100) 
YQ Real gross domestic product (1980=100) 
BOP__ Overall balance of payments 
GAP Index of excess demand/capacity 
Exogenous variables 
CP Colombo consumer's price i. ndex (1980=100) 
RST Average deposit rateon 12 month time and savings 
deposits of commercial banks 
Di Seasonal dummies (quarter i=l . ....... 4) 
ZXY Lending rate in the interbank call money market 
RR Statutory reserve requirements (level) 
Tl Long term deposits of the government and 
goverhmentýsponsored institutions 
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CI Total currency issue (sight liabilities of the 
Centra1Bank 
RS Deposits of other institutions held with 
the Central Bank 
NFACB Net foreign assets of the Central Bank 
NCG Net credit to government by the Central Bank 
GCB Gross credit to the commercial banks by the 
Central Bank 
DOI Gross credit to'the other development 
institutions by the Central Bank 
OINCB other items (net) of the Central Bank 
NFA Net foreign assets of the banking system 
OAB Other assets-(net) of the banking system 
MP Real import price index in home currency 
(1980=100) 
IC Bank-credit for imports 
GOECD Real, gross domestic. product of OECD 'Countries 
(1980 =100) 
XPFXPC Real foreign currency price of exports as 
a ratio of the export prices"of competing 
countries (1980=100) 
XP Real export price index (1980=100) 
CAP Capital account of the balance of payments 
YQT Potential output derived from a linear trend 
line fitted to YQ 
A flow diagram of the model and abbreviations used 
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are presented in Appendix'4.2'and 4.3. This displays the 
interactions between the monetary and the real sectors and 
the channels through which these interactions are estab- 
lished., It also indicates the pivotal role of broad money 
in linking the monetary and the real sector. 
4.6. Data Problems 
The model summarized in 4.5 was estimated using 
quarterly data between 1977 quarter 1 and 1985 quarter IV. 
The period thus covers 9 years and there are 36 observa- 
tions. Realsector data covering variables such as real 
GDP (YQ), the GDP deflator (P), and total real expenditure 
(PAG/P) is available only on an annual basis and represents 
flows during a year. Hence, a smoothing technique was 
necessary to convert the data to a quarterly basis. For 
this purpose we used the Otani Reichel Smoothing Technique 
10/ 
(1973). This technique is elaborated on Appendix 4.4. 
The GDP deflator is obtained by, dividing GDP --in 'current 
prices by GDP in constant 1980 prices. Trade data is taken 
from the BOP and is consistent with the National. -Accounts 
series'. Real income i. n OECD countries (GOECD) is converted 
from Quarterly Reports of OECD countries. 
Data for the monetary sector, end quarter (actual 
outstanding), is available for the entire period and is 
collected directly from Monthly Bulletins, Annual Reports, 
and Annual Reviews of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Monetary sector data are deflated by the Colombo Consumers' 
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price index (CP) based on 1980=100. 
Generally speaking the data available is good by 
developing country standards, although the generation of 
quarterly data is likely to -introduce some errors 
variables and may lead to bias and, inconsistency in the 
parameter estimates. The sample, size is satisfactory. 
4.7 Estirnation Methods. 
The model taken as a whole represents a simultane- 
ous system of stochastic non-linear equations, being linear 
il/ 
in the parameters but non-linear in the variables it 
is dynamic because it contains lagged predetermined- varia- 
bles and simultaneous because endogenous variables appear 
on both the left and right hand sides of-the equations and 
identities., 
More specifically, simultaneity is present because 
equation [3] cannot be solved without the simultaneous 
determination of DC in [8]; [41 without solving for TD in 
[51; and [61 without determining DC in [8]. It would 
appear at first sight that [11 also requires the 
simultaneous solution of [13) because YQ appears in both, 
but the bloc recursive nature of the model asý a whole 
ensures that., YQ, from the real sector bloc permits the 
determination of [I] in the monetary sector. In sum, 
theref. ore, the. model comprises 9 recursive and 5 
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12/ 
sýV>, u1ý.. ' eo L. -t-- ye-t A+c'op, c ke pS4 
In the first instance all equations were estimated 
by ordinary least squares (OLS) using Time Series Processor 
(TSP) version 3.5 at the University of Bradford. These are 
the estimates discussed in detail in 4.8 and are used in 
the simulation control run. Although it is well known that 
OLS produces biased and inconsistent estimates in 
simultaneous systems, it has become conventional practice 
in macro modelling to carry out preliminary work on a model 
using this method. For a review of different estimators 
used in the context of macro modelling, see Challen and 
Hagger (1983). In general, the appeal of OLS stems from 
the fact that its statistical properties are., relatively 
well known compared to other estimation techniques, espe- 
cially in small samples, and because it offers a computa- 
tionally cheap way of testing a range of hypotheses. -In 
addition, mord complex techniques such as full, information 
estimators, tend -to be more sensitive to specification 
errors. OLS has the advantage of 'quarantining' the ef- 
fects ofýmisspecification until the properties of the model 
are'better understood and is relatively easy to interpret. 
We did, however, re-estimate the model using a 
variation of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to try to 
improve consistency . and 
to compare the results, 
particularly in a simulation context. Since our model 
contains a large number of predetermined variables (21 in 
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the equations and 36 in the model as a whole)-in relation 
to-the sample size, we used principal components to reduce 
the number of predetermined variables to a more, fundamental 
set of instruments for use in 2SLS. The instruments were 
selected on the basis of explaining at least 95 per cent of 
the variation in the larger set of variables, and a 
correction for first order autocorrelation was carried out 
where appropriate, using,, the Fair (1970) method -of 
instrumental variable- estimation available in TSP., The 
results of-the, Two Stage Least Squares Principal Components 
(2SLSPC) are given in Appendix 4.5 and are discussed more 
fully in the context of simulation in the next chapter. - 
our basic estimation procedure was to start from 
the a priori specification described above using a log 
functional form unless unsatisfactory, and to experiment 
with different sets of explanatory variables and lag 
structures. Although our resources fell short of a 
rigorous testing procedure of the type embodied in a 
package such as Hendry's (1985) PC GIVE, we did attempt to 
13/ 
follow some 'rules of good conduct'. initial selection 
of an estimated equation was based upon sensible parameter 
estimates in terms of size and sign and an acceptable 
statistical fit using conventional statistics. Where an 
equation failed the Durbin Watson or Durbin h test for 
autocorrelation, a correction was made using the Beach- 
14/ 
Mckinnon method in TSP. All equations were also checked 
for multicollinearity via the Farrar-Glauber tests although 
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no explicit correction was introduced for this problem. 
Where there was any doubt about the choice of equation, 
particularly if this impinged heavily upon the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, alternatives were retained 
for comparison in simulation. 
4.8 Results 
The results are shown for each equation in turn, 
2. ' -- 
together with a number of relevant statistics. R is the 
multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. F' is the F distribution statistic. SE is the 
standard error of the regression. DW is-the Durbin' Watson 
statistic for first order autocorrelation. h is the Durbiný 
h test for first order autocorrelation in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable. ' RHO is the first order autore- 
gressive parameter, and n refers to the sample size. Where 
the equation is corrected for autocorrelation (all equa- 
tions except [1] and [2]), RHO is presented together with 
the oricinal, unadjusted DW or h as appropriate; but where 
aut-ocorrelation is not present, DW and h refer to the 
equation as presented. t-ratios are shown in parentheses 
beneath each estimated coefficient. Unless indicated by a 
*, all coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level 
or better. 
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Demand_, for real, currency 
[11 Ln (CU/CP) = -. 778 + . 379 Ln YQ + . 760 Ln (CU/CP)(-l) 
-(-1.05*Y(6.39) (9.25) 
-. 308 Ln-RST--+-. 042 D2 
(-6.05) (2.28) 
2 
R= 
. 83 F= 41.47-SE . 044 h= -1.25 n= 35 D. W = 2.3 
Although there is evidence ofvmulticollinearity be 
tween all the explanatory variables except the seasonal 
dummy, the relevant elasticities conform to expectations. 
The short-run income elasticity of demand for currency 
of . 379 and long-run value of 1.58 are similar to those 
found by the SEACEN Sri Lanka study, but are generally 
higher than in the other country studies. The transactions 
demand for currency is thus relatively inelastic in the 
sýort 
"run but'exceeds unity in the longer run when a par- 
tial adjustment process is taken into account. In contrast 
to the SEACEN Sri Lanka study, we also obtained significant 
negative elasticities for currency demand with respect to 
nominal interest rates on time and savings deposits, sug- 
gesting some substitution between financial assets Over 
this period. The long-run elasticity is 1.28. The Tr 
used by SEACEN (1981) to represent the rate of return as 
fixed assets was not significant. The dummy variable used 
to capture the seasonal effects in the second quarter was 
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significant but the one used to represent the effects of 
uncertainty was not significant. However, in view of the 
multicollinearity' between the key independent variables, 
this result should be treated with caution. 
Demand for real demand deposits 
[21 Ln (D/CP) = 3.135 + . 151 Ln YQ(-4) +. 541 Ln (D/CP) (-4) (2.89) (1.95*) (3.38) 
-. 248 Ln RST 
(-2.65) 
2 
R= 
. 45 F=9.43 SE = . 061 h= . 84 n= 32 D. W = 1.86 
The. overall fit of this equation is not entirely 
satisfactory, with the income variable significant only at 
the 10 per cent probability level. However, we were unable 
to improve the fit of this equation by changes in specifi- 
cation. However, there was no strong evidence of multicol- 
linearity. The income elasticities of . 151 in the short- 
run and . 33 in the long-run are significantly lower than 
those found for Sri Lanka by SEACEN (. 61 and 1.87), but are 
closer to the SEACEN averages of . 25 and . 75 excluding the 
relatively high values for Sri Lanka. The interest elas- 
ticities of -. 248 and -. 54 are again higher than those 
found for comparable estimates in the SEACEN study dealing 
with the earlier time period. The SEACEN Sri Lanka study 
found no significant interest rate effect on portfolio 
adjustment. 
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Demand for Real time and'savincs der)osits. 
[31 Ln (T/CP) = 1.015 + . 267 Ln YQ(-1) + . 231 Ln RST (1.10*) (3.00) (2.72) 
+. 496 Ln DC -. 123 D1 
(7.37) (-6.05) 
2 
K= 
. 98 F-= 568.79 SE = . 063 DW = . 42 RHO = . 798 n= 35 
Again, the notable feature of this equation is the 
positive significant interest elasticity. Although the 
sign was correct in the SEACEN Sri Lanka study, it was 
insignificant. The arithmetic mean for the SEACEN coun- 
tries as a whole is also much smaller at . 028. This would 
support the view that Sri Lankans' became more interest 
conscious during this later period. The elasticity of . 26 
with respect to income lagged one period is also higher 
than the SEACEN countries as a whole, although it was not 
meaningful to compute a mean figure for the latter. Al- 
though an income variable was not included in the Sri Lanka 
study, it is possible that their use of the number of bank 
offices (elasticity = . 065) picks up some of the influence 
of our income variable. Domestic Credit (DC)- appears to be 
highly significant in the accrual of financial savings and 
it may be treated as a proxy for income. The seasonal 
dummy variable was included to capture the effect of port- 
folio adjustment in favour of consumption expenditure 
during festive seasons. We attempted to highlight the 
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importance of financial innovation (FI) in the demand for 
time and savings deposits using a dummy variable for the 
introduction of new instruments. However, it was not sta- 
tistically significant. Multicollinearity was clearly 
present in this equation as a whole. We used the Farrar- 
2 
Glauber X and F tests (especially with respect to DC), but 
this was not reflected in the partial correlation coeffi- 
cients between the explanatory variables. The only signif- 
icant t statistic was between lagged income and the season- 
al dummy, and this was not of a high order of magnitude. 
Total reserves. 
[41 Ln R= -1.161 -. 183 Ln ZXY + . 577 Ln TD + . 466 Ln RR (-1.79*) (-2.22) (3.29) (3.04) 
2 
K= 
. 97 F= 360.99 SE = . 075 DW = . 88 RHO = ý55-. n = 36, 
An interesting feature of this equation is the 
significant negative relationship between reserves and the 
inter-bank call market loan rate ZXY. This is designed to 
test the impact of short-term lending rates representing 
the opportunity cost of holding higher reserves. In the 
Sri Lanka SEACEN study they used a measure of the price 
which the banks must pay to borrow from the Central Bank. 
This was insignificant in our study, probably because the 
Central Bank introduced quotas on borrowed reserves in the 
first part of our period, and there was excess liquidity in 
the commercial banks during the second. TD and RR are, as 
expected important determinants of reserve behaviour, as in 
the SEACEN countries in general. Required reserves, in 
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particular, was one of the most effective monetary 
instruments available to the Central Bank over this period. 
Multicollinearity is strong in this equation as a whole and 
is significant between ZXY and TD and RR and TD, but in 
neither case is the Farrar-Glauber t-statistic especially 
high. 
Total real expenditure 
[51 Ln (PAG/P) = 1.609 + . 322 Ln YQ(-3) (1.57*) (3.06) 
+ . 523 Ln (BMO/CP)(-I) +. 090 D4 (5.29) (3.09) 
2 
. 97 F= 298.81 SE = . 078 DW = 1.37 RHO = . 33 n= 33 
Since we define PAG/P to include both private and 
government expenditure, we are unable to compare our 
estimates directly with the SEACEN study. The only 
comparable figure is that for the log of real income lagged 
one period (. 636) from Wijesinghe (1986). Both the lagged 
income and lagged real money estimates are, however, as 
expected, with the latter confirming the spillover effect 
through which monetary impulses are transmitted to the real 
sector. We tried to use the interest rate variable in this 
equation but it was not significant. Although there is 
some multicollinearity present in this equation, only the 
relationship between the lagged income variable and the 
dummy is significant. 
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Agarecatt Rrice level 
[101 Ln P= -1.922 + . 661 Ln MP(-2) + . 385 Ln (BMO/CP)(-2) (-3.04) (5.46) (6.09) 
+ . 049 DI - . 054 D4 (5.93) (-6.65) 
2 
. 98 F= 393.39 SE = . 028 DW = . 18 RHO = . 94 n= 34 
In contrast to the rather poor fits obtained for 
the inflation and aggregate price level equations in the 
SEACEN Sri Lanka study, we were able to achieve an 
acceptable result. Of particular interest for a relatively 
open economy such as Sri Lanka is the coefficient on the 
import price variable, which captures the impact of a rise 
in import prices or a depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate. The impact of imported inflation is particularly 
important with liberlisation and depreciation of the rupee 
after 1977. The broad money coefficient also supports the 
spillover effect of an increase in real money on the price 
level. Multicollinearity was detected in the equation but 
was only significant for the relationship between lagged 
import prices and lagged broad money and with a relatively 
low t-statistic. 
Volume of real imports. 
[111 Ln MQ = 5.159 + . 224 Ln YQ(-2) -. 408 Ln MP(-4) (4.25) (2.32) (-2.94) 
+. 449 Ln IC(-1) 
(7.02) 
173 
2 
K= 
. 99 F= 888.03 SE -. 057 DW = 1.04 RHO = . 47 n= 32 
A key feature of this equation is the 
relatively low elasticity of import demand with respect to 
real income lagged two periods of . 224. This compares with 
a mean short-run value of . 45 and long-run value of 1.45 
for the SEACEN countries as a whole. The SEACEN Sri Lanka 
equation is particularly poor overall here, with only the 
lagged dependent variable significant. It is possible that 
the low income elasticity reflects the success of policy 
controls on imports over both periods, especially in view 
of the highly significant coefficient for lagged import 
credit over our period when import credit for priority 
imports was seen as an effective instrument of monetary 
policy. From another point of view it may also be possible 
that the import credit variable overshadowed the effects of 
income on imports. Current income may not reflect the 
import propensity as imports were restricted during the 
previous period. The relatively inelastic response of 
imports to import prices is as one would expect of an 
economy geared up to essential imports of consumer goods 
and dependence on imports of intermediate and capital 
goods. This estimate also compares favourably with both 
the general SEACEN findings and the Sri Lankan study of 
Wijesi nghe (1986). Multicollinearity was found in this 
equation but it is significant only for the relationship 
between lagged import prices and lagged import credit,, with 
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a relatively low t-statistic. 
Volume of real exports. 
[121 Ln XQ -2.222 + 1.281 Ln GOECD(-4)-. 248 LnXPFXPC(- 4) 
(-1.44*) '-(4.87) (-4.39) 
+'. 333 Ln XQ(-l) 
(4.30) 
2 
= . 99 F= 2669.28 SE = . 049 h 1.85 RHO = -. 38 n= 32 
Both the SEACEN Sri Lanka study and Wijesinghe's 
(1986) later work on Sri Lanka failed to achieve a 
significant coefficient for a variable representing world 
demand. Our elasticities with respect to real income of 
OECD countries (GOECD) lagged four periods of 1.28 and 
long-run value of 1.92, however, are not surprising in view 
of the openness of the Sri Lankan economy, and are similar 
to those estimated for Malaysia (1.26) Indonesia, Singa- 
pore (3.12) and Thailand (0.88) within the SEACEN study. 
The inelastic price coefficient of--248 in the short-run 
and - . 37 in the long-run are also similar to, but a little 
smaller than those achieved by Wijesinghe and the SEACEN 
countries in general. Surprisingly, the SEACEN Sri Lanka 
study did not obtain a significant estimate for this key 
parameter. Overall, multicollinearity was present in this 
equation and was significant between the lagged world 
demand variable and the lagged dependent variable. 
A relative price variable reflecting Sri Lanka's 
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export prices vis-a-vis the export prices of her 
competitors is introduced through XPFXPC. This variable is 
also linked to the exchange rate as the foreign price of 
exports is influenced by the changes in the exchange rate. 
The sensitivity of exports to XPFXPC is reflected in the 
coefficient (short run elasticity) of - 0.248. 
I 
On the whole, the results conform to prior 
expectations and the equations provide a good statistical 
fit. As far as the difference between the OLS and 2SLSPC 
estimates are concerned (see Appendix 4.5), The only nota- 
ble difference observed in these estimates is the change in 
the interest rate variable in equation [3']. The -positive 
interest rate in the OLS estimates changes to negative in 
2SLSPC. A comparison between these two estimators in a 
simulation context is carried out in chapter S. 
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FOOT NOTES 
1, See, ' for example, Arestis and Hadjimatheou (1982). 
2 For a review of these developmentsi see Hallwood and 
Macdonald (1986). 
3. In some SEACEN countries this was estimated as a demand 
for excess reserves. See SEACEN (1981, p. 30). 
4. Due to the introduction of a wide array of reserve 
ratios on different classes of assets it was not 
feasible to use an average of reserve ratios. Hence, RR 
was defined in level terms. 
5. In the absence of suitable data on domestic spending on 
home goods we were unable to distinguish between 
spending on domestic and foreign goods. Imports were, 
therefore, determined as a behavioural equation and an 
overall price equation was estimated. For a discussion 
of the methodology involved, see SEACEN (1981). 
6. For a review of developments in the modelling of the 
external sector, see Arestis and Hadjimatheou. (1982). 
The problems associated with Sri Lanka in particular 
are discussed in Wijesinghe (1983,1986). 
7. See Arestis and Hadjimatheou (1982). 
8. Strictly speaking, NFACB in (7) only refers to the net 
foreign assets of the Central Bank. However, since 
other foreign assets are quite small, this is not espe 
cially misleading. 
9. This variable is discussed in some detail in SEACEN 
(1981). Note that in our case we have inverted this 
index so that it measures excess demand rather than 
excess capacity. 
10. This technique is assessed in SEACEN (1981). 
11. The general properties of simultaneous equation systems 
are explained in Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1986) and 
Challen and Hagger (1983). 
12. Note that identity (7) is redundant in the actual 
solution of the model. It is retained in the specifi- 
cation of the model in order to be able to disaggre 
gate RM for purposes of exposition. 
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13. See, for example, the 'rules'-suggested by Challen and 
Hagger (1983). 
14. A5% significance level was used for both tests. An 
equation was deemed to have failed the Durbin-Watson 
test if it failed on the upper limit specified. This is 
in line with the more cautious amended version of the 
DW test. See Koutsoyiannis (1977). 
4 
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Appendix-4.1 
Results for the Sri Lanka SEACEIT model 
1. Demand for real currency 
Ln C/cp = -1.82473 + . 48811 LnYQ - 10.1584 
<+ 
. 07751 LnNBO (-1.73753) (2.5695) (3.85717) (2.46559) 
+ . 64612 Ln C/cp(-l) + . 04196 Dl . 03562D2 - . 01746D3 (6.87118) (2.1152) (1.64849) (. 91512) 
2 
= . 97188 D. W. = 1.93 2 
"= . 96458 RHOl = '. 0633 
Demand for real demand deposits 
Ln D/cp -2.99964 + . 61230 LnYQ -8.95903 
If + . 06597 LnNBO (-2.45464) (2.87267) (-3.62132) (2.15195) 
+ . 67246 LnD/cp(-l) + . 02879D1 + . 000040374D2 (7.64295) (0.76850) (. 00145) 
+ . 00207D3 (. 05606) 
2 
='. 97938 D. W. = 1.94 
_2 R . 97404 RHOI = -. 3854 
3. Demand for time and sayings deposits in real terns 
Ln T/cp =.. 51351 + . 01894 r-5.63759 
Tr 
st 
(. 87461) (1.46052) (-2.58848) 
+ . 06531 LnNBO +. 87549 Ln T/cp(-l) (2.27164) (10.8512) 
. 02298 Dl - . 01650 D2 - . 02823 D3 (-. 74276) (-. 6374) (-. 94115) 
R= 
. 99079 2 
= . 9884 
D. W. 2.02 
RHOl -. 2246 
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Total reserves 
R 74.4474 + . 10009 14BO + 17.3774r +. 07229 (D + T) 
c- 
(-1.60728) (2.15758) (2.26937) (14.4285) 
+ 1.03359Z*- 11.5568D1 - 9.18421D2 - 20.1448D3 
(14.2641) (. 78283) (. 64003) (1.41413) 
5. Private sector real expenditure 
Ln PA/P = 2.89461 + . 30777 LnYQ(-l) + . 30477 Ln NMO/cp(-l) (3.75393) (2.2900) (6.07155) 
+ 12.2465 fl(-l) + . 0127D1 +. 00746D2 +. 01652D3 (6.2990) (1.33004) (. 61802) (1.38182) 
2 
= . 92854 D. W. = 1.95 2 
= . 91323 RHOl = . 7319 RH02 = -. 2672 
Rate of price inflation 
LnP = . 27859 + . 05732 LnNMO/cp(-l) - . 08745 LnYQ(-l) (. 36165) (. 96216) (-. 60138) 
+. 88565 Tr (-l) + . 03459 A LnMP + . 02996DF +. 01404Dl (. 49682) (1.13299) (1.63656) (1.27684) 
+ . 0041D2 + . 00587D3 (. 33616) (. 43881) 
2 
= . 31543 D. W. = 2.00 2 
= . 1048 RHOl = . 2127 
LnP -. 72931 + . 13902 LnNMO/cp(-l) - . 04141 LnYQ(-l) (-. 72867) (1.72614) (-. 28633) 
+ 3.32903rl(-J) + . 01678 LnMP + . 02747DF + . 01491D1 (1.38760) (. 52198) (1.53703) (1.37518) 
+. 00348D2 + . 00472D3 + . 90512 LnP(-l) (. 29084) (. 35876) (14.2490) 
2 
= . 99432 2 
= . 99227 
D. W. = 2.02 
RHOl = . 1936 
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Volurne of inports 
LnMQ - 2.63167 + . 41007 LnYQ . 05355 LnMP/p + . 89123 LnMQ(-l) (-2.0659) (. 95069) (-. 77767) (9.29204) 
+ . 01791D1 + . 02178D2 -01184D3 (. 68900) (. 71554) (-. 4653) 
2,, 
= . 93582 D. W. = 2.09 2 
= . 92207 RHOl = . 3414 
Volune of exports 
LnXQ 4.7335 - . 42448 LnXP/XPC + . 01443 LnXQ(-l) + . 04187D1 (6.34289 (-4.17353) (. 11824) (1.03160) 
- . 04632D2 + . 03285D3 - . 32195DP + . 00215X* (-1.18377) (. 80619) (-3.71859) (5.42233) 
R= 
. 87548 D. W. 1.80 2 
= . 8432 
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Appendix 4.2 FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE MODEL 
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Appendix 4.3 
Abbreviations used in the Flow Diagram 
GAP = Excess capacity/excess demand 
TD, = Total deposits 
XPFXPC = Real foreign currency price of exports as a ratio 
of the export prices of competing countries 
DR = Real demand deposits 
YQ = Real Income 
TR = Real time and savings deposits 
CUR = Real currency 
RST = Nominal rate of interest 
OINCB = Other items (net) of the Central Bank 
RR = Required reserves 
PAGR = Real total expenditure 
XQ = Volume of exports 
GOECD = Growth of OECD countries 
D2 = Seasonal dummy (quarter 2) 
GCB = Gross credit to commercial banks by'the Central 
Bank 
Ci = Total currency issue of the Central Bank 
MPP = Real import price in home currency 
DC = Domestic credit 
MQ = Volume of imports 
RS = Deposits of other institutions held with the 
Central Bank 
DOI = Gross credit to other institutions by the 
Central Bank 
NCG = Net credit to government by the Central Bank 
OAB = Other assets (net) of the banking system 
NFA = Net foreign assets of the banking system 
XP = Real export price 
NFACB = Net foreign assets of the Central Bank 
BMOR = Real broad money 
P= Aggregate price level (GDP deflator) 
DI = Seasonal dummy (quarter 1) 
CAP = Capital account of the balance of payments 
R= Total reserves of commercial banks 
BOP = Balance of payments 
D4 = Seasonal dummy (quarter 4) 
Ic = Volume of import credit 
ZXY = Lending rate in the Inter- bank call market' 
MP = Nominal price of imports 
Tl = Long term deposits of government and government 
sponsored institutions 
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Appendix 4.4 
Otani/Riechel STnoothing Techniaue 
This method relies on the principle of moving 
averages. The first quarter data for example are equal to 
one fourth of the annual income of the current year plus 
three fourths of the income of the previous year. Second 
quarter data are obtained by giving the weight of one half 
to the current and the previous periods income. The 
weights for the third quarter are three fourths and one 
fourth and the moving average for the fourth quarter 
(expressed as in annual rate) is equal to the annual income 
of the current year. 
GDP - annual GDP for the current year 
t 
GDP - annual GDP for the previous year 
t-l 
First estimate for first quarter (3 x GDP )+ (GDP 
t-1 t 
-------------------- 
16 
First estimate for second quarter (2 x GDP )+ (2 x GDP 
t-1 t 
------------------------- 
16 
First estimate for third quarter (1 x GDP )+ (3 x GDP 
t-1 t 
------------------------- 
16 
First estimate for fourth quarter 4x GDP 
t. 
------------ 
16 
-A Sum of the first estimates for all four quarters = GDP 
t 
Final estimate for first quarter (first estimate) x GDP 
t 
-A --- 
GDP 
t 
Final estimate for second qUarter (first estimate) x GDP 
t 
--A- 
GDP 
t 
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Final estimate for third quarter (first estimate) x GDP 
t 
G JýP 
t 
Final estimate for fourth quarter (first estimate) x GDP 
t 
-A-- 
GDP 
t 
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Appendix 4.5 
Two sta" least sauares Principal corponents (2SLSPQ 
DeTnand for real currencv. 
Ln (CU/CP) = -1.341 + . 472 Ln YQ + . 742 Ln (CU/CP)(- 1) (-1.61*) (6.75) (7.57) 
-. 373 Ln RST + . 062 D2 (-4.32) (3.27) 
SE = . 042 h= -1.24 n= 32 
Demand for real demand deposits'. 
[211 Ln (D/CP) = 2.374 + . 158 Ln YQ(-4) + . 645 Ln (D/CP)(-4) (1-96*) (1.71*) (3.28) 
-. 316 Ln RST 
(-3.08) 
SE = . 062 h= . 93 n ='32 
Demand for Real tine and, savincTs deposits. 
Ln (T/CP) 2.924 + . 191 Ln YQ(-l) - . 225 Ln RST (3.32) (1.71*) (-1.81*) 
+ . 510 Ln DC -. 122 DI (13.31) (-5.18) 
SE = . 053 DW = 1.29 RHO = . 39 n= 32 
Total reserves. 
[4'1 Ln R=-. 312 - . 214 Ln ZXY + . 443 Ln TD + . 543 Ln RR (-. 292*) (-2.42) (1.66*) (2.53) 
SE = . 074 DW = . 95 RHO . 53 n= 32 
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Total real expenditure. 
[9'1 Ln (PAG/P) = 1.155 + . 598 Ln YQ(-3) + . 299 Ln (BMO/CP)(-l) (1.47*) (4.94) (2.78) 
+ . 163 D4 (4.28) 
SE = . 077 DW = 1.79 n= 32 
Acrareciate price level. 
[10'1 Ln P -2.443 + . 676 Ln MP(-2) + . 429 Ln (BMO/CP)(-2) (-3.37) (5.51) (5.86) 
+*., 050 Dl-. 056 D4 
(5.89) (-6.49) 
SE = . 029 DW = . 29 RHO = . 93 n= 32 
Volume of real inports. 
[11'] Ln MQ = 4.910 + . 246 Ln YQ(-2) -. 417 Ln MP(-4) (3.92) (2.39) (-2.95) 
+ . 458 Ln IC(-I) (7.27) 
SE = . 057 DW = 1.18 RHO = . 43 n= 32 
Volume of real exr)orts. 
[12'1 Ln XQ = -2.268 + 1.310 Ln GOECD(-4) -. 257 XPFXPC(-4) 
(-1.44*) (4.87) (-4.47) 
+. 322 Ln XQ(-l) 
(4.10) 
SE = . 049 h=1.27 RHO -. 37 n=32 
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CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION 
This chapter contains four main sections. 5.1 
outlines the methodology of simulation and discusses ýits 
uses in this thesis; A dynamic control solution of the 
model for the period 1978 Ql to*1985 Q4'is carried out in 
section 5.2. Section, 5.3 deals with the validation of the 
model based on sensitivity and multiplier analysis and 
discusses the ability of the'model to forecast and to 
capture turning points in the major endogenous variables. ' 
It also compares OLS simulation results with those obtained 
from more efficient estimation techniques, in 'particular 
2SLSPC. The-overall performance of the'model is discussed 
in conclusion. -All simulation experiments 'were carried 
out with the Tine Series Processor (TSP-version 3.5) at the 
University of Bradford. 
5.1 The Methodology of Sinulation 
According to Pyndick' and Rubinfeld (1986) 
simulation is the mathematical solution of a simultaneous* 
set of difference equations. It is a popular technique for 
testing and evaluating economic models'and for forecasting 
and policy analysis. 
The main purpose of simulation here is to provide 
both a computationally convenient solution to our set of 
equations, especially in view of the time lags and 
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nonlinearities involved. Secondly, it enables us .0 
evaluate the system as a whole. in a dynamic context. 
Equations which display an acceptable statistical fit on an 
individual basis need not perform well when simulated as 
part of a complete model, and equations which are not very 
satisfactory when taken in isolation may perform better in 
a simulation context. In this sense, simulation provides an 
additional check on the statistical fit of, the model in a 
dynamic context. Thirdly, simulation enables us to assess 
the tracking- performance of our model. Fourthly, 
simulation- enables us to carry out repeated solutions of 
our model using different values for the parameters based 
upon alternative estimation methods. For example, OLS and 
2SLSPC. We also changed some of the key parameters in the 
equations to carry out "Sensitivity Analysis" to see how 
sensitive the model is to small changes in the parameters, 
and to simulate policy changes. This is particularly 
important in so far as we are interested in assessing the 
dynamic repercussions of the MTM through the model. Fifth- 
ly, we were interested to test the accuracy of the model in 
replicating turning points in the actual data. A model may 
track the levels of variables well, but perform poorly in 
predicting changes of direction. We will therefore, com- 
pare year on year directional changes in observed and 
simulated values and assess the effects of taking sub- 
periods within the sample period. For a good review see 
Wilson (1980). 
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We also chose simulation because it enables us to 
assess the impact of "exogenous shocks" on the endogenous 
variables and their tine paths using multiplier analysis. 
(NCG) of the For example, a fiscal policy related component 
money supply could be varied and its impact on endogenous 
-ariables such as the price level can be assessed. 
Aplier analysis is also useful in demonstrating the Mult. 
interactions between different sectors of the economy and 
isolating the MTM. Both policy and non-policy exogenous 
variables can be used for this purpose and it helps shed 
light', *on future 'policy in as much as it'- enables us to 
construct counterfactual exercises with historical data. 
Finally, we use ex post forecasting to assess how the model 
tracks actual historical data, both within and outside the 
sannple period. It is not our intention, however, to conduct 
ex ante forecasting, in view of the well known problems 
associated with this analysis. See, for exanple, Pyndick and 
Rubinfeld (1986). 
We begin our evaluation procedure with' a control 
solution of the model over the sample period. and inspect 
its within saý,. vle tracking performance in line with 
conventional criteria. We then examine the model's outside 
sample tracking performance by re-estimating the model over 
a shortened time period and using it to carry out an ex 
post forecast over the rest of the sample. The actual and 
forecast values for the endogenous variables are then 
compared in order to assess the magnitude of forecasting 
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errors. 
. To complete our evaluation of, the model we use 
sensitivity analysis to compare'the system's performance 
when changes are made to the simulation sample period and 
parameters and equations in the model. We then call, upon 
dynamic response analysis to calculate dynamic multipliers 
and elasticities measuring the repercussions "on the 
endogenous variables of shocks to selected exogenous 
variables. 
5.2 Dynamic Sinulation-Ccntrol Solution 1978 01-1985 Q4 
The model containing 8 equations and 6 identities 
was dynamically'simulated over the estimation period of 32 
observations from the first quarter of 1978 to the fourth 
quarter of 1985. -This represents an unconditional ex 
post historical simulation in which the actual values of 
the exogenous-variables are used to perform, a dynamic one 
step ahead solution. The simulation was dynamic in the 
sense that*the solution values from previous time periods 
are used for the lagged endogenous variables in place 'of 
their historically observed values. 
The tracking performance of the model is sumnarised 
in Table 5.1 using the root mean square percentage error 
l/ 
(RIISPE) and Theil's inequality coefficient (U) The 
former measures the deviation of the simulated endogenous 
variable from its actual time path in percentage terms and 
is therefore independent of the units used to measure the 
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different variables. However, in the case of the balance 
of payments (BOP), which involves switching between pos. 
tive and negative values, the RMASPE is inappropriate 
Table 5.1 
Simulation Tracking Performance for the Control Solution 
1 1978 Q1 to 1985 Q4 
--- ------------------------ -------- 
RMSPE 
----- 
U 
- 
-------- 
UM 
-------- 
----- 
us 
----- 
----- 
UC 
----- --- 
[I] 
------------------------ 
Real currency 
-------- 
8.55 
---- 
. 044 . 453 . 
026 . 521 
[2) Real demand deposits 6.44 . 032 . 074 . 
319 . 607 
[31 Real time/savings deposits9.07 . 044 . 206 . 010 . 
784 
[41 Total reserves 13.64 . 058 . 021 . 
114 . 865 
[93 Total real expenditure 8.52 . 043 . 258 . 
011 . 732 
[101 Aggregate price level 9.26 . 045 4001 . 
723 . 276 
[113 Volume of real imports 5.57 . 028 . 049 . 219 . 
732 
[121 Volume of real exports - 4.24 . 021 . 001 . 
024 . 975 
[133 Real income (GDP) 9.73 . 049 . 235 . 001 . 
765 
[141 Balance of payments (650) . 174 . 067 . 121 . 
810 
[5] Total deposits 6.39 . 029 '. 175 . 001 . 
825 
[61 Real broad money 5.69 . 028 . 387 . 
006 . 607 
[83 Domestic credit 4.34 . 019 . 350 . 010 . 
641 
[15] Excess demand/capacity 
----------- 
10.56 
--------- 
. 054 
----- 
. 226 
------- 
. 183 
------ 
. 591 
------ --- ------------ 
Arithmetic mean 2/ 
------------ w --- 
7.85 
--------- ----- ------- ------ ------ --- 
I/ 
------- 
Root Mean Square Error 
2/ excludes the BOP. 
and the root mean square-error (RMSE) is used in its place. 
U is related to the RMSPE but the denominator is scaled 
such that U always falls between zero and unity. U=O 
implies a perfect fit between-the actual and simulated 
series, while U=l suggests that the predictive performance 
of the model is as bad as it could possibly be. Table 5.1 
also shows the decomposition of U into inequality 
proportions which breaks the simulation errors down into 
their characteristic sources, namely bias (UM), variance 
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(us), and covariance (UC). The UM measures the extent to 
which the average values ofýthe simulated and actual series 
deviate from each other. The US arises because the 
solution values- which the system generates given the 
observed values of the predetermined variables do not 
coincide exactly with the values predicted by each 
estimated equation for, the given endogenous variable. 
Finally, the UC measures the unsystematic error. it 
represents the, remaining error-after deviations from the 
average values and -average variabilities have been 
accounted for. A visual display of the model's tracking 
-o 14 (Appendix 5.1). performance is provided by Figures 1t 
Although there are no hard and fast criteria for 
evaluating the performance of macro-simulation models 
UISM's), the data in table 5.1 and the visual comparison of 
the actual and simulated series, suggest that the tracking 
performance of the model is-good. The average RMSPE of 
7.85 is of an acceptable order of magnitude, and only the 
total reserves and-excess demand equations exhibit RMSPE 
exceeding 10 per cent. U statistics exceed . 05 for both 
these equations and also for the BOP. In the case of 
reserves, most of the error seems to be accounted for by 
the unsystematic UC component, which is generally consid- 
ered to be less of a problem than high values for UM or US. 
The excess demand/capacity equation, despite its high U11, 
is not really central to the model since it does not appear 
on the right hand side of any relationship and is simply 
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used to give a broad indication of the relationship between 
siA-Ilulated and potential real GDP. The relatively high RMSE 
and U for the BOP is also to be expected since it is a 
residual aggregate which is notoriously difficult to pre- 
dict in absolute terms. It too does not play a major role 
elsewhere in the system, but only becomes important in a 
multiplier context when changes in this identity are of 
interest rather than absolute values. Of greater concern 
is the, relatively high systematic error UM, for real cur- 
rency and real broad money, since this usually indicates 
that revision of, the model might be necessary. 
However, these UM values are not especially high 
and the visual tracking performance for these equations 
does not suggest a serious problem. The variance component 
US is relatively high for the- aggregate price level 
equation and real demand deposits. In the latter case this 
is clearly because the actual series has fluctuated much 
more than the simulated series, as a glance at Figure 4 
would suggest. In the level case this is much less obvious 
from Figure 6. In neither of these cases, however, -is this 
error, serious, enough to distort the overall simulation 
performance of the equations concerned. 
Table 5.2 compares' the performance of our model, 
where the equations overlap sufficiently, with the earlier 
SEACEIT Sri Lanka study. Although the two models are not 
identical and the time periods are different, it seems that 
we have managed to improve the tracking performance of 'the 
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model overall on the basis of the average RMSPE and for 
Table 5.2 
The SEACEN Sri Lanka Study and the 
Control Solution Compared 
RMSPE 
1974-1979 
----- 
1978-1985 
--------------- ---- 
Ell 
----------------------------- 
Real currency 
----- 
10.19 8.55 
[21 Real demand deposits 13.47 6.44 
[31 Real time/savings deposits 4.32 9.07 
[41 Total reserves 5.03 13.64 
[9) Total real expenditure l/ 12.86 8.52 
[101 Aggregate price level 13.54 9.26 
[111 Volume of real imports 19.87 5.57 
[121 Volume of real exports 7.57 4.24 
[131 Real income (GDP) 9.21 9.73 
[141 Balance of payments 2/ 1359 650 
[51 Total deposits - - 
[61 Real broad money 22.73 5.69 
[81 Domestic credit - - 
[151 Excess demand/capacity 
-------- ----------- --------------- --- -------------------- 
Arithmetic mean 3/ 11.88 8.07 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
l/ Private expenditure only for SEACEN 
2/ Refers to RMSE 
3/ excludes the BOP. 
most equations. Finally, we looked at the ability of the 
model to capture turning points in the data. 
Table 5.3 summarizes our findings. (A) counts the 
number of occasions on which the simulated series fails to 
match a turning point in the actual data, and (B) counts 
the times that the simulated series changes direction but 
the actual series does not. overall, there is no obvious 
tendency for either (A) or (B) to predominate. Equations 
which perform relatively badly on these criteria are the 
BOP, real imports, the aggregate price level [especially on 
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(AH real exports, and time and savings deposits 
[especially MI. (C) is designed to see if there is any 
evidence that an equation systematically over or under 
predicts'the actual data by taking the ratio of positive to 
negative simulation errors. A value of unity for (C) would 
suggest that there is no tendency-for systematic over or 
under prediction. From Table 5.3 it appears that the 
simulated series tend, in general, to under rather than to 
over predict the actual series f(C) less than unity). The 
real currency and domestic credit equations are the most 
prone to under-prediction, while the price level equation 
systematically over-predicts for the first 21 quarters and 
then under predicts for the remaining 11 quarters. 
overall, it is encouraging that only the BOP 
equation see. -is to do badly over the range of evaluation 
criteria, including the visual display, we have been using. 
Thus, whilst it is suggestive of improvement, there is no 
compelling reason to alter the specification of the model 
in the light of the performance of the control so lution. 
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Table 5.3 
Turning Point Analysis for the Control Solution 
TURNING POINTS 
---- ----------------------- 
(A) 
---------- 
(B) 
------------ 
(C) 
---------- 
In actual In simula- Positive/ 
but not ted but negative 
in simula- not in simulation 
---- ---- ---- 
ted actual errors 
[11 
- -------------- 
Real currency 
---------- 
.3 
------------ 
2 
---------- 
. 28 (21 Real demand deposits IN d. 5 . 68 [31 Real time/savings 2 6 . 52 deposits 
[41 Total reserves 3 2 . 52 [91 Total real expenditure 5 0 . 45 [101 Aggregate price level 8 4 1.90 
[111 Volume of real imports 6 7 . 60 [121 Volume of real exports 6 5 . 88 [131 Real income (GDP) 4 0 . 45 [141 Balance of payments 5 8 1.50 
[51 Total deposits 1 5 . 39 [6] Real broad money 0 1 . 39 [81 Domestic credit 0 5 . 33 (151 
---- 
Excess demand/capacity 
----------------------- 
4 
----------- 
0 
---- 
. 45 
---- 
Total 
----------------------- 
. 49 
----------- 
------- 
50 
----------- 
--------- 
--------- 
5.2.1 Benchmark Comparison 
Table 5.4 compares the tracking performance of our 
model with a 'naive' benchmark alternative which predicts 
that the value of the endogenous variable in question will 
be identical to its actual value in the previous time 
period. This is a mechanical extrapolation rule not based 
on economic theory. The tracking performance of this naive 
model is expected to be quite good, since it, combines the 
trend which is prominent in most macro data, with lagged 
dependent variables which tend to capture-the fluctuating 
part of the variables. Figures 15 to 28 provide the 
graphical presentation (Appendix 5.129). 
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Table 5.4 
Comparison of the Tracking Performance 
of the Control Solution and a Naive Benc hmark Mod el 
---- ----------------------- ---------------- 
RMSPE 
--------------- 
--------- 
U 
--------- 
------ 
U 
------ 
---- ---- - 
CONTROL NAIVE CONTROL NAIVE 
[I] 
- ----------------- 
Realcurrency 
--------- 
8.55 
------- 
6.45 
--------- 
. 044 
------ 
. 032 [2) Real demand deposits 6.44 10.65 . 032 . 053 C31 Real time/savings 
deposits 9.07 9.41 . 044 . 046 [41 Total reserves 13.64 15.36 . 058 . 067 [93 Total real 
expenditure 8.52 8.23 . 043 . 041 (10] Aggregate price level 9.26 7.75 . 045 . 038 [111 Volume of real imports 5.57 9.51 . 028 . 047 [113 Volume of real exports 4.24 7.43 . 021 . 037 [133 Real income (GDP) 9.73 13.22 . 049 . 066 [14] Balance of payments 1/ (650) (490) . 174 . 125 [51 Total deposits 6.39 6.47 . 029 . 029 [63 Real broad money 5.69 7.96 . 028 . 039 [81 Domestic credit 4.34 5.80 . 019 . 027 [151 
---- 
Excess demand/capacity 
----------------------- 
10.56 
--------- 
14.87 . 054 . 073 
---- 
Arithmetic mean 2/ 
----------------------- 
7.85 
--------- 
------- 
9.47 
------- 
--------- 
--------- 
------ 
------ 
l/ Root Mean Square Error 
2/ excludes the BOP. 
Overall, the control solution perforris better than 
the naive model, with a significantly lower average RMSPE. 
Only two equations perform better with the naive model: 
those for real currency and ihe aggregate price level: and 
the total real expenditure equation does marginally better 
in the latter case. Although this reinforces our suspicions 
from 5.1 that there is room for irprovement with respect 
to these two equations, the nagnitude of their simulation 
errors is not such as to raise fundamental doubts about 
their inclusion in the model. 
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5.3. Validation of the Model 
5.3.1 Outside Tracking Perforrance 
In order to evaluate the model's ability to track 
the historical 'paths of the endogenous variables over a 
period which lies outside the estimation sample period, we 
f 1978 re-estinated the equations from the first quarter of 
to the last quarter of 1984 and carried out an ex post 
2/' 
forecast over the four quarters of 1 985 . The results are 
summarised in Table 5.5. Although aggregates such as real 
GDP and excess demand have relatively high forecasting 
errors, the overall performance of the model is 
significantly biased by the equation for total reserves, 
which seems especially sensitive to the choice of 
estimation time period. Without'this equation, the average 
RMSPE is quite acceptable at 8.59. 
5.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
As a further check on the dynamic stability of the 
model, we decided to carry out three sensitivity exer*cises 
to ascertain the implications of changing the solution tire 
period, -using an alternative estimation technique, and 
altering the values of individual parameters by specific 
amounts. , 
199 
Table 5.5 
Ex. Post Forecasting fron 
------- - 
1985 Q1 to 1985 Q4 
------ ---------- ------- --- ------------- -- ------ -- 
RMSPE 
--------- 
U 
------- --- - --------------------------- 
Real currency 
---------- 
4.04 . 016 (2) Real demand deposits 7.52 . 036 [31 Real time/savings deposits 25 8.4. . 029 [4) Total reserves 51.26 . 125 [91 Total real expenditure 10.75 . 045 (101 Aggregate price level 9.68 . 034 [111 Volu-, -. ie of real imports 3.37 . 01-4 (121 Volume of real exports 6.47 
[131 Real income (GDP) 16.67 . 071 
[141 Balance of payments l/ 892.3 . 157 [5) Total deposits 7.98 . 023 
[6] Real broad money 7.08 . 027 
(81 -Domestic credit 7.39 0 12.2 (15] 
--- 
Excess demand/capacity 
----- - ---------- 
13.83 
------------------- 
. 071 
------- - 
---- 
------ ------- 
Arith. -,. etic mean 2/ 
------ --- ----------- -- 
11.87 
------------------- ------- 
l/ 
- - ----- 
Root Mean Square Error 
2/ excludes the BOP. 
Table 5.6 
Sensitivity of the Model to a Change in Solution 
ý Time Period 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
RMSPE U RMSPE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
79-84 81-85 79-84 81-85 CONTROL 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
[11 Real currency 9.81 4.21 . 050 . 021 8.55 (21 Real demand deposits 6.93 5.93 . 035 . 029 6.44 [31 Real time/savings 
deposits 9.72 7.72 . 045 . 032 9.07 [41 Total reserves 14.64 16.81 . 058 . 058 13.64 (91 Total real 
expenditure 8.86 4.74 . 043 . 021 8.52 "6 [101 Aggregate price level 9.32 10.12 . 044 . 042 9.4 [111, Volu, -,, e of real imports 5.31 3.90 . 026 . 018 5.57 [121 Volume of real exports 4.33 3.52 . 021 . 016 4.24 '17 9.73 [131 Real income (GDP) 9.60- 5.94 . 048 . 0ý [14) Balance of payments 1/ (663) (600) . 166 . 131 (650) (51 Total deposits 6.91 6.96 . 029 . 026 6.39 [61 Real broad money 6.52 4.35 . 032 . 019 5.69 [81 Domestic credit 4.94 3.91 . 019 . 019 4.34 [151 Excess demand/capacity 9.93 5.97 . 051 . 028 10.56 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Arithmetic mean 2/ 8.22 6.47 7.85 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
I/ Root Mean Square Error 
2/ excludes the BOP 
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Table 5.6 compares the control solution 1978 to 
1985 with the results for two sub periods: 1979 to 1984 and 
1981 to 1985. The first period was chosen to test the 
stability of our model to 'changes in monetary policy 
since 1979. The second was to see the sensitivity of the 
model to changes'in the endogenous variables associated 
with-- the effects of stabilisation policies. Although the 
model simulates better over the later period, especially 
the equations for real currency, real inco. -ne, excess demand, 
and total real expenditure; there is little evidence to 
suggest that the model is particularly sensitive to the 
solution period selected. 
Table 5.7 contrasts the control solution RMSPE's 
for the OLS estimates discussed in 4.8 with 'those based 
upon 2SLSPC, with an autocorrelation correction where 
appropriate. The rationale behind the 2SLSPC procedure is 
to reduce 'the possibility of inconsistency in the OLS 
estimates arising from the model's simultaneity, and the 
autocorrelation correction is used to improve the efficien- 
cy of these results by adding information about the error 
terms concerned. Although there has been very little 
research in this area, there is some evidence to suggest 
that both these procedures improve the simulation perform- 
3/ 
ance of macro models This is confirmed insofar as the 
average RMSPE is lower with 2SLSPC and no equation does 
dramatically better with the OLS estimates. However, an 
inspection of the full results for the individual equations 
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in ( Appendix 4.5), raises some specification problems with 
respect to the equations for total reserves [41 and tine 
and - savings deposits [3j. The coefficient on the total 
deposits-variable AD) is now insignificant in the reserves 
equation, an! those for lagged income and interest rates 
are significant only an 10 per cent in the time and savings 
deposits equation. In additicn, zhe sign on the interest 
rate variable (RST) is contrary to a priori expectaticns. 
Table 5.7 
The Control Solution with Ordinary Least Squares and Two 
Stage Least Squares Principal Components Estimates 
RMSPE 
----- --------- ---- ---------------------------- 
- 
------------ 
OLS 
----------------- 
2SLSPC 
----------- ---- 
[11 
-------------------------- - 
Real currency 8.55 8.47 
[21 Real demand deposits 6.44 5.75 
[3] Real time/savings deposits 9.07 7.01 
[4) Total reserves 13.64 11.52 
(91 Total real expenditure 8.541, 7.20 
[101 Aggregate price level 9.26 9.19 
[11] Volume of real imports 5.57 5.62 
[121 Volume of real exports 4.24 4.25 
[13] Real income (GDP) 9.73 8.26 
(141 Balance of payments 1/ (650) 2) (65" 
[51 Total deposits 6.39 5.35 
[61 Real broad money 5.69 5.41 
(81 Domestic credit 4.34 4.49 
[51 Excess demand/capacity 10.56 9.06 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Arithmetic mean 2/ 7.85 7.04 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
1/ Root Mean Square Error 
2/ Excludes the BOP 
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Our final sensitivity test consisted of a series of 
control runs with a given parameter increased by half of 
the standard error of the estimated coefficient concerned. 
The-objective here is to obtain a feel Icr the sensitivity 
of the model to particular parameter estimates. Since the 
model is nonlinear, the only way to do this is by trial and 
error to see how the model performs. We varied 22 
parameters in all, excluding only the dummy variables and 
the constants. We then calculated th e average RNSPE for 
each run and the percentage of the total RMSPE across all 
22 runs accounted for by a given parameter change. By far 
the most sensitive coefficient was that for the lagged 
dependent variable in the real currency equation [1] (a2). 
This alone accounted for 89 per cent of the total RMSFE. 
Table 5.8 lists the share of, the overall error 
accruing to the 3 other most sensitive parameterýs which 
together account for about 80 per cent of the total error 
excluding the a2 change. Further investigation of the 
average RMSPEs for the individual equations suggests that 
the impact of the changes in a2 and al are transmitted via 
the currency equation to the broad money (BMO/CP) and 
domestic credit (DC) identities and then on to the rest of 
the model. Changes in el and e2 also affect these 
identities. strongly, but operate indirectly via total real 
spending (PAG/P) and the real income identity (YQ). it 
appears, therefore, that the real currency and real total 
expenditure equations are key elements in the structure of 
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the model and that the system as a whole is especially 
sensitive to the specification of these equations. it is 
encouraging, however, that both a2 and the other 
coefficients in Table 5.8 display a good statistical fit on 
the basis of the criteria used in 4.7. 
Table 5.8 
ParameterýSensitivity Test 
t"QUJ%TION VARIABLE COEFFICIENT SHARE OF 
TOTAL 
--- 
ERROR, 1/ 
--------- --------------- 
[91 Total real 
--------------------- 
expenditure Ln YQ(-3) 
----------- 
. el 
38.9 
[91 Total real expenditure Ln(BIIO/CP)(-I) e2 26.5 
[11 Real currency Ln YQ 
------------------------------------ 
al 
-------------- 
13.5, 
---------- 
TOTAL 
- -------- ------- ------ 
78.9 
---------- --- ----------- 
I/ Percentage 
------------- 
of total RMSPE over 
-- 
22 parameter changes 
excluding a2 
5.3.3. Dyna,, ric Multipliers, and Elasticities 
The final step in our evaluation procedure was to 
calculate dynamic multipliers and elasticities by shocking 
selected exogenous variables in turn and assessing the 
deviation of the disturbed solution from the undisturbed 
(control) solution. Since our model is nonlinear in the 
variables, multipliers and elasticities can only be 
obtained by carrying out simulation experiments. 
Our objective here is three-fold. Firstly, to 
obtain information on the dynamic structure of the model as 
part of the general evaluation procedure. Secondly, to 
ascertain the model's performance in the context of the 
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earlier SEACEIT country studies, 
to Sri Lanka, before engaging 
analysis. Thirdly, to asses the 
transmission paths which will f 
of ýthe important transmission 
ter. - 
especially that pertaining 
in a full policy-oridnted 
importance 'of alternative 
acilitate the identification 
channels in the next chap- 
our approach here is, therefore, heavily con- 
strained by the SEACEN (1981) framework, although a direct 
comparison between our-study and SEACEN is difficult inso- 
far as the various country studies differ in model specifi- 
cation and in the precise way in which the multipliers are 
calculated and presented. In model specification, for 
example, it is not always clear how each country has de- 
fined the relationship between the BOP and the broad money 
identity for purposes of simulation. In some cases it 
appears that net foreign assets (NFA) are treated endoge- 
nously such that a shock to a component of the BOP would 
have direct feedback effects on the monetary sector, whilst 
in other cases both a BOP component and a NFA variable in 
the money identity are disturbed simultaneously The 
overall -repercussions on the system will not be the same. 
We shall return to this point below. 
, In addition, although a comparison between the 
individual studies is enhanced by the adoption of a 
standard set of monetary shocks based upon a 2.5 percentage 
increase in the required reserve ratio and a5 per cent 
increase in reserve money (RM), the precise way in which the 
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-s, change in RM is brought about varies (changes in export 
imports, capital flows). Finally, although some trouble is 
taken to present the results of the multiplier experiments 
in a common format, the actual presentation still differs 
between the countries concerned and there is not usually 
enough information available to transcribe this into a 
homogeneous framework. We are limited, therefore, to 
comparing percentage changes from control for key 
endogenous variables in specific time periods, and only in 
the Sri Lankan and Indonesian cases are these changes 
available for the whole time period. The multipliers 
concerned appear to have been calculated on the basis of an 
impulse shock to the starting value of the variable 
concerned in the first quarter of 1974. 
For comparison, therefore, we calculated all 
multipliers and elasticities on the basis of impulse 
changes from the starting values of the variables concerned 
in the first quarter of 1978. In addition to computing 
percentage changes from control for direct comparison with 
SEACEN studies, we also calculated unit multipliers . and 
dynamic elasticities. The former provides useful 
information on the pattern of the responses of the 
endogenous variables, and the latter provide a better 
indication of the relative strength of the responses 
concerned. In the case of interest rates we present the 
effects in the form of dynamic elasticities as the 
multiplier effects are distorted as a result of the small 
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changes in interest rates as compared to the large absolute 
numbers in the endogenous variables. 
We selected 3 multiplier experiments to test the 
dynamic structure of the model and to compare with SEACEN: 
an increase in reserve requirements of 2.5 percentage 
points, a5 per cent increase in reserve money by raising 
net domestic assets, and a5 per cent increase in reserve 
money by simultaneously increasing NFACB and reducing the 
volume of imports. The first shock amounts to a contrac- 
tionary monetary policy, and the second and third to a 
monetary stimulus, although the transmission mechanisms 
involved are different. We also conducted two additional 
simulation experiments to asses the relative significance 
of interest rates and credit rationing in transmitting 
monetary impulses to the real sector. The latter two are 
not comparable with the SEACEN study. 
The purpose of these experiments within the SEACEN 
framework is essentially to shed light on the relationship 
between monetary impulses (policy and non-policy) and real 
sector variables through the spillover effect of excess 
money. For example, if the money supply [61 is increased 
through one of the channels above, this excess money is 
hypothesised to spill over into higher spending on home 
produced goods or imports. in our case, since we do not 
separate out spending on home, goods from spending on 
imported goods, the increase in the noney supply manifests 
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itself initially in an increase in total donestic spending 
[9). This in turn raises real income through the real GDP 
identity [13] and leads to a worsening of the BOP [141 via 
the iAmport function [111, and a decline in the gap between 
actual and potential output [15]. At the same time, excess 
money raises the prices of domestic goods via [101 and 
leads to a decline in real output in the long run. 
Table 5.9 presents the multipliers and elasticities 
for the first experiment in which the required reserve 
5/ 
ratio is increased by 2.5 percentage points 
Table 5.9 
Dynamic Multipliers and Elasticit 
in the Required 
--------------------------------- 
UNIT MULTIPLIERS 
--------------------------------- 
Period Real Real Price Balance 
Broad Income Level of Pay- 
Money -ments 
--------------------------------- 
Impact 
1978 1 -1.89 000 
ies for a 2.5 per cent Increase 
Reserve Ratio 
--------------------- L ----------- 
DYNAMIC ElASTICITIES 
--------------------------------- 
Real Real Price Balance Period 
Broad Income Level of Pay- 
Money -ments 
---------------- ! ---------------- 
-. 053 0001 
Delay 
1978 2 -. 183 -1.13 0 0 -. 007 -. 051 0, 10 2 
3 -. 306 -. 106 -. 004 0 -. 012 -. 005 -. 032 0 3 
4ý -. 133 -. 018 -. 000 -. 104 -. 006 -. 001 -. 003 . 074 4 
1979- 1 -. 175 -. 512 -. 001 . 011 -. 009 -. 029 -. 005 . 'Oil 1 2 -. 305 -. 139 0 . 002 -. 015 -. 009 -. 003 2 . 004, 2 3 -. 162 -. 094 -. 001 . 062 -. 009 -. 006 '-. 004 . 052 3 4 -. 166 -. 311 -. 001 . 018 -. 009 -. 019 -. 007 . 014 4 
Intermed iate 
1980 2 -3.69 -2.54 -. 009 . 248 -. 011 -. 009 -. 004 . 096 10 1982 4 -4.70 -3.51 -. 011 . 424 -. 006 -. 008 -. 003 . 014 20 1985 2 -5.18 -3.91 -. 013 . 510 -. 006 -. 007 -. 003 . 01. 30 
Long- Run 
1985 4 -5.25ý -3.96 -. 013 . 523 -. 006 -. 007 -. 003- . 01 32 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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As expected, the rise in required reserves in equation [4] 
increases the reserves component of the broad money iden- 
tity [61 and reduces broad money (BMO/CP) by a unit multi- 
plier of -1.89 in the first quarter of 1978, and in subse- 
quent periods. This then decreases real GDP via equation 
(9) after a lag by a unit multiplier of -1.13. The in- 
termediate multipliers after 10,20 and 30 periods have 
elapsed suggest that the long run impact of the shock 
decays, but that the long run multipliers are substantially 
larger than impact effects at -3.69 and -5.25 respectively. 
The repercussions on the price level and BOP are noticeably 
smaller, -although the BOP effects are delayed longer as a 
result of the lags involved. The long run BOP multiplier 
is also significantly larger in magnitude than for shorter 
periods. The dynamic-elasticities confirm the relatively 
stronger impact on BMO/CP and YQ as compared to P and BOP. 
Table 5.9 thus supports the general SEACEN 
hypothesis about the MTM and the pattern of the multipliers 
and elasticities over time suggests that the model is 
dynamically stable, with the endogenous variables 
converging on their control values and not displaying any 
obvious oscillatory effects. 
Table 5.10 presents the results from the second 
multiplier run in which RM was raised by 5 per cent in the 
first quarter- of 1978. -This was done by increasing net 
credit ýto government (NCG), as a proxy for net donestic 
209 
assets OIDA). This directly raises the money supply 
through identit into real income, -y [61 and spills over 
prices, and the BOP as before. In this case, however, the 
effect is expansionary on money, income and prices, and 
negative in its impact on the BOP. The general 
pattern of the multipliers and elasticities is similar to 
the first experiment but they are significantly larger in 
magnitude. 
This suggests that the direct manipulation of RM 
via NDA is likely to have a stronger effect on the economy 
than manipulating the money supply indirectly through the 
reserves of the commercial banks. 
Table 5.10 
Dynamic Multipliers and Elasticities for a 5 per cent Increase in 
------- 
Ne 
------ 
t Credit to Government 
---------------------- 
(NCG) 
------- ---- ------- ------- 
"IT MULTI PLIERS DYNAMIC ELASTICITI 
- 
ES 
------- ------- ------ 
Period 
- ------------- 
Real Real 
------ 
Price 
-------- 
Balance 
--- 7 ---- 
Real Re 
---------- 
al Price B alance Period 
Broad Income Level of Pay- Broad In come Level of Pay- 
------ - 
Money 
------- ------ ------ 
-ments 
-------- 
Money 
-------- ------- ---- 
-ments 
------- ------- 
Impact 
1978 1 4.08 0 0 0 . 288 0 0 0 1 
Delay 
1978 2 . 381 2.38 0 0 . 038 . 261 0 0 2 3 . 637 . 222 . 009 0 . 056 . 022 . 149 0 3 4 . 277 . 038 . 001 -. 216 -018 . 003 . 010 -. 230 4 
1979 1 . 364 1.07 . 001 -. 023 . 033 . 114 . 021 -. 541 1 2 . 633 . 290 . 001 -. 004 . 059 . 035 . 010 -. 006 2 3 . 337 1.94 . 001 -. 128 . 023 . 016 . 011 -. 139 3 4 . 345 . 646 . 001 -. 038 . 023 . 049 . 017 -. 035 4 
Intermediate 
1980 2 7.83 5.32 . 016 -. 507 1982 4 9.91 7.30 . 030 -1.38 1985 2 10.89 8.12 . 033 -1.55 
Long-Run 
1985 4 11.04 9.27 . 034 -1.58 
. 039 . 031 . 015 -. 327 10 
. 073 . 009' . 004 -. 159 20 
. 007 . 008 . 003 -. 109 30 
. 004 . 005 . 002 -. 008 32 
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In contrast to the first two experiments where the shock 
emanates from a monetary element in the domestic economy, 
our third shock involves the foreign sector. We raised RM 
by 5 per cent as before but achieved this by simultaneously 
increasing net foreign assets of the Central Bank (NFACB), 
and reducing the volume of imports. The results are pre- 
sented in Table 5.11. As expected, the impact on the 
economy is expansionary, but unlike in the previous experi- 
ment, the BOP improves with the monetary expansion as a 
result of the initial fall in imports. The pattern of 
multipliers and elasticities is similar to the first two 
experiments in terms of the relative impact of the shock on 
the variables concerned and in their stability and conver- 
gence properties, but a closer inspection of the elastici- 
ties suggests that'this shock has proportionately more 
powerful repercussions on the economy than the previous two 
shocks. 
Although our model is not strictly comparable with 
the SEACEN country study for Sri Lanka, since we have made 
some changes in specification and use a later time period, 
Tables 5.12 to 5.14 compare our multiplier results with the 
earlier study measured in terms of percentage changes from 
control. In Table 5.12, where the required reserve ratio 
is increased, the impact multiplier on broad money is 
similar in magnitude, but the subsequent pattern of effects 
is not the same. In the SEACEN case, the shock has a 
positive impact after only one period but becomes negative 
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Table 5.11 
Dynamic Multipliers and Elasticities for a5 per cent 
Decrease in import Volume 
-------------------------------- ------------------ ------- ---- ----- 
UNIT MULTIPLIERS DYNAMIC ELASTICITIES 
------- ----------------------------------------------------------- 
Period Real Real Price Balance Real Real Price Balance Period 
Broad Income Level of Pay- Broad Income Level of Pay- 
Money -ments Money -ments 
------------------------------- ---------------- - ------- 
Impact 
------- ---- 
1978 1 4.262 1.00 0 1.00 2.36 . 657 0 19.77 1 
Delay 
1978 2 . 682 2.49 00 . 342 1.37 0 0 2 3 . 768 . 244 . 009 . 092 . 357 . 129 . 823 1.39 3 4 . 449 . 574 . 002 . 226 . 211 . 294 . 131 1.70 4 
1979 1 . 636 1.20 . 002 . 026 . 404 . 892 . 178 . 317 1 2 . 791 . 376 . 001 . 059 . 437 . 275 . 099 . 564 2 3 . 493 , . 470 . 002 . 144 . 259 . 292 . 142 1.19 3 4 . 549 . 786 . 002 . 049 . 269 . 445 . 156 . 343 4 
Intermediate 
1980 2 9.67 7.89 . 019 1.76 . 306 . 33 . 136 2.26 10 1982 4 12.63 10.69 . 029 2.27 . 108 . 126 . 054 . 224 20 1985 2 14.01 11.86 . 033 2.53 . 058 . 065 . 025 . 096 30 
Long-Run 
1985 4 14.21 12.03 . 034 2.56 . 045 . 051 . 002 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
. 079 
------- 
32 
----- 
again by the seventh quarter. It is difficult to see why 
this should be so even by inspecting their model, since the 
changes in RM remain positive until the eighth quarter and 
the other components of the money identity are either 
unaffected by the shock or retain the same signs up to the 
fourth period. In our case the shock has a consistent but 
decaying negative effect on broad money as one might expect 
from this impulse multiplier. This picture is repeated for 
the other endogenous variables in Table 5.12: the effects 
in our case are similar in magnitude but more distributed 
and delayed, and do not display the same asymmetries in 
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sign as in the SEACEN Sri Lanka experiments. Although some 
of this can be rationalised in terms of the generally more 
complex lag structure embodied in our model, some of the 
asymmetries displayed in the SEACEN model are not easy to 
explain. 
Table 5.12 
Percentage Changes from Control for a 2.5 per cent increase in 
the Required Reserve Ratio 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1974-1978 1978-1985 
% CHANGE FROM CONTROL % CHANGE FROM CONTROL 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Period Real Real Price Balance Real Real Price Balance Period 
Broad Income Level of Pay- Broad Income Level of Pay- 
Money -ments Money -, -. ients 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1974 1 -3.32 000 -2.56 000 1978 1 
2 . 57 -. 84 -. 47 2.1 -. 24 -1.61 002 
3 . 36 . 06 -. 33 8.12 -. 38 -. 15 -. 99 03 4 . 17 . 19 -. 27 3.97 -. 16 -. 02 -. 09 2.05 4 
1975 1 . 06 . 15 -. 23 . 25 -. 23 -. 78 -. 15 . 28 1979 1 2 . 02 
'. 10 -. 21 . 16 -. 36 -. 22 -. 06 -. 04 2 3 -. 01 . 07 -. 18 . 04 -. 19 -. 13 -. 09 1.16 3 4 -. 02 . 05 -. 17 NA 1 -. 19 -. 41 -. 14 . 29- 4 
1976 1 -. 03 . 03 -. 15 -. 15 '14 -. 21 -. 07 . 17 1980 1 2 -. 03 . 02 -. 14 -. 22 -. 19 -. 15 -. 07 1.58 2 3 -. 03 . 02 -. 13 -. 19 14 -. 26 -. 09 . 41 3 4 -. 03 . 01 -. 12 -. 15 -. 14 -. 15 -. 07 . 24 4 
1978 4 -. 02 0 -. 07 -. 05 -. 02 -. 03 -. 01 . 04 1985 4 
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These findings are generally repeated for the other 
two shocks' (see Tables 5.13 and 5.14). However, when 
credit to government is increased the impact on income is 
stronger in our case but weaker with respect to the BOP. 
Just in case our results were influenced by the inclusion 
of the domestic credit identity [8] which might be expect- 
ed to magnify the impact of monetary impulses through the 
-em, we excluded this identity and re-ran the nultipli- syst. 
ers. Although, as expected the multipliers were dampened 
as a result, the pattern and magnitude of the results were 
very similar. This identity is not an essential ingredient 
of the model but is useful in a policy context to test for 
'availability' effects. 
Table 5.13 
Percentage Changes f rom Control for a5 per cent Incre ase in 
------ ------ ------- 
N 
--- 
et Credit to 
------------ 
Gove 
----- 
rnment 
------- ------ ------- ---- --- 
1974-1 978 1978 - 1985 
-- 
% CHANGE FR 
- ------ - 
OM CONTROL 
- -- 
% CHANGE FROM C ONTROL 
- ----- 
Period 
- 
Real 
- -- 
Real 
--- 
Pri 
------- -- 
ce Balance 
----- 
Real 
------- 
Real 
------ 
Price 
------ 
Balance 
------- 
Period 
Broad Income Le vel of Pay- Broad Income Level ofPay- 
------- 
Money 
------------ --- 
-ments 
------------ 
Money 
----- ------- ------ 
-ments 
------- ---- --- 
1974 1 5.27' 0 0 0 5.09 0 1.93 0 1978 1 
2 -. 88 1.3 . 72 -3.25 . 46 3.15 . 18 0 2 3 -. 55 -. 09 . 51 -12.50 . 73 . 28 . 28 0 3 4 -. 25 -. 30 . 41 - 6.08 . 31 . 05 . 12 ý-3.92 4 
1975 1 -. 01 -. 23 . 35 -. 38 . 44 1.49 . 17 -. 54 1979 1 2 -. 03 -. 15 . 31 -. 24 . 69 . 42 . 27 -. 07 2 3 -. 02 -. 11 . 28 -. 06 . 37 . 25 . 14 -2.21 3 4 -'. '04 -. 07 . 25 ' -. 04 . 36 
_ 
. 78 . 14 -. 56 4 
1976 1 '-. 05 -. 05- . 23 . 23 '. 46 . 39 . 18 -. 32 1980 1 2 -. 03 -. 03 . 21 . 32 . 36 . 29 . 14 -3.00 2 3 -. 05 -. 03 . 19 . 28 . 26 . 49 . 10 -. 78 3 4 -. 03 -. 02 . 18 . 22 . 28 . 28 . 11 -. 46 4 
1978 4 
------- 
-. 05 
----- 
-. 01 
------- 
. 13 
--- 
. 08 
------------ 
. 04 
----- 
. 05 
------- 
. 02 
------ 
-. 07 
------- 
1985 
----- 
4 
- 
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Table 5.14 
Percentage Changes from Control for a5 per cent Decrease 
in Impor 
------ - 
t Volume 
----- ----- ------------ --- ---- --- ------ ------ 
1974-1 
---- 
978 
- -- ------ --- 
1978-1985 
% CHANGE FROM CON TROL % CHANGE FROM 
----- 
CONTROL 
------------ --- ---- 
Peri 
--- 
od, 
----- 
Real 
------- 
Real 
---- 
Pri 
---------- 
ce Balance 
------ 
Real 
------- 
Real Price Balance Per iod 
Broad Income Lev el of Pay- Broad Income Leve l of Pay- 
Money 
---- -- 
-ments 
-- 
Money 
------ ------- ----- 
-ment 
------------ --- ---- 
1974 
--- 
1 
------ 
4.56 
- - 
1.84 
-- 
0 
-------- 
31.68 . 5.33 1.48 0 44.65 1978 1 
2 4.54 3.10 . 59 18.73 . 82 3.29 0 0 2 
3 1.58 3.22 1.14 42.04 . 88 . 32 2.02 3.41 3 
4 . 48 1.62 1.31 15.04 . 51 . 71 . 31 4.09 4 
1975 1 . 12 . 77 1.37 . 75 . 77 1.69 . 
34 . 59 1979 1 
2 -. 21 . 42 1.36 . 28 . 87 . 54 . 
19 1.12 2 
3 -. 13 . 03 1.29 . 31 . 54 . 61 . 
29 2.49 3 
4 -. 03 -. 07 1.21 1.73 . 57 . 95 . 33 . 73 4 
1976 1 -. 04 -. 07 1.14 . 65 . 64 . 53 . 
21 . 78 1980 1 
2 . 09 -. 11 1.06 . 97 . 49 . 53 . 22 3.65 2 3 . 14 -; 13 . 99 . 93 . 40 62 . 25 1.06 3 
4 . 17 -. 12 . 93 . 81 . 39 . 39 . 19 . 86 4 
1978 
---- 
4 
--- 
. 22 
------ 
-. 08 
------ 
. 70 
---- 
. 35 
---------- 
. 06 
------ 
. 07 
------- 
. 03 
----- 
. 11 1985 
------------ 
4 
----- 
Finally, we compared our results with the table in 
the SEACEIT (1981) study summarising the multiplier results 
for the country studies. As Table 5.15 suggests, with the 
clear exception of Singapore for whom the model does not 
seem to work at all, there is broad support for the S. EACEN' 
monetary m. echanism in terms of expected signs and magni- 
tudes. In general our results compare favourably with the 
other country studies, although our model tends to exhibit 
stronger short run effects on income and weaker effects on 
the BOP in the long run. 
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There are, however, some puzzling results for some 
of the other individual countries. Both Malaysia and 
Thailand have large long run values for the BOP. These are 
clearly indicative of instability and cannot be easily 
explained. It is possible that they arise from the way in 
which the BOP is related to the money identity through NFA. 
In our case, when we tried to endogenise NFACB in terms of 
the BOP instead of simultaneously raising TIFACB and reduc- 
ing imports for the third multiplier, the results were 
unstable and oscillatory. This may reflect data problems 
encountered when trying to make the money and BOP 'identi- 
ties consistent with each other, but it is also likely to 
be a direct result of altering the structure of the model. 
With NFACB endogenised the tracking performance of the 
model is much worse. 
Finally, we considered two simulations which go 
beyond the SEACEN framework: a5 per cent rise in interest 
rates (RST) and a5 per cent increase in import credit 
(IC). These are alternative transmission mechanisms and 
reflect substitution and credit rationing effects respec- 
tively. Table 5.16 below presents results of a5 per cent 
increase in the RST. 
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Table 5.15 
Policy Simulations for 
Current S 
---------------------- 
Money 
Supplyl/ 
2/ 
t=1 
----------------------------- 
Increase in reauired reserves 
SEACEN Countries and the 
tudy Compared I 
---------------------------------- 
Real Balance Prices 
Output of Payments 
3/ 
t=l t=n t=n t=n 
Malaysia - 8.3 -. 13 -. 01 . 23 0 
Nepal -. 75 -. 04 0.0 . 35 -. 06 
Singapore- -. 14 11.30 . 61 -1.15 -. 67 
Sri Lanka 4/ -3.32 -. 84 0.0 -. 05 -. 07 
Thailand -2.60 0.0 . 01 12.19 -. 63 
Current study -2.56 -1.61 -. 03 . 04 -. 01 
Increase in net domestic assets 
Malaysia 4.90 . 05 0.0- -. 05 0.0 
Nepal 4.60 . 75 -. 05 . 02 0.0 
ýPhilippines 1.10 . 18 -. 04 na . 05 Singapore 15.30 13.40 . 64 --1.70 -. 49 
Sri Lanka 4/ 5.27 1.30 0.0 . 07 . 10 
Thailand 6.70 5.80 -. 07 -38.32 2.12 
Current study 5.09 3.15 . 05 -. 07 . 02 
Decrease in imports 
Malaysia 1.70 -. 02, ' -. 90 -28.30 - 1.70 
Nepal . 64 . 16 0.0 4.38 -. 06 Singapore 9.70 12.63 . 63 -1.51 -. 55 Sri Lanka 4/ 4.91- 1.84 -. 02 ý . 37 . 55 
Thailand 6.70 0.0 -. 03 -18.39 1.35 
Current study 
----------- - 
5.33 - 
--- 
1.48 
------- 
. 07 
--- 
. 11 
------- 
. 03 
-------------- -- --------- 
l/ M1, M2, or M3. 
---- - ---- 
2/ Usually 1974 Ql for SEACEN and 1978 Q1 for the cu rrent study 
3/ Usually 1978 Q4 for SEACENý and 1985 Q4 for the cu rrent study 
4/ There is a discrepancy her e betwee n the numbers reported in 
the country study and in the S EACEN summary table 3 We 
have used the country study figures here. 
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Table 5.16 
Dynamic Elasticities for a5 per cent Increase 
in Interest Rates (RST) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Period Real Real Price Balance Period 
Broad Income Level of 
Money Payments 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Impact 
1978 1 -0.044 0001 
Delay 
1978 2 -0.036 -0.032 0 0 2 
3 -0.032 -0.020 -0.017 0 3 
4 -0.025 -0.015 -0.016 0.196 4 
1979 1 -0.036 -0.025 -0.013 -0.066 1 
2 -0.020 -0.030 -0.011 -0.049 2 
3 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.062 3 
4 -0.014 -0.016 -0.009 -0.089 4 
Intermediate 
1980 2 -0.020 -0.025 -0.009 -0.0124 10 
1982 4 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 20 
1985 2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 30 
Long- Run 
1985 4 -0.401 -0.361 -0.176 -0.391 32 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5.16 suggests that monetary variables react 
immediately whilst the response from the real sector is 
delayed. Both monetary and real sector variables were 
negatively affected, as expected , although the response of 
the "pri'ce level" is much weaker in both the short and long 
run. The BOP [141 reacts positively in the first few peri- 
ods but deteriorates thereafter and the response is similar 
in magnitude to those of real income and real money. 
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Table S. 17 
Dynamic Multipliers for a5 per cent Increase in 
----------- 
Import Credit (IC) 
------------------------ -------- ------ --------- 
Period Real Real Price Balance Period 
Broad Income Level of 
------------ 
Money 
------------- ----------- 
Payments 
-------------- --------- 
Impact 
1978 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Delay 
1978 2 -0.009 -0.087 0 -2.949 2 
3 -0.018 -0'. 006' 0 0 3 
4 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 0.686 4 
1979 1 -. 011 -0.044 -0.009 -0.023 1 
2 -0.019 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 2 
3 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.128 3 
4 -0.009 -0.023 -0.010 -0.038 4 
Intermediate 
1980 2 -0.014 -0.013 -0.005 -0.029 10 
1982 3 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002' -0.007 20 
1985 2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 30 
Long-Run 
1985 1 
------------ 
-0.249 
-------------- 
-0.331 
----------- 
-0.091 
-------- 
-2.672 
------ 
32 
--------- 
Table 5.17 reproduces'the results of a5 per cent 
increase in IC. The impact'is'clearly negative on all 
aggregates. The increase in imports [11] and hence the 
deterioration in the BOP [14]'reduces the broad money[61 
with one quarters lag. The reduction in broad money then 
reduces*real income and the price'level in the long run. In 
this case the transmission of, monetary impulses comes 
through an alternative channel via BOP and changes in 
external assets and exerts negative effects on the macro 
economy. In comparing those two exogenous policy shocks, it 
seems that although both have negative effects on all the 
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endogenous variables, the interest rate channel is strong- 
er, especially in terms of the BOP. 
Overall, therefore, our model performs well in terms 
of its dynamic structure producing results which are stable 
and, relatively easy to interpret in the context of the 
SEACEN framework. More importantly, it is clear that our 
model is capable of displaying alternative transmission 
channels of monetary policy. 
5.4. Conclusion 
When simulated as an entire system the model 
performed well in terms of a rangelof evaluation criteria. 
As in the previous studies, however, the BOP identity was a 
clear exception across the board. ' The total reserves 
equation also displayed some sensitivity to the estimation 
period and tracked the historical series I: elatively badly. 
In general, the model under rather than over predicted the 
actual series and the real currency and aggregate price 
equations might benefit from further investigation. ýThe 
model is also particularly sensitive to the lagged depend- 
ent variable and lagged real income variable in the -real 
currency equation, and the coefficients for lagged broad 
money and, lagged income in the equation for total expendi- 
ture. There is, however, no evidence that these equations 
have, been seriously misspecified. 
our simulation experiments provide further support 
for the SEACEN hypothesis about the transmission of none- 
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tary policy impulses and their impact upon the money sup- 
ply, real income, the aggregate price level, and the BOP. 
All three of our exogenous shocks produced a similar pat- 
tern of multipliers and elasticities, which were also 
stable over the long run. The simultaneous fall in import 
volume and rise in NFA produced the strongest effects on 
the system. Our simulations also suggest that the direct 
manipulation of RM via ZIDA. is likely to have a stronger 
impact on the economy than the indirect manipulation of the 
money supply through the reserves of the commercial banks. 
When compared to the SEACEN Sri Lanka study, our 
simulations produce initial percentage changes from c. ^ntrol 
which are similar in magnitude to the earlier study, but 
are more consistent with respect to sign over the full 
sample period. This partly reflects the generally more 
complex lag structure employed in our-model, which has the 
effect of-spreading the impulse shock over a longer time 
period, and-some changes in model specification; but there 
remains a number of asymmetries in the earlier study which 
are hard to explain and which do not appear in our modelý 
Finally, when compared to the SEACEN country stud- 
ies as a whole, our simulations are broadly in line with 
their findings, although our model tends to have a rela- 
tively smaller impact on real income in the short run but 
stronger effects on the BOP in the long run. The absence 
of full comparative data for the earlier studies, however, 
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precludes a more sophisticated comparison. There are also 
some unstable long run percentage deviations from control 
for Thailand and Malaysia with respect to the BOP. -This may 
be due to the way in which NFA in the money identity is 
related to the BOP, since our attempt to endogenise NFA in 
terms of the BOP produced unstable results. -Some thought 
may need to be given'to this relationship, as-- it is an 
important ingredient in the MTM and it is not clear how 
this relationship was actually dealt with in the individual 
SEACEN country multiplier simulations. 
Two additional simulation experiments carried out 
to investigate two alternative monetary transmission chan- 
nels, via RST and IC confirmed our a priori expectations, 
although the interest rate channel seems to be the stronger 
of the two in terizs of relative magnitude. 
In sum, therefore. our model performed well in 
terms of dynamic structure and generated results which are 
stable and relatively easy to interpret within the conteAt 
of the SEACEN framework, and should provide a reasonable 
basis for a more complete analysis of the MTM in Sri Lanka. 
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FOOT NOTES 
1. The statistics used in this section and the general 
approach to simulation is based upon Pyndick and Rubin- 
feld (1986) and Challen and Hagger (1983). 
2. This is less than a pure test of the system's outside 
tracking perfornance, since the data which is made 
available by re-estimating over a short period will 
have influenced the specification of the system. 
3. For a thorough review of alternative estimation methods 
in the context of macro econometric modelling, see 
Challen and Hagger (1983). 
4. Thailand, for instance, uses the former procedure and 
Malaysia the latter. 
5. Since we used required reserves in level rather than in 
ratio form, we computed the equivalent percentage in- 
crease in RR associated with a 2.5 per cent increase in 
the RR ratio for the first period. This was done to 
facilitate comparison with the SEACEN country studies. 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
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EXCESS DEMAND/CAPACITY 
CHAPTER 6 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE MONETARY TRkNSMISSION CHkNNELS 
This chapter aims to identify the important MTCs in 
Sri Lanka during the period 1977-1985. This is necessary 
prior to the discussion of policy options and the formula- 
tion of the monetary control framework (MCF) in the next 
chapter. Section 6.1 deals with the criteria for identifi- 
cation i. e. the analysis of the historical behaviour of the 
major MTCs in Sri Lanka and examines their effectiveness in 
transmitting monetary impulses to the real sector. We then 
compare this with the results obtained from the empirical 
model and simulation-experiments, in chapters 4 and 5 re- 
spectively. 6.2 analyses the relative-importance of these 
MTCs and our conclusions are presented in 6.3. 
6.1 Criteria For Identification of the Monetary 
Transmission Channels 
We deal first with the general problems relating to 
the identification of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
(MTM) and follow this with an analysis of the effective- 
ness of each of the channels in particular. 
Firstly, the working of the MTM is complex and 
asymmetrical. For example, a rise in the level of employ- 
ment following expansionary monetary and fiscal policies 
based on over-optimistic growth prospects will feed quickly 
into higher inflation. On the other hand, restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies might reduce inflation but 
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output and growth would be adversely affected. Similarly, 
if a recession induced public sector deficit overshoots, 
holding to monetary targets may lead to a rise in real 
interest rates which would not be appropriate for a de- 
pressed situation. There can also be situations in which 
money growth is excessive (well above targets) along with 
rising real interest rates, a feature observed in Sri Lanka 
during 1977-1985. Therefore, both the --identification of 
the transmission channels and the initiation of appropri- 
ate policy measures to ensure that the system works along 
the desired transmission paths are difficult to achieve. 
Secondly, the limited range of financial assets 
constrains the workings of the MTM and makes its identifi- 
cation more difficult. Although the financial assets/GDP 
ratio (40 per cent at end 1985 ) has been impressive for 
Sri Lanka, it is still low compared to many DCs, such as 
the UK, USA and European countries. This also implies that 
the currency component is still a major form of transac- 
tions. The demand for currency depends on income, the 
expected rate of inflation, interest rates, banking serv- 
ices and the general uncertainty in the economy. 
I Thirdly, the existence of well organised ICMs adds 
further problems to the MTM as currency is the main mode of 
transactions. - Theýhigher the currency component, the lower 
will be the impact of monetary impulses. Although relative- 
ly small, ICMs in Sri Lanka accounted for. nearly Rs 14 
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billion (8 per cent of GDP) at the end of 1985. See Jayama- 
ha (1987). The linkages between ICMs and FCMs are strong 
and therefore, it is difficult to isolate transactions from 
each of them separately. 
Fourthly, financial innovation (FI) also makes the 
MTM and its control more complex. Although FI reduces the 
role of non-price elements, such as CR and other direct 
intervention methods, it has in fact resulted in changes in 
the demand for money and makes monetary control more diffi- 
cult. Traditionally, the practice has been to draw a 
dividing line somewhere in the spectrum of assets, marked 
according to their Inoneyness. '. The Fl has made the divid- 
Jng line between money and the other financial assets 
conceptually more P--, ýDitrary, and'practically more difficult. 
n--En F1 proceeds rapidly, the Z;: propriate concept will be 
subject to change requiring the periodic =e-definition of 
money. For details see jayamaha (085). For exanple, Sri 
Lanka used M1 for monetary control purposes fro. m. the incep- 
tion of the Central Bank (CB) in 1950. This was changed to 
broad money in 1980 to include quasi-money and since then 
both narrow money (Ml) and broad money (M2) and have been 
used for monetary targeting purposes. It has now been found 
that even M2 is not comprehensive as NSB and FC deposits 
are outside M2 and they have grown rapidly over the last 
several years. The Financial Survey (as at end 1985) 
presented in Table 6.1 shows that about 30 per cent of the 
deposits are not included in the calculation of M2 and part 
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of these deposits are used often for transaction purposes. 
This is especially so of NSB, savings deposits as restric- 
tions on withdrawal of such deposits are minimal. The table 
also reveals that the loanable funds/total deposits ratio 
of the commercial banks accounted for 84 per cent of total 
deposits while that of finance companies accounted for 89 
per cent. Although the credit creating capacity of the 
latter is limited when compared to the former, the type of 
financial facilities offered by the latter (in particular 
the hire purchase finance) appeared to be more consumption 
oriented than savings. 'Although there are practical diffi- 
culties in targeting M3 (M2+time and savings deposits of 
the NSB and the FCs), the growing liquidity outside the 
control of monetary policy is a matter for concern. FI has 
also influenced marginal-shifts in, money demand in Sri 
Lanka especially between-1977 and 1985, towards interest 
bearing monetary -assets induced through high interest 
rates. In-addition, there was also'a notable SE between 
money, and real assets, in particular-investment in equip- 
ment and machinery and consumer durables via-lease financ- 
ing. Moreover, -. innovations such, as acceptance-finance 
played an important role in trade financing and also cir- 
cumventedýdomestic monetary. restrictions. 
Fifthly, the absence of an accepted rate/range of 
interest rates transmitting monetary impulses to the real 
sector has also made it difficult to trace the MTM through 
a Particular channel. Since 1977 the Bank Rate (BR) was 
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the apex and, the signa3ling rate and this has been an ef- 
fective instrument when banks experienced short term li- 
quidity problems. The BR however, was fixed for Imost of 
the time and did not respond to changes in money market 
conditions. 
Also, the BR would not by itself exert any signifi- 
cant impact on interest rates without a simultaneous 
change_ in the quantity of accommodation granted to banks. 
Whenever the BR was lower than the other short term rates, 
banks used BR borrowing for lending in the inter-bank call 
market (IBCM). Since 1983 the BR became inoperative and the 
treasury bill rate (TBR) and the central bank securities 
rates (CBSR) were used to signal the direction of policy'- 
Finally, the lags and the staggered effects involved 
in the shift between financial and real assets also compli- 
cates the MTM. For example, a change in the statutory 
reserve requirements (SRR) would first affect the money 
supply and interest rates and the latter in turn would 
affect investment and prices. It is generally accepted 
that a change in the rate of growth of money supply will 
only act on inflation and the real sector with a time lag. 
See for e. g. Aghevli (1979). The existence of these lags 
also creates monetary. targeting problems. The lagged 
effects of monetary policy instruments also makes the 
identification of the MTM more difficult. Changes in 
SRR are designed to limit the credit creating capacity of 
commercial banks, to absorb excess liquidity and to help in 
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the achievement of BOP objectives. SRRs raise the cost of 
funds to banks and would lead to a reduction in deposit 
rates regardless of the inflation rate. Following the 
demand for money for short term funds, the market rates, 
especially IBCM rates, would tend to go up. The tine lags 
involved in this process thus makes the identification of 
the MTM more difficult. 
6.2 The Monetary Transmission Channels in Sri Lanka 
We shall now examine the main MTCs in Sri. Lanka. 
6.2.1 deals with the, interest rate channel. 6.2.2 examines 
the credit rationing channel and 6.2.3 discusses the wealth 
channel. We begin with historical-behaviour and compare 
this- with theoretical expectations. In doing so we shall 
attempt tolanswer the main issues listed above in order to 
assess the relative effectiveness of these channels. 
6.2.1 The Interest Rate Channel 
It is important at this juncture to highlight the 
virtues of high interest rates as they are important from 
the point of view of the MTM. First, positive interest 
rates are said to trigger the SE and through it readjust 
asset portfolios in favour of financial or real assets and 
discourage consumption. The policy stance therefore, is to 
link nominal interest rates with inflation so as to main- 
tain positive real rates'. Second, high interest rat es 
reflecting the true cost of funds is thought to be instru- 
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mental in bringing about an allocative efficiency in the 
economy through the market mechanism. Third, high. nominal 
rates are expected to bring about structural changes by 
encouraging labour as against capital intensive production 
techniques. Finally, nominal rates linked to inflation are 
expected to intensify the use of credit in the economy by 
increasing turnover and making repayments quicker, thus 
allowing a larger group of borrowers to use loanable funds. 
The following are the key issues that need to be 
addressed with regard to the'effectiveness of the interest 
rate channel. Are interest rates market determined and do 
they reflect the true cost of funds? How does the substitia- 
tion effect take place when interest rates are not market 
determined? Is 'there a link between short and long term 
interest rates in Sri Lanka? Are financial assets perfectly 
substitutable? If not, what is the degree of substitutabil- 
ity among them? Are financial and real assets substituta- 
ble? What is the time lag involved in the transmission 
process? How safe and attractive are real assets? 
In the following sections we shall discuss the 
historical behaviour of the interest rate channel and 
attempt to answer the key issues raised above. In this 
regard it is logical to start with the main features and 
the'structure of interest rates in the. post 1977 period. 
Prior to 1977, a low interest. rate policy was pursued and 
interest rates were infrequently adjusted, thus resulting 
in negative real rates. In 1977, as a part of the open 
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economic policy package, a high interest rate policy was 
pursued with the longer term objective of deregulating 
interest rates. For purposes of clarity and convenience we 
divide the period into two sub-periods: 1977-1982 and 
1983-1985. The first period consisted of two major inter- 
est rate reforms. During the second, interest rate policy 
was more flexible and market oriented. 
1977-1982 
Effective August 1977, the CB set the pace by 
increasing the BR from 8.5 to 10 per cent per annum. To 
discourage banks from resorting to CB funds, a penal rate 
(PR) was introduced at 15 per cent on borrowings over and 
above the BR accommodation. The"TBR and the GSRs were 
raised to 9 and 12 per cent per annum respectively. The 
NSB raised its deposit rate structure and the commercial 
banks and the medium and long term lending institutions 
(MLTLI) followed suit. Interest rates on savings deposits 
of commercial banks rose from 7.2 to 8.4 per cent while 
time deposit rates ranged between 12 and 18 per cent per 
annum depending on the maturity period (Table 6.2). By end 
1977, the entire interest rates structure was raised to a 
higher level. Although short and long term rates varied 
according to the maturity period there was no visible yield 
curve relationship between these rates. These rates con- 
tinued to be effective up to 1982. 
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b. 1983-1985 
Since 1983 the market responded differently to 
interest rate increases and did not always follow the rates 
initiated by the CB and the NSB. The TBR, CBSR and the GSR 
were fixed for most of the time although IBCM rates fluctu- 
ated according to market forces and due to uncertainties. 
The BR advances ceased to operate since 1983 and it was no 
longer considered the relevant signalling rate. Reflecting 
the links with the inflation rate throughout 1984 (9 per 
cent) and 1985 (1.5 per cent) rates dropped substantially 
on deposits and marginally on lendings. On the whole, the 
upper end of the deposit rates was largely determined by 
the state banks and the NSB and the lower end by the TBR. 
Lending rates were determined largely by the deposit rates, 
the type of customer and the purpose of borrowing. At the 
end of 1985 lending rates of commercial banks stood at a 
range of 15 per cent for prime customers and 30 per cent 
per annum for the others. Lending rates of the FCs were 
typically high due to the risky nature of their business. 
An important feature observed in the interest rate struc- 
ture is that except for the interest rates on the negotia- 
ble bearer certificates of deposits (CDs) which are sold at 
low discounts due to tax exemptions,, the differences in the 
rates of similar maturities were very small. Therefore, 
short term financial assets, in particular savings and time 
deposits, were close substitutes. 
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We shall now proceed with a discussion of the role 
of interest rates as a MTC by examining their impact on 
selected aggregates including the money supply and infla- 
tion; the financial assets ratio; financial savings; the 
money market and capital market transactions. The real 
sector variables discussed include growth; consumption; 
domestic savings; investment and capital formation. 
Money Supply and inflation 
Immediately after the 1977 upward revision of 
interest rates, Ml growth and inflation decelerated. As 
shown in Appendix table 3.1, Ml dropped to 11 per cent in 
1978 and prices remained moderate through the first half of 
1979. However, Ml growth accelerated to 29 per cent and M2 
to 38 per cent in 1979. Inflation fuelled by excess 
liquidity in the system rose to 25 per cent by the end of 
1980. The second major interest rate reform effected in 
April 1980, therefore, was either too late or was not 
strong enough to channel monetary impulses effectively. 
Negative real interest rates throughout 1980 triggered a 
limited SE between monetary and real assets and raised the 
demand for more cash balances. 
Monetary and price increases in 1981 and 1982 were 
more moderate compared to the two preceding years and 
inflation dropped to 18 per cent in 1981 and further to 5 
per cent in 1982. As pointed out by Jayamaha and Jayatissa 
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(1984) it is important to note that the achievement of 
monetary and price stability was the result of a well 
coordinated macro economic policy package effected since 
1981 within which the interest rate adjustment was only one 
instrument. Prior to 1981, however, inflation remained high 
despite the prevalence of positive real rates' and high 
interest rates were probably not very effective as an anti 
inflationary measure. 
Financial Assets Ratio 
The M1/GDP ratio dropped from an average of 14.3 
per cent during 1968-1976 to 13.1 per cent during 1977-1985 
indicating a SE between money and interest bearing mone- 
tary assets (Table 6.3). Fluctuations in this ratio indi- 
cated the trends in real interest rates, inflation and the 
civil disturbances. The M2-Ml/GDP ratio doubled from an 
average of 8.1 to 16.2 per cent during the same period. 
Surprisingly, the M3-M2/GDP ratio (including deposits 'of 
the -NSB and FCs) declined from 13 per cent in the 'low 
interest rate period to 11-per cent during-the high -inter- 
est period.. -This indicated the predominance of primary and 
secondary liquid, assets (money and quasi-money) compared to 
the other deposits reflecting partly the difficulties of 
withdrawals, the non-availability of financial facilities 
(trade finance and overdrafts) from non-bank institutions 
and in recent years, the risks of depositing with the -FCs. 
On the whole, the. growthýin the ratio of total financial 
claims to GDP, (M3/GDP) which represent the formal finan- 
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cial sector, rose from an average of 36 per cent during the 
former period to 40 per cent in the latter period. 
Table 6.3 
Financial Asset Ratios in ý-rj Lanka 1968 -1985 
(In Percentages) 
Year 
-- 
MI/GDP* M2-Ml/GDP 
--- 
M3-M2/GDP 
------------ 
M3/GDP 
--------- ------- 
1968 
------------ 
13.6 
-------- 
8.7 12.9 36.5 
1969 13.9 8.2 13.2 34.2 
1970 14.6 9.1 13.4 37.1 
1971 15.8 9.2 13.8 39.7 
1972 16.3 9.8 14.2 41.5 
1973 15.7 7.5 14.5 37.1 
1974 12.9 6.8 12.9 32.1 
1975 11.8 6.6 12.8 31.0 
1976 13.8 7.1 13.0 33.9 
1977 14.7 9.2 12.2 -36.4 1978 13.9 11.6 12.5 38.0 
1979 14.6 14.1 12.7 41.4 
1980 13.8 15.3 10.5 39.6 
1981 11.1 16.9 9.5 38.6 
1982 12.8 20.5 9.1 41.4 
1983 13.4 20.4 9.4 42.3 
1984 12.2 19.2 10.2 41.4 
1985 11.5 18.2 ll., o 44.1 
* GDP at market prices. 
This indicates that high nominal interest rates had a 
positive impacton the accumulation of financial savings 
since 1977, except in 1980, deposit rates remained positive 
in real terms. (Table 6.4) which promoted a sharp increase 
in total financial savings from about 34 per cent of GDP in 
1976 to about 40 per cent in 1980 and further to 44 per 
cent in 1985 (Table 6.3). The relationship between real 
interest rates and financial savings indicates, therefore, 
that of the three main components of financial savings 
(money, quasi-money, provident funds and life insurance 
funds), the first two are interest sensitive. Moreover, 
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net capital flows (private) and transfers from abroad (in 
particular multi-national investments) significantly influ- 
enced the fluctuations observed in financial savings. Table 
6.5 shows that financial savings reached the peak in 1979 
(13.4 per cent of GDP) and gradually dropped towards the 
end of the period. 
Money Market- The Substitution Effect 
As far as the SE triggered by the high interest 
rates is concerned, during the first few years of the high 
interest rate period the response of the public to small 
differentials in short term interest rates was slow due to 
the limited availability of financial instruments. As seen 
in table 6.6 the FI introduced dynamism into the money 
market, widened the range of instruments and increased the 
fund movement. - High interest rates, therefore, together 
with the FI triggered the SE in a significant manner. 
Fund movements were notable towards instruments on 
which the real interest rate was positive (except in the 
primary TBM due to negative real rates). An interesting 
feature to note is the limited participation of the non- 
bank public in most sub markets. In terms of OMO however, 
it makes no difference whether the CB directly deals with. 
banks or non-banks as long as these two sectors are free to 
adjust their portfolios with each other as all changes in 
the MB will be reflected through per unit of currency. It 
is also notable that the SE envisaged in theoretical expo- 
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sitions by "Keynesians" did not take place in Sri Lanka 
during the post 1977 period despite high interest rates. 
The GS market continued to be captive and investments in 
these securities reflected a "locked in effect" as there 
was no secondary market and'real returns were negative. It 
is therefore, clear that the SE triggered by interest rates 
was visible only between money and short-term financial 
assets but hot between money and long term financial assets 
such as GS or long term bonds. Although investment in GS 
was safe, they were not attractive since they offered fixed 
interest income inadequately compensating for inflation. 
Capital Market - The Substitution Effect 
As far as_the SE betweenmoney and long term finan- 
clal assets'in the capital market (CM) is concerned, one 
important'issue-'is whether'high-interest rates discouraged 
the transfer of funds from the money market to the CM. The 
CM in Sri Lanka featured only share market (SM) activities 
and -was confined to only a few firms. Therefore, excess 
liquidity in the money market did not find its way to the 
CM despite negative real returns-on financial assets espe- 
cially in 1980. Hence, there was no notable SE between 
short and long term financial assets largely due to the 
inherited limitations of the CM. ' 
On, the other hand-, in the primary share market (new 
issues), both the number (valued at Rs 94 million) and the 
shares offered (valued at Rs 1004 million) recorded a peak 
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in 1983 (table 6-7). 
Table 6.7 
Number of New Share issues (Primary Market) 
During 1980-1985 by Type of Investment (in*RS Million) 
---------------------- 
Type of Investment 
--------------------- 
------- 
1980 
-------- 
------ 
1981 
------ 
------- 
1982 
------- 
------- 
1983 
------- 
------- 
1984 
------- 
--------- 
1985 
--------- 
I. Manufacturing 1 7 6 14 5 
2. Banks and-Finance - 2 1 2 - 
3. Investment Trusts - - - - - - 
4. Land and Property - 1 3 3 2 
5. Stores and Supplies - - - - - - 
6. Hotels and Travels- 3 3, 8 9 4 1 
7. Beverages, Food and 
Tobacco 1 1 1 4 - - 
8. Services - - - 4 
9. Trading - - 2 1 1 
10. Oil Palm - - - - - - 
11. Total 5 13 19 37 13 3 
12. No: of shares 
- (in Rs. Mn) 1.39 28.4' 37.11 94., 0 63.25 10.75 
13. Value of shares 
(in Rs Mn) 13.9 284.7 371.1 1004.2 632.5 130.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
The unprecedented increase in the activities of the SM 
(1983) has been attributed to fiscal incentives offered to 
both public companies and share holders, including the 
amendment- of the Companies Act, the establishment of the 
new Stock Exchange in late 1982 and the drop in interest 
rates iný the money market. As seen in' table 6.7, the 
highest traded values in the secondary share market' were 
recorded in 1982 and 1983 and declined thereafter. Howev- 
er, the-SE between financial assets, in the money market and 
the CM, has not been impressive (except in 1983). Moreover, 
the contribution of interest rates appears to be marginal 
compared to institutional developments and fiscal incen- 
tives. 
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Another question is whether high interest rates 
triggered a SE between financial (both money market and CM 
assets) and real assets. Real assets in Sri Lanka comprise 
land, machinery and equipment, housing and hoarding of 
jewels and gold. Despite high interest rates, inflationary 
tendencies dominated and hence there was a significant 
increase in the demand for real assets ( in particular land 
in Colombo) during the three years ended 1980 Data 
constraints do not allow an assessment of the SE between 
money and gold and Jewellery holdings, but machinery and 
equipment became popular following the introduction of 
lease financing. At the end of 1985 the leasing companies 
held an outstanding assets portfolio of Rs 624 million 
indicating the gradual picking up of the -SE between finan- 
cial and real assets. 
Since there is no organised system in Sri Lanka for 
housing finance along the lines of the Building Societies 
of the U. K or Savings and Loan Associates in the 
U. S. A, investment in housing is relatively risky and unat- 
tractive. The State Mortgage and Investment Bank (SMIB) is 
the largest specialized institution for housing finance and 
its sources of funds are the government and government 
sponsored institutions. 
In sum, it is clear that the SE triggered by-high 
interest rates between 1977-1985 was prominent between 
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money and-short term financial assets but not between money 
and bonds or long term assets. Secondly; 'although interest 
ritesý were used as an anti-inflationary measure there is 
little evidence to suggest that interest rates alone were 
capable of achieving these objectives. The effectiveness of 
interest -rates may have been further strengthened by a 
number of other monetary policy measures. Thirdly, high 
interest rates achieved their objective with regard to-, the 
accrual of financial savings and raising the financial 
as'sets/GDP ratios. In-the capital' market, however, fiscal 
policy incentives seem to have been more influential than 
high interest rates. Finally, the'SE between monetary and 
real assets was largely'confined''to land, machinery and 
equipment and consumer durables. 
We now turn to the impact of interest rates on real 
sector variables, beginning with growth. 
Growth 
The response of real sector variables to monetary 
impulses via interest rates indicates mixed results. The 
growth rate in real GDP which recorded an average of 3 per 
cent prior to 1977 rose to 6 per cent during 1977-1982 and 
remained around 5 per cent during 1977-1985 (see table 
6.8). Despite the availability of low cost credit to key 
growth sectors, their performance was poor especially 
towards the end of this period. It is likely that adverse 
weather conditions, ethnic disturbances since 1983 and the 
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heavy competition for domestic industrial products were 
more influential on growth than the cost of capital (net 
interest rates). 
Consun-Dtion 
Despite the accrual of high financial savings total 
consumption expenditure did not fall'as One would expect. 
Total consumption expenditure as a ratio of GDP (at market 
prices) stood at 0'. 8-0.9 both before-and after the interest 
rate reforms partly due to the rising money income and 
negative real rates on some financial instruments (see 
Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1985). The 
income elasticity of consumption expenditure, a key indica- 
tor of consumption has been well over unity during this 
period. The virtually unchanged consumption expenditure 
seems to indicate the importance of income compared- to 
interest rates in determining consumption. 
Domestic Savinas 
Domestic'savings as a percentage of real GDP fluc- 
tuated between 14 and 22 (Table 6.8). - While this was 
better than many other countries at a similar stage-of 
development, it is low when compared to 'the ambitious 
investment programme undertaken during 1977-1985. '-The 
savings performance varied significantly during, this peri- 
od. The influence of the external sector (in particular 
the adverse terms of trade) appeared to have offset the 
positive impact of high-interest rates and this was further 
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aggravated by the dissavings of the government and the 
corporate sector during this period. 
Table 6.8 
Domestic Savings and Investment Performance (1977-1985) 
In per cent of GDP* 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Real GDP 
, Growth 4.2 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Investment 14.0 20.0 25.8 33.8 27.8 30.6 28.8 25.8 24.9 
Domestic 
Savings 17.0 15.5 14.7 14.0 14.0 15.4 16.4 21.6 15.3 
Foreign 
, 
Savings 3.0 
. 
4.5 11.1 19.8 13.8 15.2 12.4 4.2 9.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
real GDP 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
Investment and Capital Formation 
Capital formation and investment which are usually 
negatively correlated with high interest rates, recorded 
opposite results. Capital formation as a ratio of GDP (at 
market prices) rose from a range of 14-17 per cent (prior 
to 1978) to 25-34 per cent over 1978-1985 (Table 6.8). A 
, 
2/ 
preliminary survey done on selected public corporations 
and a few private sector companies revealed that even 
during the high interest rate period (nominal rates at 30 
per cent), interest cost has not been a deterrent to expand 
investment activities. It was revealed that they were able 
to borrow at rates which were only marginally higher than 
deposit rates. In fact, labour charges and cost of raw 
materials were more significant than the interest cost. 
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The Planned Investment Survey by the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka (1980) showed that*the interest cost to the major 
companies has been minimal. The weighted average lending 
rate almost doubled in. the post 1977 period from 9 per cent 
per annum during 1968-1976. However, real lending rates 
rose from a negative average of 3.5 per cent during 1968- 
1976 to a positive 4.5 per cent during 1977-1985. The 
relatively low real lending rates were attributed to the 
inflationary tendencies, the availability of subsidized 
credit to priority areas and the favourable rates at which 
the private sector borrowed funds (institutional reasons ). 
High lending rates no doubt acted as a criterion for re- 
scheduling investments but do not appear to have exerted 
any adverse impact on investment funds via real lending 
rates during this period. 
6.2.2 The Credit Rationina Channel (CRC) 
Table 6.9 suggests that domestic credit expanded 
rapidly between 1977 and 1985, especially the share ac- 
counted for by the private. sector (gross). The public 
sector's share remain unchanged since 1977 but credit to 
both sectors as a ratio of GDP has been high. The distribu- 
tion of commercial bank credit to the private sector has 
been stable except for a decline in the relative share of 
agriculture. On a priority basis, exports, agriculture and 
industries were to receive more credit through SCCs al- 
though they were at best a modest success and probably only 
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prevented a further decline in production. 
SCCs in general, and credit ceilings in particular, 
were to supplement general credit measures (SCCs effected 
during this period are given in Appendix 3.2). Although 
most SCCs were implemented through moral suasion, CR was 
enforced through regulations. Banks observed the overall 
ceilings as a group but not on an individual basis. In 
many instances they managed to get exemptions. Moreover, 
due to classification problems and non-compliance, strict 
monitoring was difficult. Historical observations reveal 
that whenever CR was introduced there were corresponding 
increases in interest rates. This may be because banks and 
financial institutions reacted to CR by lending the same 
amount of funds at higher rates thereby maintaining profit 
levels. Therefore, in practice the impact of CR was felt 
more in terms of higher interest rates than a reduction in 
the availability of funds. From the point of view of the 
identification of the MTC it is difficult to separate out 
the impact of interest rates and CR. The real impact of 
CRE, however, appears to be in terms of the introduction of 
distortionaryý, effects 'on financial transactions. In the 
sections below we shall examine the impact of CR in select- 
ed areas starting with real investment. 
Real Investment 
The success of CR as an MTC depends largely on the 
degree of substitutability of funds (the availability 
effect). During the period under review the CB provided 
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subsidised credit under the refinance schemes to ensure 
that priority investments were not affected by the CR. 
Moreover, priority sectors were exempted from all SCCs 
imposed during the 1977-1985 period. From a conceptual 
point of view, CR would influence the borrowers' cost of 
funds and the expected rate of return and hence the budget 
constraints of individual firms. However, insofar as 
interest rates adjust to eliminate excess demand and supply 
(in the ICMs) then the impact of CR would not be felt, and 
this situation may lead to an undermining of the existing 
monetary policy measures. This is also confirmed by the 
high credit multipliers of ICMs during this period. The 
form in which CR was effected in Sri Lanka also allowed the 
borrowers to resort to alternative sources of funds thus 
avoiding its cost effects. The Financial Survey (table 
6.1) reveals that the substitution of bank credit by FCs 
and ICMs filled credit gaps in the non-priority sectors. 
Hence, the overall impact of the CR on investment and 
inventories was not significant. 
Cost Of Borrowing and'Effective Failure of Supply 
In Sri Lanka for large firms, business organisa- 
tions and public corporations, the impact of CR has been 
minimal as they borrow at favourable rates from commercial 
banks. In addition to bank borrowings some of these firms 
were allowed to borrow abroad for short term trade credits. 
They channeled these transactions through FCBUs and ar- 
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ranged acceptance finance, a facility that was allowed 
since 1979. CR therefore, exerted only a negligible effect 
on the cost of borrowing as most big firms resorted to 
inward remittances for working capital or borrowed against 
cash collateral. On the other hand, priority sectors were 
looked after through refinance schemes of the CB, develop- 
ment credit institutions or through subsidised credit 
programmes of the government. Therefore, the CRE did not 
result in an effective failure of supply during the period 
under review. In many instances the CRE was overshadowed by 
interest rate effects because credit was made available to 
the system at a higher cost, represented by high lending 
rates. 
Financial Disinterrediation 
The shift towards alternative sources of funds 
when the formal sector imposed CR may have led to some 
degree of financial disintermediation (FD). The FD has far 
reaching implications for, Sri, Lanka because the CR was not 
uniformly applicable on all financial institutions. Second- 
ly, CR forces commercial banks to maintain idle reserves 
and it acts as a 100 per, cent marginal-reserve requirement. 
If the economy is fully open-and if ceilings are imposed 
only on domestic credit, deposit inflows would tend to be 
lent abroad when the ceilings are reached. There is no 
evidence of deposit outflows, except the increasing "errors 
and omissions"item, in the balance of payments entries. A 
good part of these outflows would have to be attributed to 
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illegal transfers. Therefore, the FD would in this case have 
discouraged deposit inflows to banks thereby driving cus- 
tomers to the ICMs. 
6.2.3 The Wealth Channel 
The measurement of wealth is ambiguous and it is 
difficult to measure wealth using one particular proxy. As 
long as real cash balances are a part of wealth, there will 
be widespread WE via income changes. The question is wheth- 
er the wealth channel (WC) was able to trigger SE via money 
balances in Sri Lanka during our period. WE can be meas- 
ured using two criteria. The first takes money as a factor 
of production and the second examines portfolio shifts 
among assets. The first assumes that money is part of 
wealth while the second assumes that portfolio shifts will 
be triggered by interest rates which can be proxied by 
interest elasticities. 
Following Paul and Bhattahcharay (1981) we assumed 
that real money balances are part of wealth and calculated 
money's output elasticity in order to measure impact 'of 
real balances and hence the wealth effect. However, the 
calculations did not lead to sensible results. We therefore 
turned to the, second criteria to examine its applicability 
to Sri, Lanka. 
In Sri Lanka, the major liquid assets of the pri- 
vate sector consist of cash, treasury bills, savings cer- 
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tificates, and fixed and savings deposits. The non-liquid 
portfolio consists of consumption goods, real assets etc. 
Long term mortgages and trading of GS are not popular 
because returns are low on the former and the latter are 
not tradable as there are no secondary markets. There is 
no housing market or unit/investment trusts to transact in 
private or corporate bonds. Portfolio shifts are, therefore, 
limited between money and financial assets, which respond 
to interest rate differentials. Company sector financial 
assets grew steadily after 1977. Most companies hold CDs 
due to tax advantages and as collateral. Company invest- 
ments in the SM depends on the rate of return, investment 
relief, viability of projects and the political situation 
in the country. As seen in most developing financial 
markets the net financial position of the non-bank private 
sector vis-a-vis the banking'sector does not seem to have 
any significant influence upon, the former's portfolio 
decisions. ''' Similarly', wealth had no, role toý play as a 
variable in the net public sector debt. In the company 
sector, 'portfolio balances have been limited to borrowings 
and the firms' retained earnings. In any case the firms in 
Sri Lanka are more bank oriented compared to those of 
equity or market oriented firms in the USA or-the Uk. This 
supports -the view that the use of portfolio shifts among 
sectors as a criteria to measure WE cannot be considered a 
proper proxy in Sri Lanka. 
Thus it seems that there is no proper proxy to 
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measure WE in Sri Lanka. However, by analysing portfolio 
shifts we concluded that part of the wealth effects are 
represented through changes in real balances and hence are 
effected by the money supply. 
6.3 Observations From the Empirical Model 
There are, two approaches to analysing the role of 
MTM in macro simulation models. One is concerned with the 
identification -of the channels in, single equations or 
possibly single sectors of'the model with emphasis on the 
magnitude of the coefficients, on the, variablesý concerned. 
The second is a complementary approach concerning the 
impact on the complete model through simulation. We have 
used both of these techniques. - 
From our empirical model in chapter 4 we found that 
the interest rate variable was significant iný all- three 
money- demand equations, which indicates some degree of SE 
among financial assets. We, measured the SE between money 
and alternative assets using the interest elasticity of 
the- demand for moneyý Table 6.10' shows the percentage 
change in money associated with, a percentage change in 
interest rates on alternative financial assets. If SE>1 it 
means that a small change in-interest ratesi or- alterna- 
tively, -financial assets, is-accompanied by a large fall' in 
the demand for money reflecting an, elastic degree of-sub- 
stitution. Similarly, the shift towards interest bearing 
monetary assets is seen in the positive elasticity of . 231 
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in time and savings deposits. 
Table 6.10 
Interest Elasticities 
----- - ------------- 
of Money Demand 
----------------- ----------- ------- - -- - 
Short-term 
---------------- 
Long-Term 
----------- ------------- 
1. Demand for 
----------------- 
Currency 
- 
-. 308 - 1.28 
2. Demand for Demand Deposits -. 248 - 0.54 
3. Demand for Time and 
Savings Deposits . 231 0.347 
These elasticities conform to the observations we 
noted from the historical behaviour of interest rates. In 
the context of the real sector equations, however, we did 
not find the direct impact of interest rates to be signifi- 
cant. We observed that interest rates affected the' real 
sector via monetary variables thus transmitting monetary 
impulses to the rest of the economy. 
We did not find the expected rate of inflation (fl) 
to be significant in our model. This does not mean that 
the subs titution between money and /or financial assets and 
real assets did not occur in Sri Lanka but we might not 
have found a suitable proxy for the rate of return- for 
fixed assets. Insofar as the change in nominal interest 
rates are the consequence of changes in interest variabili- 
ty (uncertainty), inflationary expectations may have impor- 
tant effects on economic activity and hence on the effec- 
tiveness of the interest rate channel. We tried to capture 
the impact of interest rates on real expenditure but were 
unable to obtain any significant results. It is possible 
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that in the aggregation of real expenditure the positive 
impact on the sub sectors disappeared. 
The estimated equations-in our model also captured 
the direct effects of CR. The import equation, in particu- 
lar, showed the significance of import credit on the volume 
of imports. The importance of the "Availability Effects" 
is seen through the DC variable in the demand for time and 
savings deposits equation. As explained in an earlier 
chapter the availability effects are as strong as the 
interest rate effects in the determination of the demand 
for time and savings deposits. 
The WE was in part captured in the real sector 
equations through broad money (BMO/cp). It influences real 
expenditure and the price level in a significant manner 
indicating the importance of broad money or the total 
liquidity in the system. The specification of our model, 
however, does not allow us to directly measure WE as we did 
not have a proper proxy for wealth. The implicit argument 
of the portfolio balance approach suggests that following 
an expansion in the money supply (if no short term loans 
are made) the banks would then buy long term bonds. Inter- 
est rates will then change and there will be WEs. If, 
however, short term loans are made to customers then the 
commercial loan rate will go up and hence there will be 
portfolio changes. The latter appears to be of some rele- 
vance to Sri Lanka although administratively fixed interest 
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rates, the non- attractiveness of GS, and the non-avail- 
ability of secondary markets are not very conducive to 
portfolio shifts. Therefore, in Sri Lanka the changes in 
the speed of spending and adjustments in portfolios cannot 
easily be traced. 
Having analysed the single equation or the intra- 
sector SE, CRE and the WE, we shall now consider the 
impact of interest rates on the model as a whole, based 
upon our simulations using interest rates and CR as exoge- 
nous variables, both by themselves, and in connection with 
other policy instruments. This is essential to the under- 
standing of how these variables influence the transmission 
process in a complete model. 
When we compared our dynamic, multipliers and elas- 
ticities with the SEACEN (1981) study we shocked RST by 5 
per cent., The SE between money and the other'-financial 
assets and the rest of the economy was confirmed by the 
simulation results, in particular, in the three demand for 
money equations. As discussed in chapter 5 (table 5.17) 
significant impacts were seen on the monetary variables 
indicating the SE between interest bearing and non-interest 
bearing assets. The transmission of the interest rate 
impact to the real sector was seen in the reduction in 
total expenditure and real income. In line with the his- 
torical behaviour of interest rates, change in RST in our 
model did not exert any direct impact on the BOP. However, 
in the policy analysis chapter, we repeated our simulation 
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experiments with a view to assessing the relative strength 
of exogenous policy shocks and found that RST exerts more 
powerful and more widespread effects on the macro economy 
than the wealth and credit rationing effects. 
We then repeated our simulation experiments to 
evaluate the CRE on the economy. The direct impact was 
felt on the volume-of imports and hence the BOP and 
through them on the rest of the economy. This experiment 
also revealed an alternative transmission path, -one which 
works directly via the BOP and correspondingly through 
changes in net external assets. The impact is felt directly 
on the broad money supply, which in turn exerts significant 
influences on the macro economy. -Although these effects are 
as expected, one should be careful how one interprets these 
dynamic multipliers as they'depend heavily on the specifi- 
cation of the equations in the model. Moreover, the impact 
of credit rationing can be-seen only through one equation 
of -the model and may, not be as widespread as those of the 
interest rate effects. 
The scattered effects of WE cannot be captured 
using a particular variable and we assumed that money forms 
a part of wealth in Sri Lanka. WE are also passed through 
the SE as portfolio changes are linked to changes in inter- 
est rates. We endogenised broad money in our model and 
therefore, the direct impact was captured by using it as an 
exogenous variable in the real sector equations. Accord- 
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ingly, both the total expenditure and aggregate price level 
equations capture the direct effects of the money supply, 
which in turn influence the rest of the economy. In both 
equations, the money supply is highly significant and has 
direct consequences on the rest of the economy. - 
6.4 The Relative Inportance of the Transmission Channels 
-, I From the foregoing-it is clear that, -, the -observa- 
ýions from'historical behaviour'and the estimation results 
confirm' the relative effectiveness of the interest rate 
channel, the CRE and the', direct effects of the noney-supply. 
These -findings- are further confirmed by the, simulation 
results. CRE appears to be the most, direct-channel working 
via the BOP and money. However, the simulation experiments 
suggest that the interest rate, effects are more powerful 
and widespread than the CRE because part of. -the CRE are 
reflected -via changes in interest rates. Although CRE 
reveals an-alternative transmission channel, in the simula- 
tion exPeriments, ý the historical behaviour of the major 
aggregates did not provide adequate support for the signif- 
icance 'of CRE. As stated earlier, this is because part of 
*CRE was represented via higher interest rates. In the model 
the impact of CRE comes via only one equation and there- 
fore, the overall effects on the macro economy may have 
to be interpreted cautiously. The money supply, however, as 
a transmission channel appears to be direct and produces 
more lasting effects compared to the other channels. The 
impact of money is further strengthened by the fact that it 
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forms part of total wealth. Hence, the direct effects of 
the money supply can be interpreted as both wealth and 
liquidity effects. 
our historical--analysis revealed that compared to 
the CRE and WE, the-, SE triggered by interest rates appeared 
to be widespread in Sri Lanka over our period. The SE was 
further intensified by, -the FI experienced between 1977 and 
1985 and the more open and market oriented policies fol- 
lowed during this period. It may however, be noted that 
the SE envisaged-In the textbooks i. e. the substitution 
between government bonds and money did not take place. 
Instead, the SE triggered by interest rates was visible 
between money and financial assets and money and real 
assets. An interesting feature regarding the SE was the 
fact that the impact of various general monetary policy 
(SRRs) and other, direct measures, in particular SCCs and 
CR, were reflected through changes in interest rates. For 
example, , instead of reducing the availability of credit, 
most banks lent the same amount at higher interest -rates. 
Hence,, interest rates were more prominent in transmitting 
monetary impulses. 
Interest rates were significant in all the demand 
for money equations in our model but we were unable to see 
the direct impact of interest rates on the real sector. As 
mentioned earlier, there was no proxy to examine the impact 
of the wealth channel in single equations. CRE introduced 
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through the DC variable proved to be significant in the 
empirical model but we noted only a limited impact as this 
variable was not significant in many of the equations. The 
lagged money supply had a direct impact, on the real sector 
equations, especially on real expenditure and aggregate 
price level equations. The significance of the interest 
rate channel was further confirmed by our simulation exper- 
iments in that it influenced the transmission paths of both 
monetary and real aggregates. Although the direct impact of 
the money supply was important in individual equations, we 
were unable to see the overall effects through simulation 
experiments as it was endogenised in the monetary sector. 
The impact of CRE in our simulation experiments was limited 
but it tends to undermine the effectiveness of the interest 
rate channel through its influence on the demand for time 
and savings deposits. Table 6.11 summarises the relative 
effectiveness of each of these channels. 
Table 6.11 
Comparison of the Effectiveness of Transmission Channels 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Historical Estimation of Simulation 
Behaviour Equations Experiments 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Interest Rate 
channel(SE) limited widespread widespread 
2. Selective Credit 
controls(CRE) limited limited widespread 
3. Wealth Effects scattered no proxy no proxy 
4. Money Supply widespread widespread widespread 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
291 
FOOT NOTES 
1. Ceylon Daily News ; Business page; 08.02.1982. 
2. Survey of the Impact of High Interest Rates on Selected 
Private Sectors Enterprises. Unpublished Report of the 
Research Findings-of the Money and Banking Division, 
Department of Economic Research, Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka, 1984. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE MONETARY CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
Having identified the relatively more important 
transmission channels in the previous chapter we shall- now 
engage in policy analysis in order to shed some light on 
the construction of a Monetary Control Framework (MCF). 
In Sri Lanka little or no research has been done, to assess 
the effectiveness of different policy measures, although 
policy instruments are changed fairly regularly. 
There are three main objectives in this chapter. 
The first is to provide a deeper understanding of the 
effectiveness of frequently used policy instruments in 
terms of the alternative transmission paths of monetary 
impulses before these instruments are assembled in a MCF. 
The second is to help in the selection of appropriate 
policy instruments, both single instruments and in combi- 
nation with other instruments (policy scenarios) depending 
on how quickly and strongly the authorities would want to 
achieve their objectives, and to asses the feasibility of 
achieving such objectives through alternative policy combi- 
nations. The third objective is to outline the conditions 
necessary for the formulation of the MCF and to highlight 
the contribution of macro simulation models in general and 
our model in particular to any proposed MCF. At the 
present time Sri Lanka does-not have an analytical frame- 
work for monetary policy formulation and it is hoped that 
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this thesis will provide some guidelines for the establish- 
ment of such a MCF. 
7.1 Policy Analysis 
For purposes of consistency we shocked all policy 
variables by 10 per cent of their mean historical values 
and calculated unit impulse multipliers. When exogenous 
policy variables are expressed in small percentage terms, 
the calculation of dynamic multipliers becomes a meaning- 
less exercise because of the larger magnitudes involved in 
the endogenous variables. This is especially so when small 
percentage changes in RST are introduced as against large 
absolute values of the endogenous variables. In these 
circumstances, we use elasticities to interpret, the dynamic 
response of the macro economy to changes in RST. - For 
combined policy instruments (scenario analysis), the re- 
sponse is calculated by taking the difference between the 
two simulations, i. e. the control run and the shocked run 
and is expressed in the original units (Rs. million). 
Whenever possible we calculate separately the impact of 
policy instruments on both components of the money supply 
i. e. the monetary base (MB) and the money multiplier (mn). 
This is not always possible as most policy variables such 
as the rate of interest and statutory reserve requirements 
influence both MB and mm. 
Our analysis is split into four components. First 
we examine the impact of single policy instruments on the 
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system via MB. Second, we repeat the analysis via mm using 
the most direct policy instruments. mm. is a summary measure 
of the complex relationships between the MB and the money 
supply. The value of the mm is determined by behavioural 
relationships including decisions of the banking and non- 
banking sectors relating to holdings of excess reserves, 
currency and deposits. 
-Thirdly, 
we conduct scenario analy- 
sis taking various policy combinations and finally, we look 
at the effects of the changes in non-policy instruments on 
the macro economy. 
Single Policy Instruments 
From a policy point of view we selected net credit 
to government (NCG), gross credit to commercial banks 
(GCB) by the Central Bank, and net foreign assets of the 
Central Bank (NFACB) as instruments directly affecting the 
MB. NCG and GCB represent net domestic assets (NDA). 
Increases in any of the above components would 
directly raise the money supply through identity (6) in 
chapter 4 and spill over to income, prices and the BOP. The 
effect is expansionary on the money supply, real expendi- 
ture and real income and worsens the BOP due to high 
imports and capital outflows. Appendix table 7. a shows 
that an increase in NCG is stronger in its impact than a 
rise in interest rates. It must however, be pointed out 
that the response of the macro economy to these policy 
shocks appears to be very strong as this exercise assumes 
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no policy reactions from the policy making authorities. 
One should therefore, be cautious in interpreting these 
results in a literal sense, but see these experiments as 
providing information to the policy making' authorities 
prior to the introduction of new policy measures. 
Table 7.1 is a summary table highlighting the 
important channels through which the impact of an increase 
in NCG is passed on to the rest of the economy. 
Table 7.1 
A 10 per cent increase in the MB via a 10 per" cent'- 
--------- ------- 
incre 
----------- 
ase in 
------- 
NCG 
------- ---------- ----------- 
Period Real Time Real Aggregate Real Balance of 
and Saving s Broad Price Income Payments 
--------- ------- 
Deposits 
----------- 
Money 
------- 
Level 
------- ---------- ----------- 
IMPACT 5 . 812 4.20 0 0 0 
DELAY 10 . 259 . 582 . 001 . 268 -. 004 
INTERMEDI ATE 15 . 092 . 243 . 001 . 369 -. 038 20 . 077 . 173 . 001 . 146 -. 039 
LONG-RUN 36 3.47 10.61 0.418 7.77 -. 994 
The impact multipliers on time and savings deposits 
and broad money are 0.81 and 4.2, while the long term 
multipliers are 3.47 and 10.61 respectively. Real income 
responded positively with a long term multiplier of, 7.8, 
and as expected, the BOP deteriorated further by 0.99 in 
the long run. The impact is delayed on all real sector 
. -variables and the BOP due to 
lagged effects. Prices react 
positively although the impact is marginal and delayed. 
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Two important features emerge from this analysis. 
The first is the dual impact of an increase in NCG via the 
money, supply on the real sector,, and directly via real 
expenditure. The second is the ability of our model to 
analyse the consequences-of deficit financing on the econo- 
my even though it is not specified to take fiscal policy 
directly into account. I 
Table 7.2 below shows the impact of expanding 
credit to priority sectors through gross credit to commer- 
cial banks (GCB) and the channels through which the impact 
is passed on to the rest of the economy. 
Table 7.2 
A 10 per cent increase in the MB via a 10 per cent 
---- 
increase in GCB 
----------- 
Period 
------- 
Total 
----------------- 
Total Real Real 
----------- 
Balance Real Broad 
------------- 
Reser- Expendi- Inco me of Pay-, Money 
--------------- 
ves 
------- 
ture 
---------- ------- 
ments 
----------- ------------- 
IMPACT 5 . 030 0 0 0 4.076 
DELAY 10 . 014 . 296 . 291 -. 004 . 633 
INTERMEDIATE 15 . 005 . 452 . 403 -. 042 . 264 20 . 006 . 203 . 159 -. 044 . 188 
LONG-RUN 36 
--------------- 
. 235 
------- 
9.603 
---------- 
8.652 
------- 
-1.088 
----------- 
11.05 
--------------- 
As expected, -the impact is similar to that of an 
increase in NCG. For example, the'long run real expendi- 
ture multiplier i's 9.60 and for real income is 8.65. As 
before, the'BOP deteriorates, 'although part of the GCB is 
geared to the provision of export refinance. a facility 
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designed, 
"to 
reduce. the cost of Sri Lankan exports. The 
impact on the money supply is also relatively large 
(11.05). These multiplier effects confirm the importance 
of . changes,, 
in_the MB and the predictability. of the impact 
on the economy with. the help of, a small aggregative model 
of this nature., From a policy point of, view , however, it 
may be noted that it is much easier to control GCB rather 
than NCG, since the former is at the discretion of the 
Central Bank. Table 7.3 shows the effects of a 10 per cent 
increase in the MB via a 10 per cent increase in NFACB. 
Table 7.3 
A 10 per cent increase in the MB via a 10 per cent 
---------------- 
increase in 
--------- --- 
NFACB. 
-- - - --- - ---- 
Period 
------- 
Real Time Real 
- ----- 
Balance 
-- - - 
Real 
------- 
Domestic 
and Savings Income of Pay- Broad Credit 
---------------- 
Deposits 
------------------- 
ments 
--------- 
Money 
--------- ----------- 
IMPACT 5 . 837 0 0 4.097 2.990 
DELAY 10 . 278 . 287 -0.004 . 624 . 468 
INTERMEDIATE 15 . 098 . 397 -0.041 . 260 . 255 20 . 082 . 157 - . 043 . 185 . 213 
LONG-RUN 36 
---------------- 
3.690 8.212 
------------------- 
-1.072 
--------- 
10.970 
--------- 
10.093 
----------- 
As expected, the impact multipliers indicate 'that 
the response is expansionary and direct. Following an 
increase in NFACB the money supply and domestic credit 
increase by 4.09 and 2.99 respectively, and these increases 
manifest themselves initially in an increase in total 
domestic spending. The long term multipliers are also 
relatively high for both these variables at 10.97 and 10.09 
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respectively. The reaction of, the real sector is delayed 
and the multipliers tend to increase over time. As expect- 
ed, the BOP deteriorated in the long run by 1.07 due to 
enhanced imports following the increase in NFACB. The 
results show that the impact, of both domestic and foreign 
assets on the MB are of similar magnitude. 
Next we considered the relative price of exports 
(XPFXPC) as an indirect policy measure that affects the 
system via MB. Although movements in international reserves 
are beyond the direct control of the Central Bank, this 
variable partly reflects exchange rate policy at a given 
point in time, since export prices can be made more attrac- 
tive to the rest of the world through the depreciation of 
the Sri Lankan Rupee. 
Table 7.4 indicates the delayed reaction on all 
aggregates. The long term impact on broad money is 7.6, 
while the volume of exports and real income produce longer 
term multiplier effects of 2.7 and 9.2 respectively. The 
positive impact of 0.49 on BOP in period 10 is offset in 
the longer term due to the reversal of the favourable 
effects of depreciation. The BOP records a marginal dete- 
rioration in the long run. 
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Table 7. A 
A 10 per cent increase in the MB via a 10 per cent 
increase in XPFXPC 
---------------------------------------- i ------------------- 
Period Volume of Aggregate Real- Balance Real 
Exports Price Income of Pay- Broad 
Level ments Money 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
IMPACT 500000 
DELAY 10 . 607 0 . 779 . 498 . 658 
INTERMEDIATE 15 . 003 . 002 . 577 -. 082 . 367 
-20 00 . 231 -0.064 w282 
LONG-RUN 36 2.739 . 019 9.178 -0.850 7.602 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
We shall now examine the direct effects of changes 
in policy instruments via mm. As expected, 'RR first affects 
the currency/deposit ratio and the excess reserve ratio and 
through them the mm and total reserves and the monetary 
variables. Table 7.5 indicates that the impact multiplier 
on broad money is 1.87 while the delay and intermediate 
multipliers are relatively small. In the long term broad 
money reduces by 5.18. This then reduces real income via 
(9) in the long run by 3.92. The intermediate and long run 
multipliers on the price level and BOP are insignificant 
at . 012 and . 40 respectively. Our model thus captures the 
effects of an increase in RR and enables us to trace 
through the transmission path from the monetary sector to 
the rest of the economy. This allows policy makers to 
select the appropriate level of statutory reserves required 
to reduce the credit creating capacity of banks. 
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Table 7.5 
A 10 per cent increase in mm via a 10 per cent 
increa 
------- 
se in required re 
------- 
serves (RR)-. 
-------------- ----------- ------------- 
Period 
-- 
Real 
-------- 
Balance 
--- 
Real Total Aggregate 
Income of Pay- Broad Reser- Price 
-------------------- --------- 
ments 
-------- 
Money 
--------- 
ves 
-------- 
level 
----------- 
IMPACT 5 0 0 -1.868 . 488 0 
DELAY 10 -. 138 0 -. 301 -. 007 0 
INTERMEDIATE 15 -. 192 . 02 -. 125 -. 002 -. 001 20 -. 076 . 02 --. 089 -. 003 0 
LONG-RUN 36 
--------------------- 
-3.927 
--------- 
. 40 
-------- 
-5.182 
--------- 
. 350 
-------- 
-. 012 
---------- 
It may however, be noted that the effect of RR is relative- 
ly-- small in magnitude when compared to the other measures 
that directly affect the MB. This confirms our historical 
observation that the MB is more influential than mm in Sri 
Lanka during the period under-study. 
We shall now consider the irnpact of interest rates 
(RST), an irnportant policy variable, which indirectly 
affects both nin and MB. High interest rates are expected 
to discourage the denand for credit, and through this, 
reduce the credit creation capacity of the cornmercial 
banks. 
The dynamic elasticities for a 10 per cent in- 
crease in RST on all variables are shown in Appendix 7. b. A 
summary table (table 7.6) is presented below. 
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Table 7.6 
A 10 Per cent increase in mm via 10 per cent 
increase in RST 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Period Real Time Aggregate Real. Balance Real 
and Savings Price Income of Pay- Broad 
Deposits Level ments Money 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
IMPACT 5 . 182 000-. 108 
DELAY 10 -. 037 -. 029 -. 080 -. 127 -. 057 
INTERMEDIATE 15 -. 042 -. 040 -. 048 -. 088 -. 051 
20 -. 022 -. 017 -. 034 -. 068 -. 030 
LONG-RUN 36 . 579 -. 003 -1.068 -1.256 -1.195 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
As expected, the impact of an increase in RST is 
more direct on all monetary sector variables and indirect 
on real sector variables. The RST channel was able to 
trigger positive and immediate SE (. 18) between money and 
interest bearing financial assets (time and savings depos- 
its) and a cumulative effect of 0.58. This reduced broad 
money by 1.19 reflecting the restraining effects of an 
increased RST on monetary expansion. In the long run, -the 
contractionary monetary effects are passed on to the real 
sector thus leading to reductions in the price level 
by . 003 and real income by 1.07. In terms of credit crea- 
tion the impact on mm is felt through i'ncreases'in lending 
rates following the increase in deposit rates. The long 
term impact on the BOP at -1.26, however, is contrary 'to 
what was expected of an increase in RST. An examination of 
the dynamic elasticities on all variables (Appendix table 
7-b) shows that the contrary impact of RST on the BOP is 
largely dueto the specification of our exports equation 
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which is not affected by changes in RST. On the other 
hand, RST's impact on the volume of imports is too small 
(-. 26) to exert any significant positive effects on the 
BOP. 
7.1.2 Policy Scenarios 
We shall now try to assess the impact of combined 
policies on the economy via MB and mm. In this experiment 
it is not possible to separate the impact on MB and mm, and 
therefore, we examine the total impact under each scenario. 
We consider policy options under three main scenarios: 
expansionary monetary policy, contractionary monetary 
policy and stabilisation policies. 
Expansionary Policy Scenario 
Within the expansionary monetary policy scenario 
there are several policy combinations. First, we assess 
the impact of a simultaneous increase in NFACB and a reduc- 
tion in XPFXPC. Table 7.7 presents the results in Rs. mil- 
lion. The increase in NFACB directly raises the MB while 
the reduction in XPFXPC amounts to a depreciation of the 
exchange rate which is also expansionary on the MB via 
enhanced NFACB. As expected, the impact multiplier is valid 
only on broad money (Rs. 1278 million) and is followed by a 
significant long term effect of Rs. 3890 million and a 
similar reaction of Rs. 3127 million in real income in the 
long run. 
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Table 7.7 
A 10 per cent increase in NF ACB and a 10 per cent 
reduction in XPFXPC 
------- ----------------- ---------------- 
Period 
------------------- 
Real Volume 
----- 
of Balance Aggregate Real 
Broad Exports of Pay- Price Income 
---------------- 
Money 
------------------- 
ments 
------------ 
Level 
----------------- 
IMPACT 5 1278.01 0 0 00 
DELAY 10 235.14 37.65 29.64 . 20 137.65 
INTERMEDIATE 15 103.82 . 18 -17.87 . 44 159.12 20 75.20 0 -17.24 . 23 63.15 
LONG-RUN 36 
----------------- 
3890.29 169.82 
------------------- 
-280.52 
------------- 
9.25 3127.84 
----------------- 
Following the reduction in the foreign price of Sri Lankan 
exports via depreciation of the Rupee, the volume of ex- 
ports increases in the long term by Rs. 170 million. Howev- 
er, the favourable impact of enhanced exports is offset by 
the stronger effects of import rises, so that the BOP dete- 
riorates by Rs. 280 million. 
These results imply that this policy combination is 
beneficial for exports although it is difficult to sustain 
the favourable effects due to the stronger influence from 
imports, a common feature in small open economies. In other 
words, in export oriented small economies like Sri Lanka, 
more direct and stringent measures are needed to achieve 
BOP objectives and one would need to be cautious about 
placing too much reliance on exchange rate policy alone. 
Our second combination involves a 10 per cent 
increase in IC and a 10 per cent reduction in RST. This 
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combination is expansionary on the money supply via mm. 
although the immediate effect is a reduction of interest 
bearing monetary liabilities due to the effects of the 
reduction of RST. However, this effect is offset completely 
by the increase in import credit, probably due 
Table 7.8 
A 10 per cent increase in IC and a 10 
reduction in RST 
-------------------------------------------- 
Period Real Time Aggregate Real 
and Savings Price Incom 
Deposits Level 
-------------------------------------------- 
IMPACT 5 -116.71 00 
DELAY 10 -41.58 . 15 -62.48 
INTERMEDIATE 15 11.25 . 06 -41.37 20 1.35 . 01 12.00 
LONG-RUN 36 -117.47 1.09 -577.26 
-------------------------------------------- 
per cent 
------------------ 
Balance Real 
e of Pay- Broad 
ments Money 
------------------ 
0 197.12 
-7.69 -52.28 
-4.0 13.31 
1.01 2.99 
-362.49 517.98 
------------------ 
to a leakage of credit following the enhancement of total 
liquidity in the system, reflected through the increase in 
broad money by Rs 518 million in the long run. Surprising- 
ly, after positive delayed effects, real income declines 
by Rs. 577 million in the long term. This may be due to 
increased imports which subsequently decline. This empha- 
sizes the importance of increasing exports through supply 
side policies. As expected, the BOP deteriorates further by 
Rs. 362 million due to enhanced imports following the 
direct effects of an increase in import credit coupled with 
a reduction in the cost of credit via RST. 
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We considered another combination of expansionary 
policy measures which includes an increase in, NCG and a 
reduction in lending rates (ZXY). The results are shown in 
table 7.9. 
TABLE 7.9 
A 10 per cent increas e in NCG and a 10 per cent 
I reduc tion in ZXY 
---------- ------------ ---------- ------------------ 
Period 
------------ 
Real Time 
---- 
Aggregate Rea l Balance Real 
and Savings Price Inc ome of Pay- Broad 
------------------ 
Deposits 
------------ 
Level 
-------------- 
ments 
------------ 
Money 
---------- 
IMPACT 5 855.95 00 0 4423.17 
DELAY 10 273.40 . 623 283.18 - 3.92 614.19 
INTERMEDIATE 15 96.91 1.05 389.52 -40.48 256.59 
20 80.91 . 566 154.37 -41.78 182.29 
LONG-RUN 36 
------------------ 
3665.20 
------------ 
. 717 8201.80 
-------------- 
-1049.81 
------------ 
11195.88 
---------- 
The immediate impact of this combination is promi- 
nent on time and savings deposits and broad money which 
increase by Rs. 855 million and Rs-4423 million respective- 
ly. With a delayed reaction real income increases by Rs. 
8201 million while money growth is very expansiona ry at Rs. 
11195 million in the long run. The consequent deteriorating 
effects on the BOP amounts to Rs 1049 million. Following 
the expansionary effects of money and real income, prices 
increase in the long run by 0.72. 
306 
Contractionary Policy Scenario 
We shall now consider the contractionary policy 
scenario of an increase in RR and a reduction in XPFXPC. 
The former works via mm. while the latter reflects the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. This policy combination 
is expected to provide strong BOP support. 
Table 7.10 
A'10 per cent increase i n RR and 10-per cent reduction 
------------ ----- 
in 
----- -- 
XPFXPC 
------ -------- ------------ - 
Pe riod 
--- 
Real 
-- 
Real V olume of -Volume of 
------- 
Balance 
Broad Income Exports Imports of Pay- 
------------ ------ 
Money 
---------- -------- -------- ------------ 
ments 
--- 
IMPACT 5 -407.14 ,0 0 0 
------ 
0 
DELAY 10 -24.68 18.31 37.65 -. 59 31.29 
INTERMEDIATE 15 -4.53 -5.96 . 17 1.05 -73 20 -1.98 -2.11 0 -. 56 . 57 
'LONG-RUN 
------------ 
36 
----- 
-657.08 
---------- 
-285.87 
-------- 
169.82 
-------- 
-41.53 
------------ 
. 13 
---------- 
As expected, the rise in RR reduces broad money by 
Rs. 407 million in the immediate period and by Rs 657 mil- 
lion in the long run. Following this, real income falls by 
Rs 286 million in the long term. This captures the con- 
tractionary effects of this policy scenario fairly well. 
The'-contraction of imports-(Rs 41 million) and the stronger 
positive effects on exports by Rs 170 million in the longer 
term provide BOP support, although the effects are mar- 
ginal. 
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ý, ýAs seen from table 7.11, the contractionary impact 
of a 10 per cent, increase in RST and a 10 per cent increase 
RR appears to bring about more powerful and direct effects 
via mm and, MB. Accordingly, broad money reduces by Rs 567 
million at the beginning and produces a cumulative effect 
of Rs 3427 million in the long term. Following the contrac- 
tion in broad money, the delayed effects reduce, real 
income by RS 2547 million in the long run. As expected, 
the BOP improves at all stages with a long term effect 
Table 7.11 
A 10 per cent increase in RST and a 10 per cent 
increase in RR 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Period Total Real Real Balance of 
Reserves Broad Income Payments 
Money 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
IMPACT 5 97.32 -566.76 00 
DELAY 10 -3.08 -188.52 -162.02 8.20 
INTERMEDIATE 15 -2.45 -109.27 -113.35 19.15 
20 -2.35 -72.43 -69.41 15.35 
LONG-RUN 36 15.27 -3427.14 -2547.09 360.54 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
of RS 360 million. A reduction in broad money helps to 
reduce - liquidity in the system and correspondingly, im- 
proves the BOP. 
Stabilisation Policy Scenario 
The stabilisation policy scenario is used to 
strike a balance between expansionary and contractionary 
policies in Sri Lanka during this period. As explained in 
chapter 3-monetary management in Sri Lanka has been under 
308 
continuous pressure, largely because the fund requirements 
of the economy could not be'provided through the' budget. 
The enhancement of the MB via refinance funds (GCB) had to 
be arrested 'through 'an increase in RR, thus absorbing 
excess liquidity viaýa reduction in the mm. 
Table 7.12 
A 10 per ce nt Increase in GCB and 10 per cent 
------- 
Increase in RST 
------ - - ----- --------- 
Period 
-------------------- 
Real Aggregate 
---- 
Real 
- ---------- 
'Balance of 
Broad Price Income Payments 
------------ --------- 
Money Level 
-------------------- ---------- ------------- 
IMPACT 5 509.34 0- 0 
DELAY 10 - 18.83 -. 19 -84.57 7.21 
INTERMEDIATE -15 - 38.95 -. 17 - 5.15 7.91 
20 22.08 -. 07 -27.00 3.62 
LONG RUN 
------------ 
36 
--------- 
488.81 -1.34 
-------------------- 
-325.53 
---------- 
67.52 
------------- 
'A combination of'a 10 per cent increase in GCB and 
a 10 per cent increase in RST is'designed to reduce excess 
liquidity via the higher cost of credit so that the demand 
for non priority credit can be kept under control. Table 
7.12 shows that the effects of RST have been more powerful 
and widespread on the system despite the enhancement of 
GCB. Although the initial impact-'raises broad money by Rt. 
509 million, it tends-to reduce it in the long run (Rs. 489 
million). Following this, real income falls by Rs. 326 
million along with a reduction in the aggregate price 
level (1.34). As expected, both variables improve the BOP 
in the long run (via a lower demand for funds due to the 
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higher cost of credit). This provides a means of implement- 
ing alternative policy scenarios to combat the expansionary 
effects of fiscal policy by using monetary tools. These 
results are similar to the combination of an increase in 
NCG and an increase in RR. 
Another stabilisation policy package is aimed at 
providing concessionary credit to the private sector via 
GCB and absorbing part of the funds via'high RR, - thereby 
_containing 
credit creating capacity of commercial banks. 
More specifically, we raised GCB and RR by 10 per cent. The 
impact of this combination is prominent on all monetary 
sector variables as shown in 7.13. Positive effects on MB 
are offset by the increase in RR raising the total reserves 
in the system by Rs 402 million. The immediate response'of 
the money supply is an increase of Rs. 336 million but it 
increases sharply to Rs 6024 million in the long run indi- 
cating more powerful effects of GCB via MB in the long 
term. Reacting to this-policy combination, real income 
grows by Rs 4478 million in the long run. The delayed and 
the long run reaction on the BOP (Rs. 580 million) is 
contrary to a priori expectations and appears to have been 
dominated by the higher volume of imports. The impact on 
the price level is significant in the long run. 
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Table 7.13 
A 10 per cent increase in GCB -and a 10 per cent 
increase in RR 
------- ------ ----------- -------- ----------------- 
Period 
-- ------------ 
Total Aggregate 
- 
Real Balance of Real 
Reserves Price Income Payments Broad 
----------------- 
Level 
--------------------- ------- ----------- 
Money 
--------- 
IMPACT 5 401.82 0 0 0 335.91 
DELAY 10 7.66 . 344 155.70 -2.14 159.78 
INTERMEDIATE 15 2.73 . 586 215.14 -22.35 60.31 20 3.33 . 313 85.03 -23.16 67.71 
LONG-RUN 36 
----------------- 
510.91 14.07 
--------------------- 
4477.78 
------- 
-580.42 
----------- 
6024.95 
-------- 
7.1.3 Impact of non-policy variables 
As far as non policy variables are concerned, we 
first examined the impact on MB and mm of a 10 per cent 
rise in GOECD, representing the external demand for Sri 
Lankan. exports. Table 7.14 shows, as expected, that the 
volume of exports would increase by a multiplier of 5.76 in 
the long run. 
Table 7.14 
A 10 
------------------ 
per cent i 
----------- 
ncrease in 
---------- 
GOECD 
------------------ ------- 
Period Volume Balance of Total Real Real 
of Payment s Real Income Broad 
Exports Expendi- Money 
------------------ -- - - 
ture 
-------- 
IMPACT 5 
-------- 
0 
------- -- 
0 
-------- -- 
00 
-------- 
0 
DELAY 10 1.24 1.02 . 362 1.61 1.38 
INTERMEDIATE 15 . 005 -. 168 1.40 1.20 . 76 20 0 -. 132 . 613 . 480 . 59 
LONG-RUN 36 
------------------ 
5.76 
----------- 
1.83 
---------- 
16.51 19.18 
------------------ 
15.83 
---------- 
311 
Real income increases and as expected, the BOP 
outcome is favourable in the long run (1.8). Broad money 
and real expenditure also increase in the long run. These 
results can be interpreted as favourable effects from 
enhanced external demand. 
Table 7.15 
A 10 per cent 
---------------- 
increase 
------- 
in the 
---- 
price of 
-------- 
imports 
--------- 
(MPP) 
------------- 
Period 
-- 
Volume 
---- 
Total Aggregat e Real Balance of 
of 
, 
Real Price Income Payments 
Imports Expen- Level 
------------ 
diture 
- -------- --------- --------- ----- 
IMPACT 5 
--------- 
40.91 
------- 
0 0 -40.906, 
---- 
-22.498 
DELAY 10 -3.130 -6.888 --. 
017 - 3.758 2.191 
INTERMEDIATE 15 - . 770 -5.302 -. 018 - 4.532 . 654 
20 - . 647 -4.508 -. 011 - 3.861 . 647 
LONG-RUN 36 
----------------- 
16.023 
--------- 
-142.244 
-------- 
-. 366 
-------- 
-158.267 
--------- 
- 1.950 
------------- 
Finally, we increased MPP by 10 per cent,, repre- 
senting a rise in the relative price of imports. As table 
7.15 shows the immediate reaction on imports is positive 
although the delayed effects reduce imports in periods 10 
and 15. A turn around is recorded in the -long run 
thus 
increasing imports by Rs 16 million. As a result the BOP 
deteriorates in the immediate period but improves in the 
interim period. The cumulative effect on the BOP however, 
is 
_unfavourable. 
This may have been due to the feedback 
effects of increased income following the interim drop in 
imports which in turn raises the money supply in the long 
run. The reduction in the aggregate price level is marginal 
but the decrease in real income (Rs 158 million) is signif- 
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icant. 
overall, three important conclusions emerge from 
our policy analysis so far in this chapter. First, the 
impact on the MB via NCG, GCB and DOI produce similar 
results, although they differ in magnitude. Among the 
single policy instruments RST and RR appear to have more 
widespread effects on -the macro, economy. - RR, in 
particular, helps in the achievement of BOP objectives, 
-ýwhile RST reduces the total liquidity in the system via 
high cost of credit. Secondly, in the scenario analysis we 
observed similar results from an increase in RST and a 
reduction in XPFXPC; and an increase in RR and a reduction 
in XPFXPC. Finally; in both single and combined policy 
scenarios it is clear that of the two components of the 
money supply the effects via MB are more powerful than 
those via mm. This confirms the historical behaviour of 
these aggregates. 
7.2 The Monetary Control, Franework 
In this section we highlight the importance of the 
establishment of a MCF for the implementation of monetary 
policy in Sri Lanka. 7.2.1 discusses the main features of, 
and the necessary conditions for, the formulation of a 
MCF. 7.2.2 analyses the implications of macro simulation 
models in general and our model in particular on the 
proposed MCF. In-this section we also focus on the diffi- 
culties of constructingýan MCF and implementing monetary 
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policy within the MCF in Sri Lanka. 
7.2.1 Salient Features of the Proposed Monetary Control 
Framework. 
Following from our discussion in chapter 3 we 
recommended the establishment of a MCF for Sri Lanka in 
order to improve monetary management in the future. We also 
recommended that it is advisable to embark on it sooner 
rather than later because of the primary role assigned to 
monetary policy in correcting macro economic imbalances 
associated with the present economic policy package. On the 
assumption that the authorities are in favour of a MCF we 
shall highlight main features of, and the necessary condi- 
tions for, such a MCF. 
The MCF or the analytical framework 'for the money 
supply process should be relatively'simple, easy to- imple- 
ment and based on sound and details of the behaviour of 
monetary aggregates. Our objective here is to understand 
the relati onships among key macro economic variables, to 
set monetary targets, to monitor their behaviour and to use 
policy instruments in order to achieve pre-designed objec- 
tives of monetary policy. MSMs prepared on the basis of a 
priori expectations with emphasis on important institution- 
al features would help to achieve these objectives. 
The Primarv condition for a MCF is the choice of an 
appropriate definition of the money sUpply. The relation- 
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ship between the nominal I stock of money on the one- hand, 
prices, the BOP, and output'on the other, is. -determined by 
the public's demand for money. - The second condition is 
the' estimation of the'demand for money functions and the 
establishment of links between the supply and demand for 
money. A third'condition is to test the stability of the 
money 'demand - function. Fourthly, -'the MCF requires a set 
of 'forecasts at the policy making stage. These forecasts 
refer to the macro economy; the financial sector and the 
monetary base. The first category requires forecasts of GDP 
growth, investment, the BOP, the fiscal deficit and perhaps 
employment. The fifth condition is to select monetary 
targets (MTs) which are the means to achieve goals rather 
than ends in themselves. Hence, they are intermediate 
targets (ITs). The final condition is to establish rela- 
tionships linking operating targets (OT) to ITs via mm 
and through this to the macro economy. (see Appendix 7. c). 
In the section below we shall discuss briefly the 
actual formulation of the MCF and suggest a more practical 
approach in constructing the MCF and implementing monetary 
policy within that framework. Once the authorities are 
convinced that necessary conditions are adequate then they 
should concentrate on the selection of monetary targets 
which could take the form of single value or a range. 
However, too broad a range will make these targets less 
meaningful. It is also important to ensure that these 
targets can be brought back to the desired path within a 
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short time period if they deviate from it. For this purpose 
appropriate OTs would need to be selected through which ITs 
can be influenced effectively and quickly. The OTs should 
therefore, be closely linked to ITs and be under the 
direct control of the monetary authorities. Despite some 
practical difficulties associated with the control of the 
MB we consider MB as one of the most appropriate OT for Sri 
Lanka. 
The next step is to gather prior knowledge of the 
likely performance of major macro economic aggregates. In 
Sri Lanka, forecasting GDP and fiscal deficits- is difficult 
due to data constraints and frequent changes in revenue 
and expenditure estimates. '' Forecasts of the financial 
sector can be confined to narrow and broad money forecasts 
derived through 'money demand functions. Forecasting MB is 
difficult but is*the most important component of the money 
supply process. 
7.2.2 The Proposed Framework and the implementation of 
the Monetary Policy. 
- 
OUr model for Sri Lanka for, the period 1977-1985 
represents a tentative-way to analyse money's interactions 
with the macro economy and channels through which it trans- 
mits monetary influences to the rest of the economy by 
using an explicit MSM. For'example, in our model we saw how 
money feeds directly'into total real expenditure and af- 
fects the price level. This in turn influences real income 
and, subsequently, the demand for money. In the context of 
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simulation, we also assessed the dynamic paths through 
which monetary-impulses-might be passed on to the rest of 
the macro economy. For example, a priori, the interest 
rate channel reduces the demand for currency and demand 
deposits and trigger substitution effect via increases in 
the demand for interest bearing assets. We also noticed 
the influence of domestic, credit in this process and its 
role in offsetting the impact of interest rates. We further 
observed the transmission channel working via enhanced 
import credit which spills over into the BOP and hence on 
to external assets and broad money. These findings not 
only help to trace through the transmission channels of 
monetary policy, but also provide a clearer picture of the 
economy at a given point of time.. Both the original SEACEN 
model and our own variation thus provide a convenient 
starting point for the establishment of MCFs in LDCs such 
as Sri Lanka. 
Another important aspect of our empirical model was 
to emphasise the importance for the MCF of time lags and 
dynamic response. A particularly convenient tool in this 
respect was our use of dynamic multiplier analysis to 
assess the time lags involved before the respective endoge- 
nous variables reacted fully to policy variables (i. e. 
delay and long run multipliers). We also used sensitivity 
analysis to help to identify the most sensitive variables 
in our model. 
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Within the MCF it is necessary to choose ITs which 
can be controlled by OTs. ITs are broader aggregates such 
as Ml, M2, DC and NFA. As far as the choice of OTs is 
concerned, in Sri Lanka the two major components of OT, 
i. e. NCG and NFACB are beyond the direct control of author- 
ities. Hence, more effective policy instruments in these 
cases would be to conduct open market operations (OMO) and 
to absorb excess liquidity. This would, in actual fact, 
partly offset the expansionary impact of these variables. 
Our analysis in chapter 6 clearly indicated the instruments 
that can be used for OMO and their relative effectiveness. 
Alternatively, the mm could be controlled effectively 
through RR. Although much attention is not paid in this 
thesis to the exchange rate, this could be another key 
instrument to be considered. MSMs therefore, are useful as 
a means of selecting policy instruments to control OTs 
insofar as they enable the investigator to decompose both 
policy instruments and OTs in a formal manner. 
In sum, it appears that MSMs and empirical models 
of the type we have used in this study can be used in 
conjunction with other tools to establish a MCF for an LDC 
such as Sri Lanka, although a more detailed model would be 
required than the one used in-this study for accurate 
policymaking. 'At the moment Sri Lanka does not have any 
formal MCF which has surely constrained the implementation 
of effective monetary management. 
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APPENDIX 7. c 
Linking Overatin_q Targets and Intermediate Taraets 
The mm explains the behaviour of the money stock 
and its size depends on the definition of the money stock. 
Hence, 
MB =C+R 
Where C= public's demand for currency and R= bank demand 
for reserves and a relationship can be established as 
C= cD 
RR = rD 
ER = eD 
so that-MB =C+ RR + ER = (c +r+ e)D and 
MS =C+D= (1 +ýc)D 
where, RR = statutory reserves; ER = excess reserves; 
c= currency/deposit ratio 
Hence, total reserves, 
R MB -C 
therefore, 
MS = (1 + c)/(c +r+ e). (NCG + NFACB + GCB + DOI+ 
OINCB) = mm. MB 
The reserve ratio r, and the bank's excess reserves e, then 
decide the level of deposits the bank reserves will create, 
which when added to c will give the equilibrium level of 
money. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
In this-final chapter we bring together our main 
findings in the form of a conclusion, and mI ake some 
suggestions for further research. 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis analysed the relationship between money 
and the rest of the economy in Sri Lanka between 1977 and 
1985, in order to identify the important paths through 
which monetary policy impulses were transmitted over this 
period. We also tried to highlight the role of macro-simu- 
lation as a useful tool for the analysis of the, monetary 
transmission mechanism and to emphasise the importance of 
formulating monetary policy within an explicit monetary 
control framework. This is especially important in Sri 
Lanka since monetary policy has been regarded as a key 
instrument of demand_management since 1977 and historically 
there has been a noticeable absence of an explicit monetary 
control framework. 
In chapter 2 we set out the main theoretical 
underpinnings of -a monetary control mechanism in the 
context of a brief review of the various theoretical 
expositions of different schools of monetary-thought. These 
included Keynesians, monetarists, portfolio'theorists and 
rational expectationists. An important conclusion here was 
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the empirical similarity of these viewpoints within the 
context of the MTM, with the major disagreements revolving 
more around the range of assets to be included and techni- 
cal relationships between financial and real assets, rather 
than any deep-seated theoretical disputes. It would seem 
appropriate, therefore, to construct a relatively simple 
aggregative model-to help trace out the transmission mecha- 
nism in an empirical context, although some attention. would 
need to be given to the neglected aspect of-the impact of 
institutional change on the financial structure, especially 
that arising from financial innovation. 
Chapter, 3 was devoted to a historical review, of 
monetary policy in Sri-Lanka between 1950 and 1985. We 
noted the contrast between the period before 1977 when 
monetary policy had been characterised, by intense adminis- 
trative controls over the major economic variables and a 
suppression of market forces, and the much more liberal 
period-, after 1977. Monetary policy during the former period 
had essentially fallen in line-with the administratively 
controlled economy and the major vehicle was- selective 
credit controls based upon fixed and relatively low- inter- 
est-rates. During the later period, however, and largely as 
a consequence of growing monetary and price instability, 
monetary policy had ascribed to it a much-more aggressive 
role _than had hitherto been the case. In particular, the 
interest rate channel was emphasised rather than credit 
rationing or administrative controls. These reforms were 
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important because the more aggressive role assigned to 
monetary policy and the wider range of instruments used 
presented the authorities with unprecedented difficulties 
in economic management and the absence of an explicit 
framework for assessing the impact of monetary policy was 
felt throughout this period. Hence the need for a more 
explicit framework for assessing the impact of monetary 
policy and for a macro model which takes into account the 
institutional and policy changes introduced since 1977. 
Chapter 4 was devoted to the construction and 
estimation of a small-scale quarterly aggregative 
'monetarist' type macroeconomic model for Sri Lanka between 
1977 and 1985, specifically to model the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Our review of previous empirical 
work in this area suggested that a modification of the 
general SEACEN framework for selected, South East Asian 
countries would prove to be an appropriate starting-point 
for our work. The model, consisting of 8 behavioural 
equations and 7 identities was estimated using both 
ordinary least squares and two stage least squares 
principal components and generally produced satisfactory 
results 'which conformed to a prior expectations. In 
contrast to the earlier SEACEN study, we found significant 
coefficients for interest rate variables in the money 
demand functions and managed to obtain better fits for the 
aggregate price level, real exports, and real imports. 
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In chapter'5 the model estimated in chapter 4 was 
subjected to dynamic simulation, both to validate the model 
and to calculate dynamic multipliers and elasticities 
relevant to the monetary-transmission mechanism. In a 
simulation context the model performed well in terms of a 
range of evaluation criteria. As in previous studies, 
however, the balance of payments was a clear exception 
across the board. Sensitivity analysis also revealed some 
equations which could benefit from further work, but none 
of these tests suggested any serious cause for concern. Our 
ex-post simulation experiments provided further support for 
the SEACEN hypothesis about the transmission of monetary 
policy impulses and their impact upon the money supply, 
real income, the aggregate price level, and the balance of 
payments. In particular, the direct manipulation of reserve 
I- 
money via net domestic assets would seem to have a stronger 
impact on the economy than the manipulation of the money 
supply through the reserves of the commercial banks. When 
compared to the SEACEN Sri Lanka study, our simulations 
produce results which are similar in magnitude, but are 
more consistent with respect to sign over the sample peri- 
od, reflecting the more complex lag structure employed in 
our model and changes in model specification. 
In chapter 6 we used our simulation model explicit- 
ly to assess the relative importance of alternative mone- 
tary transmission channels. We found that the interest rate 
and credit rationing channels were especially important for 
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Sri Lanka over this period in addition to the dominating 
role of the money supply. 
This 'model was then further used to carry out 
policy-analysis, specifically to assess the'relative impact 
of various policy instruments on a counterfactual basis 
with a view--to including them within a future monetary 
control -framework. These instruments were considered both 
as single instruments and in combination with others. 
Although such exercises should always be treated with 
caution given the well-known difficulties associated with 
macro-simulation, our' experiments confirmed our 'earlier 
conclusion 'that instruments directed through the monetary 
base would tend to be more powerful than those aimed at the 
manipulation of the money multiplier. In addition, interest 
rates would appear to be a key'policy'variable and statuto- 
ry reserve requirements are especially effective as far as 
the money multiplier is concerned. As expected of a de- 
veloping country, -the manipulation of export and import 
prices, such as through devaluation, would not appear to be 
an especially effective weapon as far as the balance of 
payments is concerned mainly due to the feedback effects of 
the change in imports via aggregate income and the money 
supply. 
With respect to the monetary control framework, two 
general conclusions follow from our historical analysis of 
monetary policy in Sri Lanka and our empirical work. First, 
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given the complexity of the monetary transmission mecha- 
nism, it is essential to have a formalised analytical 
framework for carrying out monetary policy. Although the 
actual development of, such a framework is beyond the scope, 
of this thesis and would probably require a full optimum 
control theory approach, the, absence of such a formal 
framework is apparent from the essentially ad hoc approach 
to 'monetary policy adopted by the Sri Lankan authorities 
since 1977. 'Secondly, we believe that our macro-simulation 
framework has been useful in identifying the type of mecha- 
nisms which would form an-integral part of such a MCF. The 
'monetarist' bias,, in the construction of our, model and our 
dynamic simulation experiments have enabled us Ito assess 
the likely channels through which monetary impulses influ- 
ence other variables in the macro-economy. Three such 
mechanisms relevant to the monetary control, mechanism 
require further elaboration in this conclusion: the inter- 
est rate channel, the role of credit, and the role of the 
money supply in general. 
As far as interest rates are concerned, in chapter 
3 we noted that interest rates had been a key instrument of 
monetary policy after 1977. Moreover, when we attempted to 
identify important MTCs in chapter 6 we found interest 
rate's significance as a MTC, and our policy analysis in 
chapter 7 indicated the effectiveness of interest rates as 
a policy instrument. We therefore, feel that management of 
interest rate policy merits some comments which would be 
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helpful for future policy formulation. In view of Sri 
Lanka's commitment to open economic policies and liberali- 
sation of the financial system, the freeing of interest 
rates is a necessary concomitant, as would be the removal 
of inconsistencies observed in the interest rate structure. 
We suggest first that the NSB should be allowed to decide 
its own interest rate structure according to market rates 
and its liquidity requirements. To facilitate this the 
subsidy given to the NSB should be gradually removed. 
Second, management of interest rates has to be viewed as a 
practical concept. On the one hand, ensuring positive 
interest rates is important in periods of high inflation 
but it should not be applicable to all situations uncriti- 
cally regardless of the workings of the financial struc- 
ture. On the other hand, by maintaining unrealistically 
high nominal rates Sri Lanka may deny herself the use of a 
potent instrument of policy. A rigid yardstick of high 
positive rates would mean manipulation of rates every time 
price changes occur. - Finally, we stress that preferential 
interest rates and or subsidies should spring from the 
public sector or from foreign sources. This will allow 
interest rates to reflect market forces and equilibrium 
levels. The key principal is that total amount of subsidies 
would need to be limited to the extent of the availability 
of non inflationary funds. This view point is further 
supported by our simulation experiments which indicated 
that net credit to government and gross credit to commer- 
cial banks would enhance reserve money (MB) in the system 
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with adverse consequences on monetary and price stability. 
- As 'far as-the'credit rationing channel is 
concerned, we have found'that CRE is a direct and powerful 
channel in transmitting monetary policy, although its 
impact has been marginal in Sri Lanka due to the relative- 
ly small fraction of credit on which ceilings were imposed 
and because part of CREs are expressed in terms of high 
interest rates. 
_In 
addition, due to the administrative and 
discretionary nature of the implementation of SCCs in 
general and CRE in particular, we recommend that CRE should 
be used only to supplement traditional monetary policy 
instruments and that such measures should not be continued 
for longer_periods because of distorting effects attached 
to them. 
Finally, with respect to the money supply, a more 
comprehensive monetary aggregate would be helpful to ana- 
lyse the impact of money's influence on the macro economy. 
The choice of an appropriate monetary aggregate is also 
essential for monetary targeting. Our research suggests 
that the narrow-money supply is probably a better indicator 
of the inflationary situation than broad money. Neverthe- 
less broad money is a more comprehensive measure since it 
reflects total liquidity in the system. An M3 derived from 
a financial survey would be more comprehensive but is not 
currently available on a regular basis. 
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8.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
Aside from building upon the results established in 
this thesis to construct an explicit monetary control 
framework for the exercise of monetary policy in Sri Lanka, 
our main suggestions refer to ways of improving the empiri- 
cal model. 
-To begin with, some attention might 'be turned 
towards the construction of an expected inflation variable 
to act as a proxy for the return on fixed assets in the 
money demand functions. Our attempts to construct such a 
variable proved to be unsuccessful. It may be the case 
that price expectations are unimportant in the context of 
Sri Lanka over this period, but equally it could be that a 
more rigorous testing procedure is required. 
Secondly, 'there is room for improvement in the 
construction of the equation for'the aggregate price level. ' 
Although-we were-able to improve on the results of the Sri 
Lanka SEACEN study, our estimated equation is 'still very 
simple. Since the price level and inflation'are key fea- 
tures of the monetarist'transmission mechanism, a 'fuller 
specification might be needed; including a more detailed 
testing of supply side effects. ' our own experiments with an 
excess capacity variable (GAP) proved to be unsuccessful. 
Thirdly, to use the model in a more policy oriented 
framework would probably require a more disaggregated 
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treatment of total expenditure, with a separation into 
government and private sector spending. The former might 
then be used as a policy variable. For data reasons, we 
were unable to carry out such a disaggregation in this 
thesis. 
Fourthly, it would be highly desirable in a more 
detailed model to utilise data compiled from a full finan- 
cial survey, containing a comprehensive statement Of impor- 
tant macro aggregates; Within the monetary survey one can 
only assess a part of the total picture. 
Finally, since many of the important conclusions 
from our simulation experiments depend upon the correct 
specification and stability of the important parameters in 
the model, one would wish to expose our prototype model to 
a full econometric evaluation along the lines of Hendry's 
(1985) PC-Give. Then, if-necessary, adjustments could be 
made to ensure greater confidence in the forecasting 
properties of the model. Given the resources available to 
us and the size of the model, we were only able to carry 
out a, partial and often ad hoc-assessment of these equa- 
tions. Nonetheless, we hope that our work will contribute 
both to the understanding of the monetary transmission in 
Sri Lanka and to the construction of an explicit framework 
for a monetary control framework. 
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